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Extant research has investigated the response to moral exemplars primarily from an 
emotion perspective, with a focus on either positive or negative reactions. By contrast, 
the present project, articulated across four studies (N=1,814) in the US and UK, captured 
simultaneously the positive and negative response to others’ moral goodness adopting 
an integrative self-regulation approach that examined how the self negotiates its 
standards and standing vis-à-vis virtuous people and their actions. Participants viewed 
and rated a set of real-life moral scenarios portraying agents performing virtuous actions 
(Study 1), and two suitable vignettes were identified for further investigation. Through 
EFA (Study 2) and CFA (Study 3), a novel instrument to measure the self-regulation of 
virtue was assessed and improved. This moral self-regulation inventory consists of a 
broadening scale measuring the extent that individuals praise the agents, feel uplifted 
and inspired to better themselves (moral self-improvement), and a defensive scale 
measuring the extent that individuals experience resentment and even disparage the 
agents and their actions (moral self-defence). Path modelling (Study 2) and SEM (Study 
3) determined that moral comparisons based on opinion and ability 
(upward/downward) were at the root of these reactions, and motivational dispositions 
(approach/avoidance and promotion/prevention focus) were associated with them; 
prosociality (helping behaviour) was linked with moral self-improvement activated by 
both excellent and lesser good deeds (Study 4). Participants were also clustered in 
independent latent profiles and groups at various stages of the model (motivation, 
comparison, self-regulation), and the associations between the profiles/groups across 
stages reproduced the relational patterns observed through SEM, corroborating 




motivation, and moral emotions within a self-regulation framework, these findings 
advance theory in moral psychology, with practical implications on how to maximise the 
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Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Model 
 
In recent years, the field of moral psychology has experienced revived interest – a 
“multidisciplinary renaissance”, to say it after Haidt and Kesebir (2010, p. 797) – with the 
proliferation of empirical research and theorising, and the rise of a promising cross-
disciplinary convergence of approaches derived from fields such as social psychology, 
sociobiology, cognitive science, moral and experimental philosophy. Much of the output 
has gravitated toward the “dark” side of morality, investigating predominantly violations 
of ethical standards (Cornwell & Higgins, 2015b), that is, immoral (transgressions) rather 
than moral behaviour (good deeds). It could be considered one of the effects of the 
“negativity bias”, according to which humans show a tendency to “give greater weight 
to negative entities” (Rozin & Royzman, 2001, p. 296), hence the “bad” ends up being 
stronger than the “good” (Baumeister et al., 2001). Moreover, moral psychologists and 
philosophers have been considerably devoted to the examination of rare, unrealistic, 
and highly hypothetical moral dilemmas, such as the trolley problems (Bauman et al., 
2014; Kahane, 2015; Kahane et al., 2015), neglecting more common real-life moral 




If psychology as a science was born in the nineteenth century (see e.g., Baumeister 
et al., 2007), for many decades its development focused fundamentally on 
“understanding, treating and preventing psychological disorders” (Peterson & Seligman, 
2004, p. 3), thus perpetuating the negativity bias and addressing less common problems. 
It is only in the 1950s that the landscape started to change, with the advent of 
humanistic psychology first, and of positive psychology at the turn of the century1. These 
movements sought to emphasise the psychology of human growth, virtue, and 
flourishing, bringing about the “bright” side of human life and morality, thus moving 
beyond the study of “repairing damage within a disease model of human functioning” by 
complementing it with an understanding of how “normal people flourish under more 
benign conditions” (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 5). These developments 
brought to the fore concepts such as self-actualisation, that is, individuals’ motives to 
realise their full potential (Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1956), and character strengths, or in 
other words, positive traits whose development makes life worth living (Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The acknowledgment that virtue, positive moral character, and 
moral praise have been largely understudied (Bartels et al., 2015) has led to the call to 
bring them back centre stage (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012), redressing the balance 
between the study of morality and immorality. 
Moral psychology was also characterised by another tendency that Cornwell and 
Higgins (2015b) call the “ought premise”: the assumption that the focus of psychological 
inquiry in morality ought to be the moral imperative of the fulfilment of duties and 
obligations. This ethical orientation was inherited from centuries of philosophical 
speculation, which cemented in Kant’s deontology, and in Bentham’s and Mill’s 
 
1 For the interested reader, a discussion on the thematic convergence as well as the supposed 




utilitarianism; it still profoundly permeates moral thinking in our present society. 
However, again in the 1950s, the publication of Anscombe’s provocative article “Modern 
Moral Philosophy” (1958) challenged the moralistic fallacy and legalistic assumption that 
– in the absence of a lawgiver, such as God – morality can be reduced to a set of rules. 
Anscombe essentially claimed that a rigorous approach to ethics should necessarily 
include the notion of virtue, independent of obligation, as part of human flourishing 
(Crisp & Slote, 1997). Anscombe’s arguments were echoed by the publication of 
MacIntyre’s (1981) “After Virtue” a couple of decades later. 
The present research attempts to address these issues and integrate perspectives, 
setting out to study virtue and positive moral behaviour (good deeds) performed by real 
people. Some of these deeds are more ordinary moral actions, while others are 
uncommon and remarkable; together, they contribute to making the present 
investigation useful to a deeper understanding of the response to real-life moral 
behaviour. As will become apparent, the study of virtue does not provide a partial, 
overly optimistic perspective on morality, but also opens a window into less obvious 
maladaptive responses that are deserving of careful consideration. 
A Historical Account of Virtue and Moral Beauty 
Following the Aristotelian tradition, the term virtue refers to positive “states of 
character” (von Wright, 1963) or positive “traits of character” (Adams, 2006)2. Virtues 
manifest themselves through specific character strengths, which can be viewed as the 
“distinguishable routes” to displaying virtues, or the “psychological ingredients – 
 
2 The distinction between “states” and “traits” of character hinges on respectively the more transient or 
permanent nature of these moral attributes, and mirrors other non-moral personal attributes (for 
definitions, see e.g., Baumert et al., 2017). The debate on whether rather stable character traits do or do 
not exist was as vigorous in moral psychology and philosophy as it had been a few years earlier for 
personality traits in personality and social psychology. For an account of the two opposing perspectives, 
respectively for and against the existence of traits, see e.g., Jayawickreme et al. (2014) and Harman (2000); 




processes or mechanisms – that define the virtues” (Peterson & Seligman, 2004, p. 13). 
Character strengths “contribute to fulfilments that comprise the good life, for oneself 
and for others” and are “morally valued trait-like personality characteristics” (Ruch et 
al., 2019, p. 1). They differ from positive aspects of temperament and personality in that 
they indicate specific moral attributes. Over time, departing from the Aristotelian 
tradition, they have also come to differ from other non-moral excellences, for instance, 
intellectual capabilities such as intelligence (Dent, 1984), but also sensory-motor or 
artistic skills such as athleticism and creativity (for a slightly different perspective on 
artistic and aesthetic values, see Adams, 2006). Echoing a definition of personality traits, 
Cohen and Morse (2014) conceptualise moral character as “an individual’s disposition to 
think, feel, and behave in an ethical versus unethical manner, or as the subset of 
individual differences relevant to morality” (p. 45). 
The perimeter of what can be considered within or outside the moral domain has 
been – and still is – the subject of long-standing controversies. For a long time, 
philosophers understood morality as a code of conduct (norms and duties) endorsed by 
individuals and groups (Luco, 2014). However, Rawls (1975) found a conception of 
morality as a set of duties to be too restrictive and extended its perimeter to include not 
only the realm of the right (duty), but also of the good (virtue) and worth (utility), 
cardinal concepts that he considered capable of identifying the key axes through which a 
wide variety of moral properties could be analysed. In moral psychology, some 
researchers described morality as a “collection of biological and cultural solutions to the 
problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life”3 (Curry et al., 2019, p. 106; 
 
3 For a collection of definitions of morality centred around cooperation, see Curry and colleagues (2019), 
who cite Haidt and Kesebir (2010), Rai and Fiske (2011), Tomasello and Vaish (2013), Greene (2015), and 
Sterelny and Fraser (2016). Although much of morality involves cooperation and the restraint of selfishness, 




emphasis added). Other psychologists retained a similar monistic approach, but instead 
of focusing on cooperation, tried to condense the essence of morality in care/harm 
(Gray et al., 2012), in yet another reductionist attempt to distil the core of the concept 
in one single element. By contrast, other theorists proposed a pluralistic view, 
identifying multiple moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011) that represent the basic 
template at the root of moral judgment: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, 
authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation, and the recently added liberty/oppression 
(more could be discovered, according to the authors). 
Whichever definition is considered more appropriate, recent research has revealed 
that moral character has a fundamental importance in attributions of person perception 
and evaluation (Goodwin et al., 2014). These attributions share a few critical 
characteristics. A prominent one is the fact that they are based on the detection in the 
performer of a good deed of ideal motives, that is, pure motivations to pursue what is 
fine and noble, either for its own sake (Darwall, 2003) or for the altruistic desire to 
improve their lives, with no consideration for personal recognition and public praise. 
Indeed, concern for others has been identified as one of the central ideal motives that 
pervade positive moral character traits; this means that virtue entails high consideration 
of what others need and want, and how one’s behaviour affects others’ needs and 
wants, as claimed by Cohen and Morse (2014). Attributions of moral character based on 
others’ perceived intentions are ubiquitous and pervasive (Cushman, 2015; Reeder, 
2009; Uhlmann et al., 2014), and occur spontaneously, not just when experimental 
measures draw attention to them (Critcher et al., 2020). Because others’ intentions are 
not directly observable, to make these attributions people rely on inferences based on 
 





contextual factors that are filtered through the lens of their ingrained dispositions, 
which account for what is available (stored in memory), applicable (fitting), accessible 
(ready to be activated), and salient (subject to selective attention) to them from the 
surrounding environment (Higgins, 1996). 
A second prominent feature of moral character traits is the fact that they manifest 
abilities (Cohen & Morse, 2014); according to Aristotle, character strengths – like other 
abilities – are acquired through practice (London, 2001). Individuals can develop stable 
dispositions to act for the good if they consistently exercise them through noble actions. 
For example, it is only by learning how to temper fear that individuals become capable 
to dominate it and act courageously. Additionally, it could be argued that virtues could 
also be learned by observation of others (Bandura, 1986): as people witness others 
perform praiseworthy actions that reveal their noble intentions toward others, they 
apprehend what good character looks like. Consequently, they might desire to emulate 
them (see e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009) and eventually develop those character traits. 
A further distinctive aspect is the fact that when consideration of others’ needs 
becomes ingrained in one’s motives and consistently manifests itself in real-life 
behaviour, virtues tend to become integrated within that person’s identity (Cohen & 
Morse, 2014): when that happens, the person’s self-concept prominently features moral 
values and concerns. Aquino and Reed’s (2002) notion of “moral identity internalisation” 
represents the extent to which those moral values are central to the individual’s self-
concept. 
In a nutshell, virtues are positive character traits which reveal other-orientated 
motives that are central to the person’s sense of self and are developed by consistently 
performing good deeds. Anscombe (1958) insisted on conceptually distinguishing 




character of the person, whereas the latter refer to specific requirements of moral 
behaviour. In this sense, she emphasised that ethical systems essentially based on moral 
conduct (a set of behavioural duties and prohibitions) are insufficient and must be 
complemented by an understanding of character strengths that are conducive to virtue. 
The centrality of virtue has been acknowledged by philosophers all around the 
world. In ancient China, the concept of de or mei de (i.e., “inner character” or “virtue”) is 
found in the Daodejing, attributed to Lao-Tzu (for an account of virtue in Daoism, see 
Cline, 2004) and later substantiated in the “Five Constants” (wu ch’ang), Confucius’s five 
essential virtues of benevolence, justice, propriety, wisdom, and integrity (Runes, 1983). 
In India, the concept of kama muta (i.e., “being moved by love” in Sanskrit) has been 
used for centuries to designate the experience of being touched and inspired by moral 
beauty in situations of intense communal relationships; recent research has shown that 
the elicitation of kama muta through acts of virtue increases interpersonal closeness and 
sharing of communal values that extend beyond in-groups, leading to a heightened 
humanisation of out-groups (Blomster Lyshol et al., 2020). In the Buddhist traditions, the 
ten paramitas (i.e., “perfections” in Pali) of generosity, discipline, renunciation, wisdom, 
persistence, patience, honesty, determination, loving-kindness, and equanimity (Van 
Horn, 2017) have been at the centre of moral teaching for centuries. In ancient Greece, 
the concept of areté broadly corresponds to “excellence” (and specifically “virtue” in the 
moral domain) and represents the acme of Aristotle’s ethics (London, 2001). The 
Aristotelian tradition was later adopted and reorganised by Thomas Aquinas to serve the 
theological purposes of Medieval Christianity and culminated in the doctrine of the four 
cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude) and the three theological 
virtues (faith, hope, and charity) (O’Meara, 1997). As the Middle Ages drew to a close 




justifications, the idea of virtue slowly faded away to make room for the rule of reason, 
which culminated in the concept of “universal reason” brought about by the 
philosophers of the age of enlightenment. In ethics though, the move from premises 
about human virtue to conclusions about the rational authority of moral rules implied a 
move from is to ought; this is often referred to as “Hume’s guillotine”, the impossibility 
to derive values and norms from facts (see e.g., Saariluoma, 2020), which involves the 
blurring of the boundaries (and subsequent contamination) between descriptions of 
“nature” (is) and prescriptions of “duty” (ought)4; and this very move reveals the above-
mentioned moralistic fallacy that Anscombe (1958) critiqued. 
Virtue is highly prominent in the work of novelists and poets across cultures. 
Children’s narratives – from “Pinocchio” and “The Little Mermaid” through to the 
“Chronicles of Narnia” – vividly depict heroes and villains in their quest of virtue and 
goodness as opposed to power and fame (for an account of children’s literature on 
virtue, see Bennett, 2010). Similarly, adult fiction and poetry have exemplified moral 
character through the traits and values embodied by the protagonists of the stories told 
by renowned authors such as Homer and Aesop, Dante and Shakespeare, Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky, Mann and Hesse, and many others. 
Beyond aesthetic appreciation, arguments about the social and moral effects of 
literature date back to the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle (Cain, 2005; 
Mendelson-Maoz, 2007), and continue until the Middle Ages, but then stalled for 
several centuries. The debate was reignited in the last fifty years by the work of 
philosophers such as Palmer, Eldridge, and Nussbaum (see Cates, 1998). Recently, 
psychologists have also contributed theorising and research on the reader’s response to 
 




fiction and poetry. First, the psychological literature shows a robust effect of fiction 
reading on social cognition, that is, the ability to perceive, interpret, and respond to 
social information (Fiske & Taylor, 2013): a recent meta-analysis found a significant 
positive (albeit small) impact in terms of empathy, theory of mind, and prosociality 
(Dodell-Feder & Tamir, 2018), explained by the phenomenon of “narrative 
transportation”, according to which readers mentally enter the world that a story 
evokes (Van Laer et al., 2014). This phenomenon has also moral implications: Zbikowski 
and Collins (1994) hinted at viewing literature as the “laboratory of moral life building” 
and a few years later, Hakemulder (2000) borrowed the same idea, describing literature 
as a “moral laboratory” and providing a theoretical/empirical framework of the manifold 
effects of reading literature, including those in the moral domain. In this respect, 
Koopman and Hakemulder (2015) as well as Carr (2005) emphasised the role of the 
interplay between the cognitive sphere (understanding of values and moral knowledge) 
and the affective sphere (intuitive motive apprehension and empathy development). 
Both spheres are at the root of the processes of identification with literary characters 
described by Oatley (1994) through the Aristotelian concept of “mimesis”, often 
translated as imitation, but more precisely corresponding to the notion of simulation. 
Empirical research on children’s moral education was also carried out by Hickman (1981) 
and Hart et al. (2019), who provided further evidence of the role of literature as an 
important contributor to moral character building5. 
 
5 A very different school of thought moved the focus from the reader’s response to the literary text to its 
meaning, emphasising the role of language as a mere set of signs to be deciphered rather than a force acting 
on the world (see Tompkins, 1980). This formalist view, which flourished at the start of the twentieth 
century, denied any educational effect of literature, purported the exclusion of any external interests (ethics 
included) in the process of reading and evaluation of the literary text (Mendelson-Maoz, 2007), and hotly 




In sum, philosophers and psychologists are now converging in the rediscovery of 
virtue and positive moral exemplars as vehicles to elevate the human conscience and 
guide it towards “the good life” (Higgins et al., 2014). 
Overarching Goal of the Research 
If virtue can have the remarkable effect of leading toward the good life, what 
contribution can moral psychology make at present through the study of moral 
goodness? Nowadays, mass media and social media often report narratives of good 
deeds performed by unknown heroes and celebrities alike6. Also, contemporary authors 
write ever new stories of courage and generosity, justice and compassion that continue 
to inspire readers all over the world thanks to their ability to strike a chord, elicit awe, 
win their hearts over, and ultimately motivate them to desire to perform similar actions 
to the benefit of others. They show that not only real, but also fictitious stories of moral 
beauty can infuse positivity and produce benefits beyond the direct advantage 
experienced by the recipients of the good deeds. 
At the beginning of the new millennium, Haidt and his research team started a 
psychological inquiry into the positive emotion that follows “witnessing acts of human 
moral beauty or virtue” (Haidt, 2000, p. 1). Interestingly, in one of these studies (Algoe & 
Haidt, 2009) the authors recorded an occurrence of 18% of cases whereby participants 
reported having primarily negative feelings (or did not follow the instructions) in 
response to acts of goodness; as these instances were extraneous to the main research 
question, those participants were excluded from the analysis. Instead of examining both 
sides of the coin of the moral response to good deeds (positive and negative reactions), 
Algoe and Haidt’s approach deliberately ignored one side and focused exclusively on the 
 




other. The present research, by contrast, set out to look at both sides of the coin, 
investigating why some people experience positive reactions when exposed to good 
deeds and others deviate from this prediction. Indeed, this two-sided account of 
morality is necessary because people make widely different judgments about the same 
moral act. For instance, some people consider sacrificing one’s life to save a stranger an 
ultimate act of unselfishness, while others argue that it imposes an unnecessary life-long 
cost on family members, whose kinship needs ought to be prioritised; some people 
consider organ donation a supreme act of generosity, while others view it as a violation 
of religious beliefs. The present research attempted to shed light simultaneously on the 
two sides of the reactions to virtue: the more positive side of moral praise in association 
with uplifting feelings of moral admiration, and the less positive side of moral 
condemnation in association with denial and resented feelings of discomfort. 
A notable literature on the positive and negative reactions to acts of virtue has 
been published in moral psychology during the last couple of decades, for instance the 
frameworks of “moral elevation” and “do-gooder derogation” that will be discussed in 
more detail in the following sections. However, these still appear to be independent, 
self-contained endeavours; one of the key theoretical contributions of the present 
research is their conceptual and empirical integration under the overarching theme of 
the self-regulation of virtue. If virtue can be double-edged and can potentially generate 
a wider spectrum of cognitions, motivations, affects, and behaviours, primarily positive, 
but also negative, then it is important to explore and understand their underpinnings 
and explicate the underlying psychological processes. By doing so, the investigation 
could hint a range of strategies to maximise the positive effects and minimise the 
potential negative impact of the response to virtue. 




The objective of the present research programme is to investigate reactions to 
descriptions of virtuous acts by moral exemplars. A set of moral stimuli in the form of 
vignettes depicting good deeds was developed and presented to participants in a series 
of studies to record their reactions on various scales, along with relevant individual 
difference measures. The research adopted a framework wherein virtuous moral agents 
performed morally motivated good deeds (the moral actions) in favour of third parties 
(the beneficiaries). Research participants were considered in the position of external 
observers, as if they were witnesses of the deeds7. The beneficiaries were other 
individuals (human or not, but never the participant) or collective entities (a group, an 
organisation, a nation, humankind). The phenomena analysed in the research were 
framed and interpreted within four fundamental theoretical domains: 
1. motivation and personality theories (see e.g., DeYoung, 2015; Elliot & Thrash, 
2002; Higgins, 1997); 
2. social comparison theory (see e.g., Festinger, 1954); 
3. self-regulation theory (see e.g., Forgas et al., 2009); 
4. social cognitive theory (see e.g., Bandura, 1991). 
The response to the good deeds depicted in the vignettes was measured in terms of 
moral comparative and self-regulatory processes, capturing the mechanisms through 
which people managed their self-views in the face of the agents’ virtuous actions and 
their own moral standards. Indeed, self-regulatory mechanisms were found to be 
dependent on the moral comparisons underlying the judgments that people make about 
the moral agents/acts in relation to their moral self as well as ethical norms and beliefs. 
 
7 In the present research, the real-life stories depicted in the vignettes presented to the participants sought 
to create an experimental environment that simulated (in a broad sense) their “witnessing” of the deeds; 




At the same time, certain dispositional traits were also found to be associated with 
specific patterns of moral comparison and self-regulation. Lastly, proximate behavioural 
outcomes were measured to analyse their relationship with moral self-regulation and 
compare the level of prosocial behaviour elicited by different degrees of positive moral 
deeds and self-regulation. All these processes and their theoretical frameworks are 
sketched out in Figure I and will be described in greater detail in the following chapters. 
 
Figure I:  





Moral Elevation Through the Lens of the “Broaden-and-Build” Theory 
In moral psychology, the study of the positive emotions experienced by people who 
witness displays of virtue took a considerable step forward when Haidt (2003) 
rediscovered what Thomas Jefferson wrote back in 1771 to a friend who was asking for 
his recommendation on the best books for his library: 
[E]very thing is useful which contributes to fix us in the principles and 




instance, is presented either to our sight or imagination, we are deeply 
impressed with its beauty and feel a strong desire in ourselves of doing 
charitable and grateful acts also. (p. 350) 
Haidt named the emotion described by Jefferson moral elevation and initiated a 
line of research which defined it, distinguished it from other positive emotions (e.g., joy, 
but especially gratitude, awe, admiration), and delineated its main antecedents and 
consequences. Thanks to that research, we now know that elevation is elicited by acts of 
virtue or moral beauty, induces a warm feeling in the chest (sometimes even moves to 
tears), and motivates to aspire to do something good for others (Haidt, 2000). Further 
research also found a direct link between elevation and actual prosocial behaviour, 
beyond the mere intention (Schnall et al., 2010; Schnall & Roper, 2012). 
The findings on the moral emotion of elevation seem to harmonise with 
Fredrickson’s (2001) “broaden-and-build” theory of positive emotions. This theory posits 
that positive emotions, such as joy, interest, pride, and so forth, in the short term 
“broaden” individuals’ thought-action repertoires and in the long term “build” their 
physical, intellectual, and social resources. This is different from the mechanism of 
negative emotions, which – according to Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) – typically do 
not develop enduring capabilities for the future, but narrow down individuals’ thought-
action repertoire, so that individuals can act quickly when required by the 
circumstances, for example averting an imminent threat. 
The example of the positive emotion of joy can be revealing: regarding the first 
function, joy broadens by creating the urge to play, push the limits, and be creative, 
while in terms of the second function, the joy experienced during play builds by making 
individuals share amusement and develop lasting bonds for their future lives 




build model, in that it opens people’s sensitivity to the needs of others (broaden) and 
makes them cultivate social skills and relationships that will help them in the long run 
(build). 
Resentment and “Do-Gooder” Derogation 
A separate line of research has more recently examined what appears to be an 
opposite phenomenon to moral elevation: the resentment experienced toward a moral 
agent who performs a good deed and the manifestation of “do-gooder” derogation or 
even “antisocial punishment”. The term “do-gooder” has been defined as “individuals or 
groups who deviate from the majority on moral grounds, offering morality as the 
justification for their nonnormative behavior” (Minson & Monin, 2012, p. 206). The term 
“antisocial punishment” has been used to refer to the sanctioning, under certain 
circumstances, of highly cooperative people (Pleasant & Barclay, 2018). The premise of 
this kind of psychological inquiry is founded on evidence that being moral is not always 
well received by others. Research has identified specific circumstances that help explain 
this counterintuitive phenomenon. One of these is the fact that the disparagement of 
moral agents often occurs when people perceive that others’ virtuous behaviour 
endangers the positivity of their self-image (Monin et al., 2008) or their reputation, 
particularly in competitive contexts (Pleasant & Barclay, 2018). In other cases, the 
unfavourable evaluation of the good deeds and their protagonists is due to the 
perception of deviations from typical behaviour, that is, the social norm (Herrmann et 
al., 2008; Kawamura & Kusumi, 2020). 
Do-gooder derogation and antisocial punishment have been studied not only 
among adults, but also children (see e.g., Tasimi et al., 2015), and in several life domains 
and contexts. Well-known cases are the denigration of moral advocates who publicly 




sexual discrimination (Bashir et al., 2013; Hornsey, 2005); in organisational contexts, 
people are sometimes vilified for “working too hard” (Pleasant & Barclay, 2018); scorn 
often accompanies moral vegans and vegetarians (Minson & Monin, 2012). However, 
there may be a difference between the derogation of a minority of moral “activists” and 
“rebels” (Monin et al., 2008) or vegans and vegetarians (MacInnis & Hodson, 2017) who 
deviate from normative or usual behaviour and the disparagement of virtuous people 
who save a life or help someone in need. Does the phenomenon of moral detraction 
extend to all kinds of good deeds or is it confined to non-normative goodness? Is it 
dependent on personal inclinations or beliefs of the witnesses? 
The bittersweet contradictory co-existence of elevation/praise and 
resentment/derogation of virtuous exemplars is a puzzling paradox of morality. 
Centuries of philosophical reflection and countless inspiring narratives provide an 
account of the adaptiveness and social utility of virtue. Yet, the phenomenon of do-
gooder derogation brings to the surface a parallel reality of denigration and ridicule that 
is far from being socially desirable. So, all in all, is moral goodness double-edged? 
The Mechanisms of the Moral Response to Virtue 
Analysis of the literature suggests that the answer might come from the analysis of two 
psychological mechanisms that appear to be related to the response to other people’s 
virtue: moral comparisons and moral self-regulation. 
Moral Comparisons 
The social reality in which humans are immersed creates multiple opportunities for 
acknowledging similarities and differences between individuals. People care deeply 
about who they are and are motivated to seek information from the environment to 
evaluate themselves, acquiring knowledge about their relative strengths and 




identified in several species, and has been claimed to be phylogenetically old, 
biologically powerful, and important for adaptation and survival (Buunk & Mussweiler, 
2001). When they evaluate themselves, people do it with reference to certain standards: 
these can be internal, for instance individuals’ own goals or values, but often they are 
also anchored to external entities, such as social norms or other people. When people 
think about information concerning other individuals in relation to the self, whether 
carefully and consciously or not, they engage in social comparison processes (Wood, 
1996). More broadly, these comparative processes comprise “acquiring, thinking about, 
and reacting to social information” (Wood, 1996, p. 521). 
The phenomenon of social comparison was first described by Festinger (1954), who 
specified that people make comparisons with others in terms of opinions and abilities, 
reflecting questions such as, respectively, “how correct is my opinion?” and “how smart 
or skilled am I?” (see Gerber, 2018). When applied to the moral domain, the former are 
comparisons focused on the “rightfulness” of the act (how right or appropriate 
something is), whereas the latter are comparisons focused on the “skills” of the person 
(how capable someone is). 
Kelley (1971) echoed this distinction when he proposed that people perform 
evaluations through a “reality system”, which distinguishes correct from incorrect, and 
an “achievement system”, which distinguishes success from failure. In the moral 
domain, the reality system deals with evaluations of right or wrong, referred to 
behaviours that are deemed to be appropriate or inappropriate based on certain moral 
standards; the achievement system deals with evaluations of good or bad, referred to 
virtuous achievements or temptation failures experienced by people. In support to the 




system is undoubtedly of the domain of opinions, while the achievement system is of 
the domain of abilities” (Monin, 2007, p. 55). 
Moral comparisons based on opinion and ability represent the sort of information 
that individuals seek to constantly refine moral self-evaluations that help them establish 
who they are relative to others, assess how close they are to what they want to be, and 
how to behave to do so. They are extremely pervasive and occur at an explicit but also 
an implicit level, spontaneously and effortlessly (Alicke et al., 2012; Dunning, 2000; 
Wood, 1996). Based on Monin’s (2007) above-cited claim, when people witness a good 
deed performed by a moral agent in favour of a third party, it is plausible to anticipate 
that opinion-based and ability-based comparison processes will be elicited. 
Research on social comparison initially focused on the choice of comparison targets 
(Gerber, 2018) through the so-called “rank-order paradigm”: participants perform a test 
and are subsequently given a bogus score (e.g., 410) and rank (e.g., fourth out of seven). 
At that point, they are asked to select the rank of a participant whose score they wish to 
view; rank choices from first to third are indicative of upward comparisons (target better 
than self), rank choices from fifth to seventh imply downward comparisons (self better 
than target), and rank choice fourth denotes lateral comparison (target and self at 
parity). 
Two studies published in a supplement of the Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology in 1966 that used this paradigm are now considered the first classic social 
comparison experiments (Wheeler, 1991): the first was informative of upward 
comparison driven by pressures toward uniformity (Wheeler, 1966) and the second 
provided evidence of downward comparison driven by experimentally induced self-




Importantly for the present research, about a decade later Brickman and Bulman 
(1977) argued that upward comparisons are encouraged by adaptive forces to use social 
information for the purpose of self-growth, while downward comparisons are preferred 
when hedonic motives are prevalent, especially in the presence of insecurity, shame, or 
guilt. At the same time, Berger (1977) added that comparisons with similar others offer 
performance models that represent the best available standards to judge one’s abilities, 
hence providing inspiration for imitative processes. Taken together, these findings 
contribute insights that can help identify mechanisms potentially at play when people 
witness others’ good actions. 
First, it is plausible to assume that witnesses of good deeds could make quick 
judgments on whether the action performed by the moral agent is appropriate; this 
evaluation is anchored to certain moral standards held by the witnesses, results in an 
appraisal of goodness and propriety versus those standards, and implies opinion-based 
comparisons. The standards that are part of the comparison may have different degrees 
of perceived objectivity and social acceptability (Goodwin & Darley, 2012), such that – as 
mentioned earlier – different people could evaluate what appears to be a good deed 
along a wide spectrum of degrees of positivity. 
Additionally, it is plausible to assume that witnesses of good deeds could also draw 
moral inferences, using perceptions of circumstantial evidence and person cues to make 
trait attributions (Reeder, 2009) and establish how morally virtuous the moral agent is 
compared to themselves, implying ability-based comparisons. Witnesses could explicitly 
or implicitly wonder whether they would have the same strength of moral character as 
the moral agents; they could ask themselves whether they would be morally so good as 




comparative processes could result in upward, downward, or lateral moral comparisons 
(Wills, 1991). 
In summary, judgments about the deeds (goodness and propriety) bear upon 
opinion-based comparisons, reflecting questions such as “do we share the same moral 
views?” or “do we agree that it is a good deed?”; judgments about the persons (moral 
agent and self) are related to ability-based comparisons, implying questions such as “am 
I as morally capable as you to perform that action?”. Because the focus of the present 
research is on the processes through which people manage their self-views when 
witnessing others’ virtuous actions, both action and person judgments are relevant and 
represent ways to indirectly capture opinion- and ability-based comparisons referred to 
the reality and the achievement systems mentioned above. Managing the self-concept 
following the outcome of these kinds of comparisons constitutes one of the facets of the 
psychological processes that social psychologists call self-regulation. 
Moral Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation has to do with all the adaptive transformations that the self 
performs to conform to some standard in its ongoing relationship with the environment 
(Forgas et al., 2009). This standard broadly refers to “concepts of how something ideally 
should be” (Baumeister, 2007, p. 843) and can comprise aspirations, ideals, rules, or 
norms that individuals hold at an explicit or implicit level. Self-regulation is, therefore, 
the ongoing iterative psychological function of the self that underpins contextualised 
goal-directed behaviour, encompassing a blend of cognitive, affective, and conative 
components that play out in the social arena. 
As a function of the self, some self-regulation theories regard the self as a decision 
maker, a doer, an agent that governs and models people’s behaviour (Leary & Tangney, 




psychologists have described its many facets, converging on the idea that it represents a 
central autonomous organising construct in the social and behavioural sciences 
(Dunning, 2007; Leary & Tangney, 2012), but still wrangle about the details of its 
definitional content and perimeter. For that reason, in 2004 Leary wrote an editorial to 
the journal Self and Identity, pleading clarity around the concept and its use. 
In the present research, the word “self” is used with multiple connotations, as a 
stand-alone term as well as a prefix to other defining notions, such as concept, esteem, 
regulation, improvement, defence, enhancement, protection, and others. Depending on 
the context, it can be viewed as: a) a set of core beliefs about oneself (self-as-known), b) 
an experiencing subject (self-as-knower), c) an executive agent regulating individuals’ 
psychological functioning (see Leary & Tangney, 2012)8. The concept of self-regulation, 
around which this research project revolves, certainly involves the governing function, 
but also implies the contents regulated by the function and the subject who regulates 
those functions, proving the intricate interdependencies that are at the roots of the 
long-standing controversies about the meaning of the term “self”. 
Based on the above-mentioned definition, self-regulation can be viewed within a 
cybernetic framework. A cybernetic system is a dynamic apparatus with control 
mechanisms based on feedback loops: in a discrepancy-reducing loop, an input is 
compared to a standard and adjustments are made to shift it to a state that is closer to 
the standard, whereas in a discrepancy-enlarging loop, an input is shifted to a state that 
is farther away from the standard or at least not closer to it (Carver & Scheier, 2002). 
In this perspective, self-regulation constitutes a much broader psychological 
function compared to the narrower conception to which some social psychologists have 
 





confined it. It encompasses more than the mere deliberative effortful processes of self-
control, willpower, and other executive functions (Carver & Scheier, 2016; Forgas et al., 
2009); rather, it also includes other dynamic processes that occur automatically, partly 
inaccessible to conscious control (Forgas et al., 2009; Papies & Aarts, 2016), through the 
workings of implicit goals that lie at various levels of the individual’s goal hierarchy 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah & Kruglanski, 2000). 
Moral self-regulation refers to the complex set of cognitive, affective, and conative 
interactive patterns related to the moral domain. Moral judgment and moral behaviour 
are inextricably related to self-regulatory processes. According to Pyszczynski and 
colleagues (2012), the two most fundamental self-regulatory functions are those that 
evolved for the preservation and the expansion of the self, because they enable it to 
defend against threats and improve its capabilities. One of the greatest challenges that 
the self must face is how to harmonise motives to remain open to new experiential 
input while at the same time minimising the impact of information that could destabilise 
cherished self-views (Alicke et al., 2012). 
The broadening and shielding functions of the self operate simultaneously in 
multiple life domains, including morality. The monitoring subsystem of the self-
regulation function constantly scans the environment in search of “cues that signal 
advantageous or disadvantageous circumstances” (Leary & Guadagno, 2013, p. 340). 
When individuals witness an act of moral goodness, this search for person and situation 
cues is in action and forms the grounds, as mentioned earlier, for appraisals that 
subsume moral comparisons. The outcome of these comparisons can be construed in 
two different ways: opportunities or threats (Lockwood & Matthews, 2007). 
If they are construed as opportunities, the witnesses of the good deeds view the 




comparison as an incentive to become better persons, and set aspirational goals to 
develop and expand the self (see e.g., Buunk & Ybema, 2003); this broadening, 
advancing regulatory strategy is defined here moral self-improvement9 (see Kurman, 
2006; Sedikides & Hepper, 2009; Taylor et al., 1995). It can be considered a particular 
instantiation of a broader category of self-growth concepts that became popular in 
psychology with Maslow (1954), whose notion of “self-actualisation” represents its 
culmination. Self-growth has been also studied in the context of academic learning 
(Meece et al., 2006), career development (Bartley & Robitschek, 2000), and 
achievement goals (Elliot & Thrash, 2002). Only more recently it has been investigated in 
the context of morality and human flourishing, particularly in research on personal 
narratives, generative goals, the redemptive self, and eudaimonia (see e.g., Bauer & 
McAdams, 2010; Bauer et al., 2015; McAdams, 2008). 
The outcome of moral comparisons can also result in the perception of threats if 
the witnesses of the good deeds perceive them to be aversive to the integrity of the self, 
for instance if they push self-views below the tolerance level (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). 
People are motivated to protect the positivity and stability of their self; that is, they seek 
to maintain a phenomenal experience of the self that is adequate, capable, strong, 
unitary, and coherent (Steele, 1988). Any perceived threat to the self, especially in a 
domain that is important to the individual, could potentially elicit conscious or non-
conscious responses aimed at defusing them and re-establish perceptions of self-worth. 
Individuals can reach a new state of equilibrium by modelling aspects of the self-concept 
through various alternative defensive mechanisms, among which two have become 
prominent in the social psychology literature: 
 
9 In this thesis, moral self-improvement and self-improvement will be used interchangeably, but will always 




 maximising positive self-views by “distorting” the contents of the comparison, 
manipulating them so that the outcome is favourable to the self (Wood & Taylor, 
1991), uplifting their positive traits and abilities beyond what objective facts would 
warrant (Sedikides & Alicke, 2012), for example convincing themselves that in many 
ways they have done greater deeds in other aspects of their lives; 
 minimising negative self-views by shielding themselves from unmanageable self-
criticism, for example convincing themselves that, after all, the deed was not so 
praiseworthy or that the agents had egotistic ulterior motives undeserving of any 
merit (Reeder et al., 2005). 
These two defensive self-regulatory strategies are generally referred to respectively 
as self-enhancement and self-protection (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). In the moral domain, 
by exaggerating their moral traits and achievements (moral self-enhancement), 
individuals psychologically level or even exceed the moral stature of the virtuous agent, 
re-establishing a desirable degree of positivity of the self; by trivialising the value of the 
moral act or downgrading the virtuousness of the moral agent (moral self-protection), 
they indirectly attenuate negative self-views, restoring a tolerable level of self-worth. 
These are both guarding, defensive strategies of the self that overall form what hereon 
will be referred to as moral self-defence10. 
It must be noted that these defensive mechanisms are distinct from accurate, 
objective self-assessment (Gregg & Sedikides, 2018), in that they involve manipulation 
of the information so that the outcome becomes favourable to the self (Wood & Taylor, 
1991). Therefore, they represent essentially self-serving deceiving processes. The idea 
that the human mind can deceive itself dates back to the third century B.C.E. and is 
 
10 Moral self-enhancement and self-enhancement, moral self-protection and self-protection, moral self-




attributed to the Greek orator Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.E.), but it was Sigmund Freud 
who introduced it in the field of psychology (Cramer, 1998). In his early publications 
(Freud, 1894, 1896), defence mechanisms were defined as psychological strategies 
utilised by individuals, often non-consciously, to ward off sources of psychological threat 
and protect them from unpleasant or unacceptable thoughts (e.g., harm, death, 
inadequacy, inferiority) or feelings (e.g., anxiety, guilt, fear). By resorting to them, 
individuals would maintain or restore psychological equilibrium and preserve positive 
self-regard. Anna Freud (1937), his daughter, undertook a systematic categorisation and 
integration of the defence mechanisms in a unified coherent framework. 
Despite originating in Sigmund Freud’s work, defence mechanisms do not belong 
only to the realm of psychopathology, but broadly affect normal psychological 
functioning (Cramer, 1998). Their explanation in contemporary social psychology does 
not refer to any specific psychoanalytic content (sexual or aggressive impulses) or 
mechanism (conflicts between Ego, Superego, and Id), but still retains much of the 
framework based on the shunting of distressful psychological contents (Paulhus et al., 
1997). Furthermore, there is no need today to anchor defence mechanisms deep into 
the unconscious; indeed, there is growing acceptance of the idea that they are pre-
conscious processes, “available to discovery, but not persistently within awareness” 
(Paulhus et al., 1997, p. 551). 
The two defensive strategies considered in the present research (self-enhancement 
and self-protection), along with the broadening strategy of self-improvement, are not 
the only possible self-regulatory processes elicited by witnessing others’ good deeds. 
People might also engage in moral “self-assessment” and “self-verification”, respectively 
seeking accuracy in the evaluation of their moral stature, or consistency with long-




(Gregg & Sedikides, 2018) and self-verification (Swann & Read, 1981) theories have been 
proposed to explain some of the phenomena related to how the self negotiates the 
social reality. For example, individuals with low self-regard might be motivated to self-
verify instead of self-defending when confronted with a virtuous moral agent, preferring 
to stick to existing negative beliefs about themselves rather than trying to enhance them 
in order to avoid feeling bad about themselves; although not specific to the moral 
domain, research on depressed individuals has lent credit to this mechanism (Giesler et 
al., 1996). However, consistent with Pyszczynski and colleagues’ (2012) claim about the 
more fundamental nature of expansion and preservation motives, self-improvement and 
self-defence were deemed to be an appropriate starting point for the present research, 
without implying that other mechanisms should be ruled out. 
Moral comparisons, and in general all social comparisons, are in the service of 
broader regulatory processes (Wood, 1996). When people “look up” in a moral 
comparison (upward comparison), evaluating themselves as morally inferior to a moral 
agent, they could potentially either self-improve or self-enhance/self-protect, depending 
on whether they see the moral agent/action as an ideal exemplar to learn from and 
imitate (opportunity) or a competitor who exposes the limitations of the moral self and 
therefore represents a menace to deal with (threat). The rationale for the association 
between upward comparison and self-improvement comes from studies that identified 
two inter-related motives: the desire to get better by learning from others who are 
more skilled (Berger, 1977) and the inspiration to emulate aspirational exemplars 
(Brickman & Bulman, 1977; see also research and theorising on observational learning, 
e.g. Bandura, 1986). Both motives appear to be fostered in cooperative interactions. 
However, in competitive contexts, the literature suggests that upward comparison 




When people “look down” in a moral comparison (downward comparison), 
evaluating themselves as morally superior to a moral agent, in theory, they could either 
self-improve or self-enhance/self-protect, depending on perceptions of opportunity or 
threat to the self. Evidence of the link between downward comparison and self-defence 
was offered by Brickman and Bulman’s (1977) studies mentioned earlier; in principle, 
downward comparison could also be associated with self-improvement, although 
empirical evidence is scarce (Wood & Taylor, 1991). Therefore, at the outset of the 
present research there were no a priori hypotheses as to whether either mode of self-
regulation would be prevalent when participants engaged in each of the two types of 
moral comparisons, and it was a matter of empirical discovery the extent to which they 
were likely to occur in each condition. 
Extant literature also suggests a link between motivation and moral self-regulation. 
Broadening or advancing moral self-regulation (self-improvement) is usually associated 
with strong future-orientated growth or achievement goals (Wood & Taylor, 1991); that 
is, when people have a strong drive to get better at what they do, they use information 
from their environment to learn about how they can improve. Under these conditions, if 
individuals witness a good deed, it seems plausible to assume that they would tend to 
make favourable judgments about it, experience positive feelings and prosocial action 
tendencies, for example the desire to emulate the moral agent and do themselves 
something good for others. However, in the absence of strong growth motivations, 
people who engage in upward comparisons could construe them as threatening and 
potentially self-defend (see Sedikides, 2012). 
On the other hand, extant literature also indicates that defensive self-regulation is 
usually underpinned by psychological well-being concerns (Wood & Taylor, 1991) rooted 




are typically prone to self-regulation that allows them to maintain or promptly restore 
flattering views of the self whenever life events signal a threat. Those individuals could 
potentially display a variety of responses. Self-enhancement usually results in re-
instating positive self-views, and therefore could be characterised by moderately 
positive feelings (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009), with more ambivalent moral judgments and 
action tendencies, ranging from slightly positive to neutral or indifferent. Self-protection 
is usually the result of more turbulent regulatory processes (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009), 
which realign negative self-views to the tolerance level, and thus could leave the witness 
of the good deed with a sense of inner struggle and stronger negative affect 
characterised by feelings of annoyance or resentment; judgments of the moral agent 
could be more negative than in self-enhancement and action tendencies in a grey area 
or sometimes even antisocial. More infrequent, yet possible, should be the case of self-
improvement resulting from downward comparison (whereby people already think they 
are superior to the comparison target). Based on these assumptions from the literature, 
the present research sought to shed light on all these phenomena and measure the 
likelihood of their occurrence. 
The interdependencies between moral comparison and self-regulation processes is 
evident in the social comparison literature, especially the body of research based on the 
rank-order paradigm mentioned earlier (Gerber, 2018). However, it must be noted that 
this experimental design tends to conflate comparison and self-regulatory processes: 
the choice of the comparison target is interpreted as a regulatory mechanism to 
improve or enhance/protect the self as a result of growth or well-being motives. One of 
the key methodological contributions of the present research is an attempt to clearly 




mechanisms through distinct constructs, related but separable. The details will be 
explicated in the next chapters. 
The psychological literature in the field also posits that self-regulatory processes 
can be conceptualised either as situational states, or dispositional and relatively stable 
traits11. In this research, moral self-regulation was conceptualised and operationalised as 
a situational process (state); that is, a temporary “online” dynamic response to a specific 
eliciting stimulus (exposure to an act of moral goodness). At the same time though, the 
research also investigated how certain motivational traits affect the way individuals 
experience others’ good deeds and self-regulate, as outlined in the following sections. 
Moral Self-Regulation and the Componential Process Theory of Emotion 
One of the important aspects implicated in the self-regulation of virtue is emotion. 
Various phenomena of emotional activation have already been mentioned in this 
introduction, for instance when describing the emotion of moral elevation that 
accompanies moral self-improvement, or the emotion of resentment associated with 
moral self-protection and do-gooder derogation. Emotion and self-regulation are indeed 
highly intertwined instantiations of cognitive, affective, and conative processes that are 
immanent in all aspects of social life. 
Although universal consensus on a definition of emotion has not been reached yet 
(Izard, 2007), the componential process theory of emotion (see e.g., Scherer, 2005) is 
gaining traction. According to this theory, emotions are dynamic episodes made up of 
distinct components: cognitive appraisals activated by meaningful elicitors, 
neurophysiological and motor changes in the body, action tendencies, and subjective 
feelings. Thus, emotions are reactions instigated by events that are highly relevant to 
 




the needs and goals of an individual (Scherer, 2009) and are experienced in the form of 
feelings, which “derive from sensory processes that tell the organism what is 
happening” (Izard, 2007, pp. 262-263), enabling self-regulatory adjustment. 
Critical to the componential view of emotion is the role of appraisals (Frijda, 1986; 
Ortony et al., 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985): these are cognitive evaluations of the 
significance of the environment for the well-being of the individual (Moors et al., 2013). 
The pivotal role of cognitive appraisals in emotion processes has a long tradition that 
begins with Aristotle, who described anger, for instance, as the consequence of specific 
thoughts, which in turn can motivate aggressive behaviour (Lazarus, 1999). 
Appraisals revolve around specific dimensions, which have been categorised in 
different ways by psychologists. Russell (1980) introduced the systematic use of 
multivariate analysis techniques in emotion research, and from various sorting tasks he 
was able to recover through multidimensional scaling two main dimensions of affect, 
valence and arousal, around which some of the main affect terms could be arranged in a 
circumplex. 
The existence of these two dimensions was consistently replicated in several later 
studies, but a severe limitation of this research concerned the narrow set of affect labels 
utilised; the quality and number of the dimensions recovered from multivariate analysis 
is strongly dependent on the scope and variety of the initial input. By expanding the 
range of the affect terms used as input with participants, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) 
were able to identify a wider set of appraisal dimensions through principal component 
analysis: pleasantness, effort, certainty, attention, control, responsibility.  
A few years later, Ortony and colleagues (1988) reduced the appraisal categories to 
three, theorising that they are valenced evaluations along the axes of desirability, 




events, agents, and objects. This means that an emotion elicitor provokes distinctly 
valenced reactions that are dependent on how the elicitor itself is construed: for 
example, a desirable event will likely trigger a positive emotional response, while a 
blameworthy agent and a repulsive object will likely instigate a negative emotional 
response. Importantly, these cognitive appraisals are often posited to take place at the 
very early stages of the chain of events that constitute an emotion episode (Frijda, 1986; 
Plutchik, 2001). Scherer recently reaffirmed the fundamental role of multilevel 
appraisals as the triggers of motor expressions, physiological changes, and action 
tendencies, whose complex interactions are integrated in central representations and 
categorisation labels that constitute feelings (Scherer, 2019). From this perspective, 
while cognitive appraisals are located at the source of emotion episodes, subjective 
awareness of their occurrence emerges downstream in the form of feelings, after bodily 
changes activate action tendencies. 
The moral experience of virtue can be studied through this “componential” lens. An 
act of moral goodness can be viewed as the elicitor, the event that gives rise to an 
emotion episode. This elicitor, depending on its relevance and meaningfulness to the 
individuals’ moral concerns, could trigger early cognitive appraisals and moral 
comparisons, which in turn could instigate corresponding self-regulatory processes, 
characterised by more complex sets of cognitions, action tendencies, and subjective 
feelings capable of energising specific social behaviours. These components are precisely 
the constituents of an emotion episode as described by the componential process 
theory. The only component omitted here is neurophysiological and motor changes, 
outside of the scope of this research. 
When this componential perspective of emotion is widened even further, explicitly 




under a more comprehensive nomological network, a self-regulatory framework, which 
is the perspective adopted in the present research, as illustrated in Figure II. 
 
Figure II:  
A streamlined nomological network of the moral experience of virtue observed through 




Other Factors Affecting Moral Comparisons and Self-Regulation 
If moral comparison and self-regulation are indeed implicated in the wide spectrum 
of the processes elicited by displays of virtue, then answering questions about the 
mechanisms that govern this variety of responses is essential. For instance, what 
determines whether an act of goodness triggers upward or downward moral 
comparisons? In the presence of upward comparisons, what instigates self-improvement 
as opposed to self-enhancement or self-protection? 
To answer these questions beyond what already discussed, it is necessary to 
consider two classes of phenomena: those that pertain to the person (individual 
differences, e.g. personality traits) and those that pertain to the situation (contextual 
factors, e.g. features of the virtuous acts/agents). A more detailed description of these 
phenomena will follow in the next sections, examining individual differences first, and 





The analysis of individual differences in the present research attempted to establish 
the effect of specific dispositions on participants’ judgments of the moral scenarios 
depicted in the stimuli and the ensuing regulatory processes. These dispositions fall into 
three categories: personality traits, motivational orientations, and self-beliefs. 
Personality Traits. Personality traits are defined as relatively stable patterns of 
thought, affect, motivation, and behaviour that represent human universals (McCrae & 
Costa, 1997). Two of these broad personality traits potentially relevant to the present 
investigation are humility and narcissism. 
Humility forms with honesty one of the six factors of the HEXACO model (Lee & 
Ashton, 2004). It does not explicitly appear in the five-factor model (Costa & McCrae, 
1992), but one of the facets of agreeableness is modesty, which is also one of the facets 
of honesty-humility in HEXACO. Humility and modesty have not been clearly 
distinguished in the psychological literature until recently, and the fact that laypeople 
and research participants tend to conflate them has not helped empirical research 
(Exline & Geyer, 2004). In the last decade, research has offered evidence that general 
humility is a broader construct that includes modesty content (Davis & Hook, 2014), 
consistent with the factorial structure of the HEXACO model. Its most central feature is 
hypo-egoic non-entitlement, or in other words, “the belief that, no matter how 
extraordinary one’s accomplishments or characteristics may be, one is not entitled to be 
treated special because of them” (Banker & Leary, 2019, p. 1). Research has specified 
that general humility can apply to a variety of life situations or domains, giving rise to 
more specific constructs such as intellectual humility (unassuming self-restrained 
approach to the negotiation of one’s ideas with those of others: see McElroy et al., 




of assumptions about the superiority of one’s background in multicultural contexts: see 
Hook et al., 2013). The underlying thread that unifies these aspects of humility is partly 
intrapersonal (moderate and accurate views of one’s strengths and weaknesses) and 
partly interpersonal (behaviours that mitigate attention to the self, facilitating 
cooperation, reducing envy or jealousy in groups, handling conflict, power struggles, 
cultural differences, and disagreement in a respectful and unassuming manner) (Davis et 
al., 2016). The intrapersonal dimension of humility could be particularly relevant in the 
context of the present research: indeed, if individuals tend to hold moderate views of 
their attributes, including moral attributes, they should be more likely to engage in 
upward comparisons in response to someone’s remarkable acts of moral goodness. 
The opposite could be true for narcissism, a personality trait characterised by 
entitled self-importance (Krizan & Herlacher, 2018). Narcissism has been found to be 
associated with heightened social comparison processes, particularly downward 
comparisons, given the highly flattering self-views held by narcissists (Krizan & Bushman, 
2011). Krizan and Herlacher (2018) recently developed an integrated “narcissism 
spectrum model” whose unifying feature is the tendency of narcissists to view their own 
needs and goals as more significant than those of others, which makes them exhibit an 
inflated sense of deservingness. These authors have factor analysed a wide array of 
narcissism items from some of the most widely used measurement instruments in the 
field. Their results confirmed earlier findings – acknowledged in the literature since the 
early 1990s (Wink, 1991) – about the existence of two distinct manifestations, both 
related to a common narcissistic phenotype based on entitled self-importance. These 
two manifestations are grandiose and vulnerable narcissism12. Krizan and Herlacher 
 




(2018) showed that the expression of entitled self-importance can be either bold, 
assertive, exploitative, and exhibitionist (grandiose narcissism: see also Crowe et al., 
2016) or reactive, hypersensitive, volatile, and vindictive (vulnerable narcissism: see also 
Hendin & Cheek, 1997). According to them, both expressions carry a strong antagonistic 
potential, but while the grandiose type is expressed in a callous and manipulative way, 
the vulnerable type is often revealed through anger and hostility. Additional evidence 
exists of the associations between grandiose narcissism with high self-esteem, and 
vulnerable narcissism with low-self-esteem (Rohmann et al., 2012). Following downward 
comparison, individuals scoring high on self-esteem and narcissism (grandiose) were 
found to self-enhance and experience more positive affect (Campbell et al., 2000), while 
individuals low in self-esteem and high in narcissism (vulnerable) tended to self-protect 
and experience more negative affect and hostile intentions (Hart et al., 2018). 
Beyond Personality Traits: Characteristic Adaptations. More recent theorising has 
broadened the concept of personality structure beyond the notion of traits, to 
encompass other dimensions, particularly what McAdams and Pals (2006) first, and then 
DeYoung (2015), defined characteristic adaptations. These are “relatively stable goals, 
interpretations, and strategies, specified in relation to an individual’s particular life 
circumstances” (DeYoung, 2015, p. 38). By capturing both traits and characteristic 
adaptations, personality psychology can offer a more holistic framework, capable of 
understanding the person “as a whole” (McAdams & Pals, 2006) and providing not only 
an account of how individuals differ from each other, but also an explanation of why 
they do so (DeYoung, 2015). This is possible because the strategies, goals, and 




directed self-regulated behaviour in all life domains (including morality) in a cyclical 
configuration typical of cybernetic systems (DeYoung, 2015)13. 
Among the fundamental strategies that form part of characteristic adaptations, the 
present research considered a set of three motivational dispositions that individuals 
consolidate starting from the crucial early years of their development, as they learn 
from their caretakers how to socialise in their environment. These motivational 
dispositions are: 
 hedonic orientations: chronic energisations of behaviour either toward positive, 
appetitive, and rewarding stimuli (approach) or away from negative, aversive, and 
punishing stimuli (avoidance) (Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Elliot, 2008); 
 regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 2014): motivational tendencies to either 
achieve growth and realise ideal hopes and aspirations (promotion focus) or to 
ensure security, and fulfil duties and obligations (prevention focus); 
 regulatory mode (Kruglanski et al., 2000): motivational propensities to either 
emphasise movement, action, and state shift (locomotion mode) or appraisal and 
accurate evaluation (assessment mode). 
Further insights into the nature and utility of these motivational constructs will be 
discussed in the next chapters, when they are introduced in the models (Studies 2-4). 
Although not much research exists on the relationships between them and moral 
comparison and self-regulation, the definitions of approach and promotion focus are 
consistent with strivings toward self-improvement, while the definition of avoidance 
aligns with tendencies toward self-defensive regulation. 
 
13 Another theoretical approach that expands the realm of personality beyond the traditional traits has 
been recently advanced by Fleeson and Jayawickreme (2015) with their “whole trait theory”, which bears 
some similarities, although in a different framework, with McAdams’s and DeYoung’s integration of traits 




More nebulous appears the relationship between prevention focus and moral self-
regulation. Despite their conceptual independence, theorising on the associations 
between regulatory focus and hedonic orientation has pointed out the stronger 
conceptual links of promotion combined with approach and prevention combined with 
avoidance, as opposed to the more tenuous conceptual links of promotion combined 
with avoidance and prevention combined with approach (see Cornwell & Higgins, 
2015b). For this reason, prevention focus could potentially function similarly to 
avoidance in the prediction of self-defensive regulation (positive association). 
Further, although research on regulatory mode is less developed, assessment and 
locomotion mode underpin two distinct motivational orientations in the goal pursuit 
process (Cornwell & Higgins, 2014): assessment entails epistemic concerns (need for 
truth) that appear consistent with strong comparison tendencies and iterative 
appraisals/reappraisals cycles that could trigger and amplify self-defensive regulation, 
whereas locomotion is governed by needs for control and psychological motion that 
could predispose to action, state-shift, hence self-improvement. 
Among the fundamental interpretations that form part of characteristic 
adaptations, the present research investigated self-esteem. Self-esteem is related to 
global beliefs of worth, that is, “the feeling that one is good enough” (Rosenberg, 1965); 
it encompasses both positive and negative overall views about the self. The relationship 
between self-esteem and moral comparison has been controversial, due to the 
conflicting results that emerged in empirical research. Studies on direct comparison 
choice based on personality attributes suggested that people low in self-esteem are 
more likely to engage in downward comparison than people high in self-esteem (Friend 
& Gilbert, 1973); the same pattern was found in studies based on ability (Smith & Insko, 




targets works as a defensive mechanism for people low in psychological resources when 
facing potential self-threats. 
However, subsequent research in interpersonal relationships unveiled a more 
faceted reality. In those studies (see e.g., Crocker et al., 1987), participants were not 
asked to choose a comparison target, but provided separate evaluations for self and 
others on various measures of personality and ability. With this research paradigm, 
upward or downward comparisons can be inferred through the difference between self-
other scores on the target measures. Results revealed that people higher in self-esteem 
rated themselves better than others on those target measures. Additionally, in studies 
where participants were divided in depressed and non-depressed groups, the non-
depressed group showed significantly higher self-enhancement than the depressed 
group (Campbell, 1986). This second body of evidence seems to suggest that downward 
comparison functions as a self-serving mechanism for people high in self-esteem who 
strive to maintain flattering self-views. Further evidence (Tice & Masicampo, 2008) 
replicated the finding that high trait self-esteem is linked with self-enhancement, and 
low trait self-esteem with self-protection. 
In the present research, self-esteem was conceptualised as a characteristic 
adaptation, like regulatory focus and hedonic orientation. Research suggests that trait 
self-esteem is positively associated with promotion focus and negatively associated with 
prevention focus (McGregor et al., 2007), and also positively associated with approach 
and negatively associated with avoidance (Heimpel et al., 2006). 
Beyond these assumptions based on the literature, the present research also 
hypothesised that the characteristic adaptations could define specific conditional 
processes, interacting with moral comparisons, thus functioning as moderators of moral 




depending on their intensity, could lead to different outcomes in terms of modes and 
levels of moral self-regulation given certain types and strengths of moral comparisons. 
For example, depending on the level of approach motivation, higher or lower degrees of 
self-improvement could be expected in the presence of certain levels of upward 
comparisons. 
Situational Factors and the Vignettes 
Although the individual differences described above constitute personal signatures 
that are relatively stable across situations (Fournier et al., 2015; McAdams & Pals, 2006), 
contextual factors significantly influence their functioning. A situation is defined as “a 
set of circumstances outside the person consisting of objectively quantifiable properties 
(often including other people) that may be perceived and interpreted by a person” 
(Baumert et al., 2017, p. 528). Given the huge number of these situational variables (and 
their possible combinations), in the present research they were not systematically 
manipulated, but critical sets of features of the situation (relative to the moral act and 
agent) were purposely assembled in each moral vignette, and these vignettes were 
pitted against each other14. 
The moral acts were chosen to be relatively substantial accomplishments in the 
domain of moral goodness and not just trivial everyday expressions of courtesy or 
kindness. However, the degree of goodness was carefully dosed across the vignettes to 
depict a wide variety of deeds, from more accessible acts up to outstanding displays of 
virtue, each with different gradients of risk/cost to the moral agents and advantage to 
the beneficiaries. The stimuli also varied in the degree of “obligation” and 
“supererogation” of the deeds; these categories subsume respectively the deontological 
 




normativity of the actions (obligation, i.e., rules that ought to be followed) or their 
nature of being optional, beyond the call of duty (supererogation, i.e., permissible acts 
in terms of both performance/commission or omission: see Archer, 2018). Furthermore, 
the stimuli were created so that they showcased two fundamental categories of moral 
exemplars: the brave and the caring (Walker & Frimer, 2007). These reflect two basic 
domains of moral goodness, courage and care, which map respectively onto the broader 
social dimensions of agency and communion (Wiggins, 1991; Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012), 
dominance and nurturance (Wiggins, 1979), competence and warmth (Fiske et al., 
2007). Given the emphasis in more recent literature on an additional aspect of moral 
goodness, the stimuli also portrayed a third fundamental moral domain, that is, justice 
(see e.g., Piazza et al., 2019; Walker & Hennig, 2004). Lastly, the vignettes featured 
various instantiations of other situational variables referred to the moral agents, such as 
their gender, ethnicity, profession (for a more complete account of situational variables 
in moral psychology, see e.g. Christensen & Gomila, 2012). All these features defined a 
set of boundary conditions that demarcate the range of circumstances to which the 
model refers and applies. As previously mentioned, the many variables that make up the 
contextual factors were not systematically manipulated in the present research, and a 
selection of them (those specifically referred to crucial characteristics of the deeds and 
the agents) were measured to guide selection of the vignettes: a) goodness of the deed; 
b) propriety of the deed; c) level of care/courage/justice15. 
The use of vignettes in moral psychology has become popular because they enable 
the collection of data about participants’ thoughts, feelings, attitudes, judgments, and 
behaviours that might otherwise be difficult to investigate in naturalistic settings. More 
 




details about the moral vignettes will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, suffice 
to say that for the present research twelve vignettes were initially created and tested. 
Of these, two were progressed to the next stages of the research, as they represented 
emblematic moral scenarios that best summarised a suitable assortment of critical 
contextual features, allowing to test to what extent the conceptual model could apply to 
different templates of virtue. 
Effects on Social Behaviour 
Social psychologists agree that social and moral comparisons are in the service of 
self-regulatory processes (Wood, 1996); there is also wide consensus that, in turn, self-
regulation is in the service of behaviour, representing one of the important predictors of 
success in life (Baumeister, 2007). In a social cognitive perspective, behaviour is an 
inherent aspect of self-regulation. Following Bandura’s (1991) social cognitive theory, 
Zimmerman (2005) refers to “behavioural regulation” as one of the regulatory systems 
that operates in reciprocal causation with the other regulatory components, “person” 
and “environment”. In the context of this investigation, the behavioural component of 
wider self-regulatory systems was considered distinct from self-regulation at the 
intrapersonal level, which Zimmerman (2005) refers to as “covert self-regulation”16. 
Nevertheless, they are highly interconnected and therefore it was paramount to 
determine to what extent intrapersonal moral self-regulatory mechanisms affect overt 
behaviour. 
Because of the expected prevalence of moral self-improvement responses to high 
moral exemplars (relative to self-defence), the most pertinent kind of behaviour to 
examine here was prosocial behaviour. In her seminal article, Wispé (1972) defined it as 
 
16 To avoid any confusion, in the present research the term self-regulation strictly refers only to “covert self-




behaviour that has positive social consequences and consists of acts valued by society 
that improve the life and well-being of other persons. Existing research suggests that 
others’ good deeds eliciting moral elevation promote helping behaviours (Schnall et al., 
2010; Schnall & Roper, 2012), a particular manifestation of prosocial behaviour 
characterised by voluntarily aiding or donating to others with the selfless aim of 
enhancing their welfare (Wispé, 1972). Similarly, recent evidence suggests that others’ 
good deeds can induce the emotion of kama muta (Blomster Lyshol et al., 2020), which 
can promote other positive social outcomes, such as increased humanisation of out-
groups. The same kind of prosocial effects should be observed when studying the 
experience of moral exemplars from a self-regulation rather than an emotion 
perspective: virtuous actions eliciting moral self-improvement should lead to 
significantly higher levels of helping behaviour relative to morally neutral or mildly 
positive moral actions. To test this hypothesis, the present research examined one of 
the vignettes against a control scenario, measuring the difference in the helping 
behaviours that they induced; the control scenario was created so that it matched the 
key components of the experimental vignette, keeping constant the critical contextual 
elements except for the manipulating factor (the level of goodness of the deed). 
Summary of Key Hypotheses and the Conceptual Model 
Grounded in the psychological research and theorising available to date in the field, 
the considerations discussed thus far elucidate some of the key aspects related to the 
moral response to virtue, highlighting fundamental hypotheses about their mechanisms, 
antecedents, and proximate consequences. These are summarised in Figure III, which 




Figure III:  
The initial conceptual model of the moral experience of virtue observed through the lens of moral self-regulation, inclusive of a selection of key 


















The model illustrates graphically key initial assumptions and hypotheses of the 
research, all based on the literature reviewed in this introductory chapter. Translating 
them into a narrative form, these hypotheses predict that, following the presentation of 
moral stimuli (vignettes) portraying moral exemplars, participants will make initial 
judgments, about the goodness of the acts and of the moral agents, that imply specific 
moral comparisons. Of these comparisons, those based on ability will identify two 
critical participant groups: those engaging in upward and those engaging in downward 
comparisons. 
For participants in upward comparison, the perceived positive self-discrepancy in 
moral character (self worse than the agents in the vignettes) will be stronger as their 
own level of self-assessed humility increases. If this discrepancy is experienced as an 
opportunity, self-improvement and positive affect will be elicited, which in turn will be 
likely to induce prosocial behaviours; if it is experienced as a threat, self-defence 
processes will be triggered (enhancing or protective self-regulation) and these, in turn, 
will likely hamper the enactment of prosocial behaviours. The strength of self-
improvement effects will be positively moderated by promotion focus, approach, and 
self-esteem, while the strength of self-defensive effects will be positively moderated by 
prevention focus and avoidance, and negatively moderated by self-esteem. 
For participants in downward comparison, the perceived negative self-discrepancy 
in moral character (self better than the agents in the vignettes) will be stronger as their 
own level of self-reported narcissism increases. It is theoretically possible that 
downward comparison experienced as an opportunity could induce self-improvement 
and positive affect, but most likely it will instigate defensive mechanisms, either self-
enhancing or self-protective, to preserve their perceived superiority. The strength of 




positive or ambivalent affect, whereas the strength of self-protection effects will be 
negatively moderated by self-esteem, leading to negative affect. 
Moral self-improvement will inspire degrees of prosociality directly proportional to 
its level (the higher self-improvement, the higher the degree of prosociality) and greater 
deeds will induce higher levels of prosociality than smaller deeds; by contrast, self-
defence will proportionally inhibit prosocial behaviour, such that the higher self-
defence, the lower the degree of prosociality. 
Adaptiveness of Moral Self-Regulation Modes 
The psychological literature on the self proposes a variety of interpretations about 
the degree of adaptiveness or maladaptiveness of the different types of self-regulatory 
processes. 
Self-improvement is usually depicted as conducive to positive outcomes. In studies 
by Karney and Frye (2002) as well as Hui, Bond, and Molden (2012), participants 
reported better relations in their marriages thanks to self-improvement strivings; Ryff 
(1991) found that participants’ self-improvement endeavours were gratified by benefits 
in various dimensions of well-being, such as self-acceptance, positive relations with 
others, autonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life, personal growth. Cross-
cultural research in the US (Tsai, Chiang, & Lau, 2016) also revealed that self-
improvement benefits were more pronounced among Asian Americans than European 
Americans. 
More complex are the outcomes of the processes of self-enhancement and self-
protection. The case of self-enhancement is particularly thought-provoking, due to the 
contradictory effects that make it “a mixed blessing” (Paulhus, 1998, p. 1207). Among 
the empirical studies that have investigated the consequences of self-enhancement, 




through a group task in the laboratory and long-term effects in a longitudinal study in a 
real-world context. In the first experiment, they found that after completion of the task, 
self-enhancers who convinced themselves that they had done well tended to be 
narcissistic and ego-involved in the task, and reported increased levels of positive affect 
versus baseline. However, in the second study, the authors followed undergraduate 
students during the course of their studies (four years), and repeated measures of 
critical outcome variables revealed a downward trajectory for self-esteem, satisfaction 
with university, and well-being; importantly, self-enhancement did not correlate with 
actual academic performance measured through GPA and likelihood to graduate. 
Further research found that self-enhancement in the short term was beneficial in 
terms of intrapersonal adjustment, in that it helped individuals restore self-worth while 
dealing with various kinds of self-threats, thus serving a stress-buffering function (Alicke 
& Sedikides, 2009). However, and perhaps more importantly, in the long run, it often 
ended up being dysfunctional, particularly in terms of interpersonal adjustment, since it 
was linked to the progressive deterioration of the individual’s ability to use social 
feedback as a means of personal growth (Sedikides, 2009) and to the worsening of the 
quality of social relations; these effects were found to be more marked among 
individuals who, while self-regulating, tended to arrogantly exaggerate agentic traits 
(Dufner et al., 2018), inviting dislike and derision (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009), hampering 
the effectiveness of their social integration, and damaging others’ experience of 
inclusiveness (Sedikides & Luke, 2007). For this reason, Crocker and Park (2004) 
suggested that self-enhancement in the service of establishing domination over others 
or in the pursuit of immediate emotional rewards, such as feeling good about oneself, 





Beyond conducting the traditional variable-centred analysis of the conceptual 
model described above, a complementary objective of the present research was to 
assess the existence of independent latent profiles of participants with meaningfully 
different characteristics. This person-centred analysis was carried out on multiple levels 
of the model (motivation, comparison, self-regulation) expecting to generate specific 
participant clusters for each of them. For instance, the analysis could potentially yield a 
group of individuals with a strong propensity to avoidance motivation, a group who 
engaged in downward comparison, and a group whose response pattern was 
characterised by strong self-defence; specific relations between these clusters could also 
be assessed, seeking to confirm the significance of theoretically driven association 
patterns deriving from the variable-centred analysis. 
A Path Toward Causality 
Through the methods designed to test the conceptual model, psychological traits 
and states in the nomological network were measured primarily as quantities and the 
analysis attempted to delineate associations across these quantities, offering initial 
probabilistic causal explanations about these relationships. 
Rohrer (2018) recently pointed out that researchers often avoid making causal 
claims, especially with observational data, because they are afraid of being unable to 
justify their claims. They are trained that “correlation does not imply causation”. This is 
undoubtedly a valid principle, but progress toward a causal understanding of 
psychological phenomena can be made in the presence of specific experimental designs, 
assumptions, and analytic methods. Grosz and colleagues (2020) speculate that the 
taboo against causal inference does not prevent researchers and readers from drawing 
causal conclusions even when they are not overtly formulated. They claim that the 




avoid thinking in terms of causality” (Asendorpf, 2012, p. 391). These authors are not 
alone, as similar arguments have been put forward for example by Hernán (2018). Pearl 
and MacKenzie (2018) even claimed that in recent times the so-called “causal 
revolution” has provided the philosophical framework, the mathematical language, and 
the analytical tools to harmonise the realm of statistics (in particular, of probability) with 
that of causality. From their viewpoint, these advances have allowed to dissipate the fog 
that has enwrapped causal inference for a long time, giving birth to what they call the 
“new science of cause and effect” (Pearl & MacKenzie, 2018). 
Leveraging these recent developments, the present research project aimed to 
generate and refine a new model of the self-regulation of virtue. While attempting to 
unearth some of the mechanisms hidden underneath the observable surface, causal 
inferences were drawn from “noisy observations” (Pearl, 2009). Based on the claims on 
causality advanced by Pearl, Rohrer, Hernán, and others, this thesis did not shy away 
from using explicit causal language. It adopted a probabilistic approach to causality 
(whereby certain causes are likely to generate specific effects under certain probability 
assumptions), thus excluding a deterministic view of cause and effect as necessities 
(whereby events are determined completely and necessarily by previously existing 
causes). 
In this context, a cause was intended as a probabilistic determinant of an effect, 
which “listens” to its cause and determines its value based on what it “hears” from the 
cause itself (Pearl & MacKenzie, 2018). Along the same lines, a causal model was viewed 
as an inference engine that – based on prior knowledge – uses assumptions, queries, 
and empirical data to produce estimates (with a certain level of uncertainty) and 
ultimately provides answers to scientific questions of interest (Pearl & MacKenzie, 




chapters, where descriptions of putative correlations are complemented by initial causal 
inferences, made possible partly thanks to experimental designs and partly through 
specific analytic approaches (independent of design) such as exploratory/confirmatory 
factor analysis (EFA/CFA), path modelling, structural equation modelling (SEM), and 
other latent variable modelling methods, such as latent profile analysis (LPA). With 
Pearl’s “causal revolution”, experimentation and observation, manipulation and 
description should no longer be considered incompatible pairs, but complementary 
components that contribute to causal and counterfactual expressions of the reality 
under investigation (Bollen & Pearl, 2013). 
Research Roadmap 
The process put in place before data collection, analysis, and reporting of this 
research project was aligned with the traditional steps recommended by Dubin (1969): 
a) a review of the literature allowed to establish a provisional nomological network, 
highlighting key constructs expected to be implicated in the phenomenon under 
investigation; b) appropriate measurement instruments were identified (if available) or 
created (if unavailable) for those constructs; c) tentative associations between the 
constructs were specified, alongside conditional processes and boundary conditions17; d) 
hypotheses and predictions were formulated and preregistered. Following this theory-
building groundwork, data collection and analysis enabled to refine the measures and 
their relationships, until the theoretical model was tested through confirmatory tests 
and further improved and expanded to encompass a wider range of critical 
consequences. 
 
17 Conditional processes are contextual or individual difference factors that define existence, magnitude, 
and direction of certain effects (see Hayes & Preacher, 2013) and boundary conditions are the 





In terms of empirical research, the plan included a sequence of four core studies 
across generative/exploratory and confirmatory/integrative stages (Fig. IV): 
 Study 1 – Stimuli and model development: creation of a set of new stimuli in the 
form of vignettes and choice of the most suitable ones for the project; selection of 
critical variables and construction/assessment of new scales to operationalise the 
constructs of moral comparisons and moral self-regulation; preliminary analysis of 
mutual relations across the key variables; 
 Study 2 – Model assessment: analysis of the reliability and dimensionality of the 
moral self-regulation/affect constructs, selection of critical antecedents, analysis of 
their mutual relationships, and development of provisional path models; 
 Study 3 – Model improvement: confirmatory tests and improvement of the 
measurement and structural models, and identification of motivation, comparison, 
and self-regulation typologies, with measurement of their associations; 
 Study 4 – Model extension: retest of the model with integration to include social 
behavioural outcomes (helping behaviour) elicited by self-improvement states, 






Figure IV:  




All the studies across the four phases of the research were preregistered18 on the 
Open Science Framework (OSF) website (https://osf.io). 
The four studies had a similar structure and design, and the questionnaire followed 
a consistent flow across all of them, as illustrated in Figure V. The main differences 
concerned the presentation to each participant of multiple stimuli in Study 1 (mixed 
design) versus a single stimulus in Studies 2-4 (between-subjects design), and the 




18 Despite being essentially exploratory in nature, even the first two studies were preregistered. Some 




Figure V:  
Graphical illustration of the questionnaire flow across the four empirical studies 
 








Study 1: Stimuli and Model Development 
 
Introduction 
The first study of the research plan outlined in the previous chapter was designed 
to provide learning on three key aspects: the stimuli, the measurement instruments, and 
the relationships across some of the main variables in the conceptual model. Its 
structure and implementation reflected the need to use the available resources as 
efficiently as possible, knowing that the following phases would be highly resource 
intensive. 
The Moral Vignettes 
Due to the prevailing interest in moral violations, empirical research in moral 
psychology does not offer a wealth of stimuli depicting good deeds. Most of them can 
be found in studies focused on positive moral emotions. An example is represented by 
the early work on the “other-praising” emotions of elevation, gratitude, and admiration 
by Algoe and Haidt (2009): in the elevation condition, the stimulus for one of the studies 
was a video featuring a young man who, as a boy, had established a shelter for homeless 
people in Philadelphia. Later, a series of studies on moral elevation by Erickson and 
colleagues (2017) used several videos depicting virtuous actions, for instance, a father 
pulling his paralysed son in a marathon, a teenager helping others escape gangs, and 
athletes with disabilities displaying courage and grit. In another study on moral 
elevation, Silvers and Haidt (2008) used a video from an episode of “The Oprah Winfrey 
Show”, where a musician told the story of how he was saved from a life of gang violence 
by his music teacher. This video was later used in other studies on moral elevation, 




Instead of video clips, written stories administered on a computer screen were used 
in a set of studies by Freeman et al. (2009), and Aquino et al. (2011): one of these stories 
was about the members of an Amish community in the US who showed remarkable 
forgiveness and support to the family of a young man who massacred five young Amish 
girls in a schoolhouse and subsequently took his life. Other written stories were used in 
research by Thomson and Siegel (2013), who provided evidence that moral elevation 
was effectively induced among participants presented with them. 
Stimuli in written format were also utilised in several neuroimaging studies on 
moral dilemmas. These are hypothetical scenarios involving a moral conflict, where 
people are forced to make difficult decisions about what they would do (or not do) if 
they were in those situations. The choices are usually between moral imperatives of 
which neither is objectively preferable or perfectly acceptable. Although the first to use 
moral dilemmas was Kohlberg (1964), it was Foot (1967) who introduced the one that 
became the most popular: the trolley dilemma. Many others were proposed in the 
following years, such as the footbridge, the lifeboat, the hostage, and so forth. The 
variety of moral dilemmas that proliferated in the literature became so wide that “the 
obtained evidence is neither necessarily comparable nor replicable across studies” 
(Christensen & Gomila, 2012, pp. 1249-1250). For this reason, researchers have tried to 
offer guidance on how to standardise the moral stimuli (even beyond dilemmas), so that 
more rigorous control can be achieved (see e.g., Christensen & Gomila, 2012; Clifford et 
al., 2015). The guidelines concern both formal and substantive elements: presentation 
format, expression style, word framing, word count, order of presentation, type of 
question, participant perspective, situational antecedents, intentionality, certainty, 
normality, justifications, factors related to the moral agents, type of moral action, type 




Moral dilemmas are not the kind of stimuli that are useful to study the response to 
others’ good deeds, but the issue of standardisation was very relevant for the present 
research. The videos used in previously cited work differ remarkably from each other in 
length and format, and prove the relevance of the issues highlighted by Christensen and 
Gomila, especially when comparing experimental with control conditions in the same 
study. Written stimuli are more flexible than videos because they can be more easily 
created ex-novo and more easily modified after pre-testing to address emerging 
improvement needs; they can also be easily created in larger numbers, potentially 
manipulating each relevant factor. Therefore, a decision was made for the present 
research to generate a set of new stimuli in the form of vignettes with text and images; 
they were designed to cover a wide range of good deeds, display differential degrees of 
virtue and normativity, a variety of moral exemplars, while sharing essentially the same 
format and length. 
While all the vignettes were intended to depict good deeds, they also contained 
ambiguous cues subject to diverging interpretations19; this is because the social reality 
of real-life situations is invariably steeped in complex textures of subtle “signifiers” that 
can take on more than just one “signified” (de Saussure, 1959). Depending on specific 
histories and accretion processes (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015) that crystallise certain 
propensities, individuals select and deselect, take in and filter out different signs 
(reinforcers in behaviourist theories) from the surrounding environment and form 
mental representations, evaluating and making sense of them by attributing meaning. 
Thus, it was expected that the narratives in the vignettes, which describe real-life 
 
19 For example, in the vignette named after him, Cory rushed into a burning building after fighting off 
members of the security staff who tried to restrain him. This action may be interpreted in a positive light, 
putting the emphasis on the favourable outcome, or a negative light, putting the emphasis on the 




situations and facts as reported by the media in the public domain (see Appendix 2), 
could be subject to diverse interpretations and meanings (Monni et al., 2020) as a 
function of participants’ personality structures (traits and characteristic adaptations 
discussed earlier). It is for this reason, among others, that in Study 2 measures of 
individual differences between participants were introduced (for instance, regulatory 
focus), as they could potentially account for differential propensities to decode and 
interpret the ambiguous signs in the vignettes, contributing to giving rise to dissimilar 
moral judgments and self-regulatory processes. 
One of the key objectives of Study 1 was to enable decisions about which moral 
vignettes were apt be progressed to the following stages of the research. The main 
criteria for their evaluation included their ability to:  
• depict morally motivated good deeds in different moral domains, such as courage, 
care, and justice, and with different degrees of obligation and supererogation; 
• portray incremental gradients of exemplarity of moral character through a diverse 
range of deeds, from more ordinary acts of goodness to truly uncommon altruistic 
actions; 
• trigger moral judgments subsuming direct or indirect moral comparisons and elicit 
functional and dysfunctional moral self-regulatory processes through the written 
narrative format. 
Measurement Instruments 
Moral Self-Regulation Inventory 
Besides new stimuli, appropriate measurement instruments were required for the 
research, particularly for the construct of moral self-regulation. A widely accepted state 
measure of the self-regulation of virtue was nowhere to be found in the literature; thus, 




concept, capable of capturing the nuances of the distinct mechanisms through which the 
self negotiates other people’s virtuous acts. The psychological literature provided useful 
starting points. 
First, existing work on moral elevation investigated specific thematic areas in 
common with adaptive broadening moral self-regulation. Scholars have used in 
disparate combinations various items known to tap into the different components of 
moral elevation, and often analysed them individually, correlating each of them with the 
outcome measure under investigation (Schnall et al., 2010), or creating a scale and 
computing the composite mean of the items or groups of items (Aquino et al., 2011). 
Schnall and colleagues (2010) attempted data reduction through principal component 
analysis and retrieved one principal component capable to summarise moral elevation 
items. However, observing the response to acts of moral goodness from the perspective 
of self-regulation (instead of emotion) meant slightly shifting the point of view; while 
certain elements overlap with an emotion-focused analysis, new aspects related to the 
self had to be integrated into a measure of adaptive moral self-regulation, for example 
the level of identification between the self and the moral agent. 
Second, a completely new set of items had to be developed to measure defensive 
moral self-regulation. The literature does not provide a consolidated state instrument to 
measure these processes when activated by an eliciting positive stimulus. What is 
available though, is an inventory of items that measures individual differences in the 
propensity to adopt self-enhancing and self-protective strategies (Hepper et al., 2010). 
While the content was sometimes relevant, the wording had to be changed from the 
average frequency in the deployment of those strategies to the situational occurrence of 
a set of transitory thoughts, action tendencies, and feelings elicited by the presentation 




Despite this critical difference, the existing trait scales provided helpful hints. For 
instance, Hepper and colleagues’ item “When you do poorly at something, thinking it 
was due to the situation, not your ability” confronts participants with the strategy of 
deflecting responsibility for lack of ability to circumstantial factors not depending on 
themselves; this item inspired reactions of motivated avoidance to accept the possibility 
of lack of moral character to perform the same moral deed as the agent in the vignette, 
which came together in items such as SD5 (“These extreme behaviours should not be 
considered the standard we live by”) and others tested in Study 2. Another example is 
the item “Thinking of yourself as generally possessing positive traits or abilities to a 
greater extent than most people”, which presents aggrandising self-construals that were 
reconfigured in item SD2 (“In many ways, I have done greater deeds than Francia”). 
Another source of inspiration was provided by studies on do-gooder derogation. 
For instance, Minson and Monin (2012) used the semantic differential and asked their 
participants to rate vegetarians across several attributes, among which was “humble-
conceited”; this gave rise to the idea of assessing to what extent participants reckoned 
the moral agent in the vignette felt superior, which inspired item SD6 (“Francia probably 
thinks she’s better than everyone else”). Also, Monin (2007) described trivialisation as 
one of the critical strategies to deflect self-threats from unflattering moral comparisons, 
and this notion was distilled into item SD1 (“It’s not such an extraordinary action”), as 
well as others tested in Study 2. Collectively, these sources provided input to the 
generation of a set of new self-growth and self-shielding indicators; these tentatively 
formed the first version of the newly developed moral self-regulation inventory, which 
was pre-tested in a streamlined variant in the present study. 
Only a selection of six self-improvement and six self-defence items were tested in 




participants’ fatigue related to the length of the questionnaire (see the Methods section 
in this chapter). Consequently, Study 1 did not investigate whether the self-defence 
items formed one or two distinct subscales (self-enhancement and self-protection), 
deferring investigation of this aspect to Study 2. 
Moral Affect Scales 
The moral affect scales were intended to measure feelings or subjective 
experiences of pleasure/displeasure self-reported by participants. They were measured 
after participants answered the moral self-regulation questions. Several scales exist in 
the literature in this area, for example, the Affect Circumplex (Russell, 1980), the AIM - 
Affect Intensity Measure (Larsen et al., 1986), the PANAS - Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (Watson et al., 1988), the SAM - Self-Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 
1994), and others. However, not all of them would have been wholly relevant to the 
measure of the response to good deeds, and they would have been too long and time-
consuming to administer in their entirety. Therefore, two brief scales were developed to 
focus on the discrete affect terms underlying the positive and negative feelings more 
directly implicated in the response to others’ good deeds. For example, item PA1 (“I felt 
uplifted”) came from the emotion word “uplifted” used, among others, by Aquino and 
colleagues (2011) in their seminal study on moral elevation. Item PA2 (“The story was 
inspiring”) was borrowed from the emotion word “inspired” used by Algoe and Haidt 
(2009) in their study on moral elevation. The feeling of envy that features in item NA4 
(“To be honest, I felt envious”) was suggested by a study by Smith and colleagues (1994), 
which links this negative emotion to the sense of inferiority evoked by a position of 
advantage enjoyed by the envied person. 




A further need in the initial phase of the current research programme concerned 
the measurement of specific judgments underlying moral comparisons. Especially 
important was to develop a measure capable of capturing the participants’ perception 
of the differential in terms of moral stature and capability between the self and the 
moral agents portrayed in the stimuli. To this end, a direct and an indirect measure of 
moral character discrepancy (or simply moral discrepancy) were constructed and tested 
to choose the most suitable one (further details in the Methods section). 
Association Patterns Between Variables 
Lastly, besides filling the gaps in terms of stimuli and measurement instruments, 
Study 1 was designed to explore patterns of mutual relationships between critical 
variables in the nomological network illustrated in the previous chapter (Fig. III). No 
specific hypotheses were made about the prevalence of either mode of self-regulation 
(self-improvement or self-defence) in upward or downward comparison; self-
improvement and self-defence were simply assumed to be theoretically possible in 
association with each of the two comparison types. Empirically assessing this 
assumption was one of the objectives of the present study. 
The relations between moral self-regulation and affect needed to be explored, too. 
In this case, although Study 1 was exploratory, it seemed plausible to anticipate that 
moral self-improvement would be associated with a prevalence of positive affect, 
whereas moral self-defence would link more closely with negative affect, consistent 
with the conceptual model. These patterns were scrutinised based on the empirical data 
collected in this first study to inform hypotheses for the following studies. 
Summary of Key Objectives 
In summary, Study 1 was designed under the general framework of the conceptual 




exploration of the moral landscape of the response to moral exemplars. Its main 
objectives were to: 
 test a set of new moral scenarios in the form of vignettes, in order to verify their 
suitability to the research and select the optimal stimuli to progress to the following 
studies; 
 test a selection of items from the newly developed moral self-regulation inventory, 
providing an early assessment of the quality of their wording and their 
psychometric properties, and identifying possible improvements; 
 test and select one of two measures of moral discrepancy between the self and the 
moral agent underlying comparative processes in terms of moral character; 
 provide initial insights into the nature and strength of the relationships between 
moral discrepancy, moral self-regulation, and affective states elicited by exposure 








Study 1 was conducted between August and September 2018 using a structured 
questionnaire hosted by Qualtrics. Recruitment was completed through a variety of 
methods, including face-to-face invitations by the experimenter at the Lancaster 
University campus, posts on social media, email requests to postgraduate research 
groups at Lancaster University and other universities in the UK. Data collection took 
place on campus using university tablets, or remotely. 
The sample size reflected the exploratory nature of the study, the number of 
research stimuli, the number of items for each of the new scales, the length of the 
online questionnaire, and accessibility of voluntary participants in the allocated 
timeframe. Power analysis with G*Power ver. 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) in a streamlined 
scenario indicated that, to detect a medium-sized effect in a multiple linear regression 
with two to three predictors with α = .05 and power set at .80, a sample of 68 to 77 
participants per vignette would be necessary (see Supplemental Materials SMA120). 
Based on the research design discussed in the next section, the intended overall sample 
size for analysis was determined to be 150 participants. 
Among the 212 subjects who started the questionnaire, 66 dropped out before 
finishing it; the data from these 66 individuals were therefore deleted. The final sample 
consisted of 146 participants, of which 115 were female (78.8%) and 31 male (21.2%). 
Their age ranged from 19 to 81 years, with median of 51 and mean of 49 years (SD = 15). 
Participants were primarily residents of the UK (67.8%) and the USA (10.3%); the rest 
 
20 Hereon, the Supplemental Materials will be abbreviated and indicated with three letters and numbers, 
e.g. SMA1-1, SMB1-1, etc. The first two letters SM indicate Supplemental Material; the third letter A 




resided in various countries in Europe (17.4%) and other continents (4.1%); one 
participant did not disclose the country of residence. The participants’ main nationality 
largely reflected the country of residence, with minor variations. Most participants were 
employed (54.1%), one was a student (0.7%), and the remainder had other occupations 
(6.2%) or did not reveal their employment status (39%). The median completion time 
was 34 minutes. Further details about the socio-demographical variables, including 
political orientation and level of religiosity/spirituality, can be found in SMA3. 
Research Design and Materials 
The online questionnaire consisted of two parts: a) a brief introductory section, 
with general socio-demographic questions and a moral self-evaluation question; b) the 
experimental section, with the administration and rating of the moral vignettes. 
The structure of the study was a mixed design. Each participant was presented with 
a random selection of six out of twelve moral vignettes, and therefore each vignette was 
evaluated by a range of 68 to 76 participants. The independent variable was the 
vignette; the dependent variables consisted of measures of moral appraisal, moral self-
regulation, and moral affect (plus an open-ended question for general comments), 
which were collected for all the vignettes presented to each participant. 
The twelve vignettes depicted various good deeds performed by moral agents in 
favour of a third party. The vignettes were all based on true stories in the public domain 
gathered by the experimenter. They covered a variety of aspects of morality: several 
focused primarily on care, while others were more centred on courage or justice. The 
format of the vignettes comprised text (from 134 to 183 words) and visuals (2 to 5 




labelled after the name of the protagonist of the story: Cory, Wesley, Arnaud, Francia, 
Matthew, Sarah, Joey, Markus, Ruxandra, Alvaro, Sunita, and Nicholas21. 
The twelve vignettes can be viewed in Appendix 1 and the questionnaire in SMA2. A 
summary of the content of the stories is reported in Table A1: 
 
Table A1:  
Summary of the content of the stories in the 12 vignettes 
Short 
label 
Full name of 
moral agent Story content 
   
Cor Cory a man who saved a woman from the fire that broke out in her building 
 
Wes Wesley a man who jumped down the tracks of the New York subway to save 
someone who fell off the platform 
 
Arn Arnaud a policeman who swapped places with a hostage during a terrorist attack in 
France and ended up being killed while saving the woman 
 




a runner of the London marathon who compromised his finishing time by 
helping someone who was about to collapse toward the end of the race 
 
Sar Sarah a woman who, despite being insulted by an online troll, showed him 
compassion and paid surgery for the back condition that he could not 
afford to treat 
 
Joe Joey a man who offered his shirt and hat to a shirtless person shivering on a 
freezing train in winter in the New York subway 
 
Mar Markus a man who left his successful career behind and flew to South America to 
volunteer and help children in need 
 
Alv Alvaro a former bullfighter in Colombia who repented and became a campaigner 




a woman who became vegetarian and blogs to raise awareness on animal 
cruelty in the food industry 
 
Sun Sunita a woman who campaigns so that Western countries, the largest 
contributors to global warming, provide financial aid to developing 
countries for the protection of the environment 
 
Nic Nicholas a lawyer who challenged the Anti-Homosexuality Act in Uganda and pushed 




21 Hereon, in several tables and graphs (particularly in the Supplemental Materials) the vignettes will be 






Before the presentation of the vignettes, participants rated the perceived level of 
their own morality (hereon, moral self-evaluation, or simply self-evaluation) through the 
question: “To what extent do you see yourself as a morally good person?”. Participants 
were asked to answer using a slider bar, with a unipolar scale ranging from 0 (not at all) 
to 100 (very much)22. 
After the presentation of each vignette, a few closed-ended questions asked 
participants to evaluate the moral character of the agents (hereon, moral agent 
evaluation, or simply agent evaluation) and the perceived level of moral similarity of the 
agents to themselves (hereon, similarity). These moral evaluations were measured with 
unipolar scales ranging from 0 to 100, using slider bars. For example, the following item 
was used to assess Francia’s moral character: “To what extent do you consider Francia 
to be a morally good person?” (0 = not at all, 100 = very much). 
A further set of moral evaluations revolved around the quality and nature of the 
moral action performed by the protagonists of the stories: participants rated the 
perceived level of goodness of the deeds (hereon, goodness), the extent to which they 
believed the moral actions were “the right thing to do” (hereon, propriety), the level of 
relevance of the actions to the circumstances of their own life (hereon, relevance), and 
the extent to which they would have done the same thing in that specific situation 
(hereon, in-shoes). Again, these moral evaluations were measured with unipolar scales 
ranging from 0 to 100 (0 = not at all, 100 = very much) using slider bars. 
 
22 It must be noted that in all the four studies of this research, for all the scales with slider bars (whether 




Participants were also asked to make a direct comparison between their own 
perceived moral character and that of the moral agent, again using a scale 0-100 with 
slider bars. In the instance of Francia’s vignette, the anchor points were: 0 = Francia is 
much less moral than I am, 50 = Francia and I are equally moral, 100 = Francia is much 
more moral than I am; participants were also allowed to bypass this question, by 
choosing I don't compare myself to Francia. 
A variable measuring an indirect form of moral character comparisons was 
computed by subtracting the self-evaluation score from the agent evaluation score. This 
variable, called moral discrepancy, could potentially vary from –100 to +100. Positive 
values indicated an upward comparison (agent evaluated more positively than the 
participant), whereas negative values indicated a downward comparison (participant 
evaluated more positively than the agent); zero indicated parity in this indirect form of 
moral comparison (lateral comparison). 
Lastly, participants were asked to rate the degree of courage, care, and justice of 
the moral actions performed by the agents; these three independent evaluations were 
measured again with slider bars using unipolar scales varying from 0 = not at all to 100 = 
very much. The wording of the question, for example for the item courage, was the 
following: “To what extent does the story depict an act of courage?”. 
Moral Self-Regulation 
Following the moral appraisals, participants were asked to rate the extent to which 
they agreed with a set of items aimed at measuring the moral self-regulatory response 
elicited by the presentation of the vignettes. These items comprised a variety of 
cognitions and action tendencies through which participants elaborated on their initial 
moral judgments while negotiating their self-concept; therefore, these items underpin 




moral agents bore on their own moral self; and b) regulated the impact of the agents’ 
actions on their self to orientate their own behaviour. 
The items were divided into two distinct sets of cognitions/action tendencies: 
positive and negative. The positive cognitions/action tendencies constituted the new 
scale of moral self-improvement, and the negative cognitions/action tendencies the new 
scale of moral self-defence; the latter contained a mix of self-enhancement and self-
protection items. Together, the moral self-improvement and moral self-defence scales 
formed the moral self-regulation inventory. 
The list of moral self-regulation items tested in Study 1 is shown in Tables A2-A3. All 
these indicators were measured with 0-100 agreement scales using slider bars (0 = 
strongly disagree, 50 = neither agree nor disagree, 100 = strongly agree). They were 
presented in randomised order, and all of them were worded in the direction of high 
self-enhancement or self-protection (no reverse-coding), following Hepper and 
colleagues’ (2010) trait scales. 
The moral self-regulatory items included in Study 1 represent a narrow selection of 
those developed in the early stage of the project. Because of the research design and 
the length of the questionnaire, a choice was made to prioritise and test only six items 






Table A2:  
Moral self-improvement items tested in Study 1 (example of Francia’s vignette) 
Item code Label Item wording 
SI1 Admirable Actions like this are truly admirable 
SI2 Awakened When I read these stories, I feel awakened to the good in the world 
SI3 Humanity This story strengthens my faith in humanity 
SI4 Values Francia and I share the same values 
SI5 BeBetter Francia has shown me how to be a better person 
SI6 ForOthers I feel like I want to do something good for others 
 
Table A3:  
Moral self-defence items tested in Study 1 (example of Francia’s vignette) 
Item code Label Item wording 
SD1 Ordinary It’s not such an extraordinary action 
SD2 MeGreater In many ways, I have done greater deeds than Francia 
SD3 Praise Francia’s actions may be good, but I bet she is seeking the praise of others 
SD4 Untrue This story is too good to be true 
SD5 Extreme These extreme behaviours should not be considered the standard we live by 
SD6 Superior Francia probably thinks she’s better than everyone else 
 
 
The item generation process involved a combination of deductive theory-driven 
approaches and inductive data-driven methods (DeVellis, 2003). As previously noted, 
some of the self-improvement items were inspired by measures of moral elevation 
utilised in previous research; for example, Aquino and colleagues (2011) used the item 
“The person/people in the story have shown me how to be a better person” 
(corresponding to item SI5: “Francia has shown me how to be a better person”), Schnall 
and colleagues (2010) used the item “optimistic about humanity” (corresponding to 
item SI3: “This story strengthens my faith in humanity”). The items of the self-defence 
scale were generated mostly within the theoretical framework of self-enhancement and 
self-protection. Some of the items refer to self-serving construal processes (Sedikides, 
2012), for example item SD4 (“This story is too good to be true”), or dismissive 
reasoning, for example item SD5 (“These extreme behaviours should not be considered 
the standard we live by”). Other items refer to the trivialisation of the deed, for example 




(Sedikides, 2012), for example item SD6 (“Francia probably thinks she’s better than 
everyone else”). Other items refer to self-aggrandising processes, for example item SD2 
(“In many ways, I have done greater deeds than Francia”). 
Following protocols recommended in the literature (see e.g., Bastos et al., 2010), 
the new experimenter-generated items were pre-tested qualitatively in a few brief 
interviews with members of the target population to assess content validity, as well as 
clarity and comprehension of their verbal expression. Then a selection of them was 
included in the present study, where they were presented in randomised order. 
Moral Affect 
Following the moral self-regulation measures, participants were asked to rate the 
extent to which they agreed with a set of items aimed at measuring their perceived 
affective reactions to the vignettes. These items assessed how participants felt after 
reading the moral stories. 
The full list of moral affect items tested in Study 1 is shown in Tables A4-A5. Two 
items were designed to capture specifically the perception of opportunity (PA3: “I felt 
challenged in a positive way”) and threat (NA2: “I felt as if I was threatened by 
something”) that the literature considers central to self-regulatory mechanisms. Item 
NA1 (“I had a mix of conflicting feelings”) was included to capture ambivalent feelings 
that could be associated with self-enhancement (see conceptual model in Fig. III). The 
other items assessed further affective states relevant to the response to good deeds, for 
example inspiration, envy, guilt, resentment. 
Like with the moral self-regulation scales, all the affective items were measured on 
0-100 agreement scales using slider bars (0 = strongly disagree, 50 = neither agree nor 
disagree, 100 = strongly agree). Again, the affect items included in this study were a 




made to prioritise and test only three items for the positive affect scale and five for the 
negative affect scale. All the items were presented in randomised order. 
 
Table A4:  
Positive moral affect items tested in Study 1 
Item code Label Item wording 
PA1 Uplifted I felt uplifted 
PA2 Inspired The story was inspiring 
PA3 Challenged I felt challenged in a positive way 
 
Table A5:  
Negative moral affect items tested in Study 1 
Item code Label Item wording 
NA1 Conflicted I had a mix of conflicting feelings 
NA2 Threatened I felt as if I was threatened by something 
NA3 Guilty It made me feel guilty 
NA4 Envious To be honest, I felt envious 




At the end of the closed-ended questions, participants had the opportunity to 
answer an open-ended question for each vignette. Specifically, the question asked: 
“Would you like to make any comments regarding this story or questionnaire? Please, 
feel free to share any relevant thoughts or feelings”. Participants’ answers were 
analysed to provide additional insight into the general content of the moral stories, as 
well as the wording of the questions and the items of the new scales. 
Procedure 
The study had received prior ethical approval by the Faculty of Science and 
Technology Research Ethics Committee (FSTREC) at Lancaster University (UK). 
Participants were invited to follow a link to an online questionnaire. They read 
information about the study, including that they could withdraw at any time without 




demographic and the moral self-evaluation questions, participants viewed a random 
selection of six vignettes, providing answers to the moral appraisal, the moral self-
regulation, the moral affect, and the open-ended questions. Following this, they were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. They also learned that, if they wanted, 
they could take part in a prize draw to win an Amazon voucher. The draw took place on 
27th October 2018 and on the same day the vouchers were emailed to the winners. 
Analytic Approach 
The dataset from Study 1 was analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics ver. 25-26, as well 
as R ver. 3.6 (R Core Team, 2020) and RStudio ver. 1.2 (RStudio Team, 2020)23, 
employing a variety of descriptive and exploratory techniques. First, multivariate outlier 
analysis was conducted to detect extreme data points. Next, analysis of the distributions 
and key assumptions for the main variables was conducted. Regression and correlation 
analyses were carried out to single out critical variables and investigate key relationships 
between them. Path modelling was used for the most promising vignettes to identify 
preliminary models that could shed light on the pathways between those critical 
variables. Lastly, thematic analysis of participants’ answers to the open-ended questions 
was carried out to obtain information used to improve content and wording of the items 
and the questionnaire. Overall, the analysis yielded a detailed understanding of 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as commonalities and differences, across the twelve 
vignettes, and provisional measurement and path models reflective of the conceptual 
model. 
During the analysis, the conceptual model was implicitly referenced as the 
theoretical backdrop, but no systematic hypothesis testing was carried out between 
 




vignettes. Methods originally developed in a confirmatory framework, such as path 
modelling, were used here in a model generation rather than validation approach. The 
use of path modelling (and SEM in general) as a preliminary exploratory procedure has 
recently become more common as a result of the issues related to the use of these 
techniques in the absence of strong hypotheses for the specification of a theoretical 
model (Marsh et al., 2014). In the past, tentative models would often yield poor fit, 
leading to extended sequences of model modification using the same datasets (Kaplan, 
1995, 2009). Nowadays, to avoid such practice, researchers often conduct preliminary 
path modelling (or SEM) to generate initial models; these provisional models are then 
fully tested and validated in subsequent research, often among larger samples, through 
the conventional confirmatory procedures typical of these methods. By clearly 
separating the exploratory and the confirmatory stages, the number of iterations of the 
model modification process in the validation stage is considerably reduced, thanks to 
the stronger bases on which the models subject to validation are specified. 
The critical evaluation of the combined findings from all the analyses of Study 1 
contributed to making informed decisions for the following stages of the research, such 





Results and Preliminary Reflections 
The final dataset from Study 1 was virtually complete, as only one participant did 
not answer one socio-demographic question (level of religiosity/spirituality). Otherwise, 
all the other variables had no missing data. 
Multivariate Outliers 
Following the preregistered analysis plan, multivariate outlier analysis was carried 
out. The analysis involved the calculation of centred leverage values, Mahalanobis 
distance, and Cook’s distance. Centred leverage values and Mahalanobis distance are 
informative about the distance of the data points from the centroid of the predictors’ 
space. Following Belsley et al. (1980), the cutoff points for centred leverage values were 
identified through the formula: 
2(1+k)/n 
where n represents the sample size and k the number of predictors. 
The cutoff points for the Mahalanobis distance were identified through the critical 
chi-square at the chosen probability level (here α = .001) with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of predictors (Stevens, 1984). 
Cook’s distance provided complementary information about the overall influence of 
the data points on the regression equation. The cutoff points were identified through 
the formula (Fox, 2015): 
4/(n–k–1) 
where n represents the sample size and k the number of predictors.  
As a conservative strategy, participants were considered extreme multivariate 
outliers if they lay beyond at least two out of three of the above-mentioned cutoff 




model: positive and negative moral affect. A total of 18 participants were found to be 
multivariate outliers; the complete list by vignette is shown in Table A6. 
 
Table A6:  
Number of outliers and participant ID for each vignette 
Vignette Number of outliers Participant ID 
Cory 2 59, 146 
Wesley 3 11, 37, 70 
Arnaud 2 67, 70 
Francia 3 16, 77, 85 
Matthew 1 70 
Sarah 2 19, 122 
Joey 2 134, 146 
Markus 2 46, 54 
Ruxandra 1 70 
Alvaro 1 70 
Sunita 2 65, 143 
Nicholas 3 70, 131, 137 
 
 
It can be noticed that outliers recurring across multiple vignettes were rare. 
Participant 70 was an outlier in six vignettes, participant 146 in two vignettes, and each 
of the other outliers was detected in only one vignette. Crucially, even when the 
distance from the predictors’ centroid was large, the influence on the regression 
equation for both positive and negative affect was noticeable only in two vignettes for 
participant 70 (Ruxandra and Matthew) and no influence was noticeable for participant 
146. Because the impact caused by the outliers was deemed trivial, the full sample of 
146 participants was retained. 
Moral Appraisals 
The details of the descriptive statistics for the moral appraisal variables can be 
found in SMA4. Regarding the moral self-evaluation, the mean score was very high (M = 
82.86, SD = 12.85) and the distribution was asymmetric. The mean scores of the moral 




varied between 79.53 and 88.32, as can be seen in Figure A124. Wesley received the 
highest evaluation of moral character (M = 88.32, SD = 15.22). The other top ratings 
were for Arnaud (M = 87.86, SD = 14.87), Nicholas (M = 86.75, SD = 15.75), Joey (M = 
86.57, SD = 15.41), and Francia (M = 86.40, SD = 17.15). The two vignettes with the 
lowest scores received considerably lower ratings, with greater variability around the 
means: Ruxandra (M = 59.28, SD = 23.53) and Alvaro (M = 58.70, SD = 27.22). 
 
Figure A1:  









The mean scores of the level of goodness of the deeds were on average even higher 
and varied between 78.23 and 93.90 for the same top ten vignettes (Fig. A2). Francia’s 
deed (M = 93.90, SD = 10.90) and Cory’s deed (M = 93.90, SD = 10.21) received the 
highest evaluation, followed closely by the deeds performed by Wesley (M = 92.87, SD = 
14.58) and Arnaud (M = 92.64, SD = 11.87). Again, the two moral actions with the lowest 
scores obtained substantially lower ratings, with greater variability around the means: 
Alvaro (M = 55.07, SD = 30.97) and Ruxandra (M = 45.01, SD = 31.10). 
 
Figure A2:  




With regard to the measure of indirect moral comparison (moral discrepancy, i.e. 
the difference between agent evaluation and self-evaluation), when aggregating all the 
evaluations across the twelve vignettes, the mean score was negative (M = -2.63, SD = 
22.79), indicating a slight tendency toward downward comparisons. Figure A3 displays 




overall upward moral comparison, although the values were not far from zero; this 
phenomenon is not surprising, considering the uncommon goodness of many of the 
moral acts performed in the stories. Among the remaining six vignettes, which were on 
average in downward comparison, two of them (Alvaro and Ruxandra) showed moral 
discrepancy values that were much lower than the others; this was mostly a reflection of 
the lower rating of the moral character of the protagonists of those vignettes and 
explains why the overall moral discrepancy across the twelve vignettes was negative. 
 
Figure A3:  
Moral discrepancy (indirect moral character comparison): bean plots with mean scores 




The direct moral comparison measure depicted a slightly different scenario (Fig. 
A4). In aggregate, the mean was well above the scale mid-point (i.e., 50) indicating an 
overall upward comparison: M = 64.22, SD = 20.54. Thus, when participants were forced 




less flattering image of their own relative moral standing. Eleven vignettes out of twelve 
showed an average upward comparison and only Alvaro’s vignette displayed an average 
downward comparison. Interestingly, with this direct measure, Ruxandra showed an 
average upward comparison, while the previous indirect measure revealed an average 
downward comparison. Because the self-evaluation question was asked at the beginning 
of the questionnaire, well before showing the vignettes and rating the moral agents, its 
score reflected a chronic assessment of the moral self, independent of the protagonists 
of the vignettes; therefore, it could be argued that the indirect measure of moral 
comparison was indicative of a trait-like comparison of the self with the moral agent. By 
contrast, the direct measure – obtained immediately after viewing the vignettes – could 
be considered more indicative of a state-like comparison, the self-evaluation having 
been made just as salient as the agent evaluation at the time of the measurement. 
 
Figure A4:  






Another way to look at the indirect moral comparison measure is to examine the 
proportion of upward, downward, and lateral comparisons for each vignette; this means 
comparing the percentage of participants who showed a negative, positive, or null value 
of moral discrepancy for each vignette (see Fig. A5). 
 
Figure A5:  





The moral actions in the vignettes were meant to showcase different moral 
domains (Fig. A6): care, courage, and justice (sometimes partly overlapping). In terms of 
care, Francia’s deed was perceived as the most caring (M = 95.60, SD = 7.20), but many 
others received high ratings, too (Joey, Wesley, Matt, Cory, and Arnaud). Once again, 
the deeds performed by Ruxandra (M = 59.73, SD = 32.11) and Alvaro (M = 58.32, SD = 
35.78) appeared at the bottom of the rank by a considerable margin. 
In terms of courage, Arnaud’s (M = 97.46, SD = 7.04), Cory’s (M = 96.76, SD = 6.83), 
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by Francia’s (M = 93.89, SD = 9.74) and Nicholas’s (M = 89.35, SD = 16.47). Below the 50 
mark (mid-point of the scale) were the acts performed by Alvaro, Matthew, Sarah, and 
Ruxandra (the last with a very low mean of 28.62 and a large standard deviation of 
30.09). 
In terms of justice, Nicholas’s deed (M = 92.55, SD = 12.30) was perceived to be by 
far the most just, followed at a distance by Sunita’s deed (M = 73.63, SD = 26.62). For 
once, the repairing nature of Alvaro’s deed endowed it a relatively high score (M = 
66.36), although with noticeable variability (SD = 33.52), while Francia’s deed, the most 
caring of them all, received the lowest rating (M = 17.82, SD = 23.48). 
A comparison of the perceived nature of the deeds across all the twelve vignettes 
showed that the moral domain of justice is the most discriminating: it was perceived to 
be highly pertinent to a more limited set of vignettes, particularly Nicholas (social justice 
for minority groups) and not at all relevant to other vignettes, for instance Francia and 
Cory. On the other hand, a substantial overlap was observed between courage and care, 
especially in Francia, but also in Arnaud, Cory, and Wesley (all brave actions aimed at 
taking care of someone in need). 
These findings seemed to suggest that Nicholas and Francia could be the two most 
interesting vignettes to further explore in the next stages of the research: the former 
focussing on justice, the latter other on care (and courage); the former with more mixed 
judgments, the latter positively received by almost all participants. In the rest of the 
analysis of Study 1, these two vignettes were scrutinised with particular attention to 
confirm the initial impression that they were good candidates for selection. 
A third vignette stood out from the rest for being very different: Ruxandra (the 
vegetarian). It emerged as arguably the least positive scenario, with the lowest means 




of the protagonist, the lowest moral discrepancy, and the highest proportion of 
downward comparisons. This could be a third promising vignette for further 
investigation, particularly to explore how less positive judgments affect moral self-
regulation and prosocial behaviour. 
 
Figure A6:  
Moral domain: perception about the nature of the deed (courage, care, justice) for the 





Whereas the detail of the descriptive statistics for the items of the moral self-
regulation inventory can be found in SMA5, a summary of the reliability analysis for the 
self-improvement and self-defence scales (six items each) is illustrated in Table A7 and 
discussed below. At this stage, the analysis aimed at determining if any items were 
decidedly inadequate, with a view to retaining the same item list for all the vignettes, 







































































































































across vignettes. In addition, consideration was given to rewording the items if clear 
directions for improvement were identified. 
Overall, the self-improvement scale showed satisfactory internal consistency, with 
Cronbach’s alpha always above .80. Across all the vignettes, Cronbach’s alpha ranged 
between .813 (Arnaud) and .875 (Matthew). Sometimes the original 6-item scale could 
be marginally improved by deleting one item in certain vignettes, but that small 
improvement would cause a drop in Cronbach’s alpha in the other vignettes. 
The self-defence scale overall showed greater variability and lower internal 
consistency than the self-improvement scale. In three vignettes Cronbach’s alpha was 
equal or higher than .700 (Alvaro, Markus and Ruxandra), in two vignettes it was 
comprised between .642 and .660 (Matthew, Sarah and Sunita), and in all the remaining 
vignettes it fell in the region of .5 or even .4. This lower level of internal consistency was 
due to the fact that some of the six self-defence items did not correlate strongly with 
the scale. Reliability of the scale would improve with the removal, for example, of item 
SD5/Extreme (which recurred four times as a candidate for deletion or rewording), and 
item SD4/Untrue (twice). 
Table A7 shows Cronbach’s alpha for both the self-improvement and the self-
defence scales for all the twelve vignettes, highlighting the items that could be deleted 
to improve internal consistency. More detailed analyses of reliability for the moral self-






Table A7:  
Cronbach’s alpha for the self-improvement and self-defence scales for the 12 vignettes 
Vignette 
Moral self-regulation scales 
Self-improvement  Self-defence  
original scale 
with 6 items 
reduced scale 
if any item deleted 
original scale 
with 6 items 
reduced scale 

































Joey .821 - .539 
.564 
(SD2/MeGreater) 














Nicholas .862 - .524 .604 
(SD5/Extreme) 
Note: in parenthesis the items that, if removed, would improve Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
 
The composite means for the self-improvement and self-defence scales are shown 






Figure A7:  




Figure A8:  







Overall, participants showed higher levels of self-improvement (M = 61.12, SD = 
23.65) than self-defence (M = 19.05, SD = 17.74). Francia’s deed generated the highest 
self-improvement mean (M = 70.34, SD = 19.79), followed closely by Joey’s (M = 68.67, 
SD = 20.08), Wesley’s (M = 67.88, SD = 21.32), Cory’s (M = 67.22, SD = 19.72), Matthew’s 
(M = 66.53, SD = 22.23), and Nicholas’s (M = 66.51, SD = 22.80); relative to these, 
Alvaro’s and Ruxandra’s deeds induced less improvement regulation (respectively, M = 
42.95, SD = 24.75, and M = 36.91, SD = 21.02). 
In terms of self-defence, Ruxandra’s vignette produced the highest mean score (M 
= 35.86, SD = 21.77), followed by Alvaro’s (M = 24.83, SD = 18.78). Francia’s vignette 
generated the lowest score (M = 13.42, SD = 12.20). 
Moral Affect 
Whereas the detail of the descriptive statistics for the items of the moral affect 
scales can be found in SMA6, a summary of the reliability analysis for the positive and 
negative affect scales (three and five items respectively) is illustrated in Table A8 and 
discussed below. As for moral self-regulation, at this stage the analysis aimed at 
determining if any items were clearly inadequate across all the vignettes, with the aim of 
having a set of items with balanced performance across all of them, rather than optimal 
for any single vignette. In addition, if necessary, consideration was given to rewording 
poorer items. 
Overall, the original three-item positive affect scale showed an acceptable degree 
of internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha varying from .690 to .875; however, for 
most vignettes, Cronbach’s alpha could be improved by removing item PA3/Challenged, 
which often inadequately correlated with the scale. The modified two-item positive 
affect scale showed an improved level of reliability, ranging between .778 (Francia) and 




The exception was Joey’s vignette, for which overall the positive affect scale did not 
seem to be particularly efficient: in this case, the best candidate for deletion was item 
PA2/Inspired (Cronbach’s alpha would improve from .690 to .699), while removing item 
PA3/Challenged would cause Cronbach’s alpha to drop from .690 to .625, which is much 
lower than all other vignettes. 
The original five-item negative affect scale showed greater variability across 
vignettes, and overall exhibited lower internal consistency than the positive affect scale. 
This pattern mirrors the pattern observed for defensive self-regulatory processes. In six 
vignettes, the original five-item scale was the optimal one, with Cronbach’s Alpha 
varying from .764 (Ruxandra) to .514 (Alvaro). In the remaining six vignettes at least one 
item could be removed with an improvement of Cronbach’s alpha, particularly item 
NA1/Conflicted, which correlated less markedly with the scale, especially in the 
vignettes where the moral action was more highly regarded. However, the elimination 
of that item would cause a drop in the internal consistency of the negative affect scale 
of the other vignettes. Joey’s vignette appeared to have the lowest internal consistency 
also in the negative affect scale: with the original five items, Cronbach’s alpha was only 
.430, and improved to .574 (which is still low) if three items were deleted. 
Table A8 displays Cronbach’s alpha for both the positive and negative affect scales 
for all the twelve vignettes, showing the items that could be deleted to improve 







Table A8:  
Cronbach’s alpha for the positive and negative affect scales across the 12 vignettes 
Vignette 
Moral affect scales 
Positive affect Negative affect 
original scale 
with 3 items 
reduced scale 
if any item deleted 
original scale 
with 5 items 
reduced scale 
if any item deleted 
Cory .751 .782 (PA3/Challenged) .580 
.736 
(NA1/Conflicted) 
Wesley .783 .809 (PA3/Challenged) .551 
.665 
(NA1/Conflicted) 
Arnaud .816 .857 (PA3/Challenged) .640 - 
Francia .695 .778 (PA3/Challenged) .746 - 
Matthew .819 .861 (PA3/Challenged) .613 - 






















Ruxandra .869 .887 (PA3/Challenged) .764 - 
Alvaro .845 .911 (PA3/Challenged) .514 - 
Sunita .808 - .756 - 
Nicholas .733 .815 (PA3/Challenged) .651 
.763 
(NA1/Conflicted) 
Note: in parenthesis the items that, if removed, would improve Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
 
The composite means for the positive affect and negative affect scales are shown 






Figure A9:  




Figure A10:  






Overall, participants reported experiencing more positive than negative affect 
(respectively, M = 62.26, SD = 30.52, and M = 14.03, SD = 14.47). The results for positive 
affect by vignette mirrored the self-improvement scores: Francia’s action elicited the 
highest levels of positive affect (M = 76.62, SD = 22.11), followed closely by Wesley’s (M 
= 74.23, SD = 26.11). High levels of positive affect were reported also for the deeds 
performed by Joey (M = 70.44, SD = 24.40), Matthew (M = 69.95, SD = 26.05), Nicholas 
(M = 67.85, SD = 28.88), and Cory (M = 67.56, SD = 27.16). Alvaro’s and Ruxandra’s 
deeds elicited considerably lower levels of positive affect (respectively, M = 40.54, SD = 
32.89, and M = 32.99, SD = 30.23). 
The highest negative affect value was observed in Arnaud’s vignette (M = 17.91, SD 
= 15.98); strongly negative feelings probably arose because of the tragic ending of the 
story (i.e., the death of the protagonist). Ruxandra’s deed followed closely behind (M = 
17.47, SD = 17.86); in this case, some degree of negative affect arose most likely due to 
the polarising or controversial nature of her moral action (being vegetarian and 
campaigning for it). Matthew’s deed elicited the lowest levels of negative affect (M = 
9.31, SD = 11.30). 
Overall, analysis of the moral self-regulation and affect scales confirmed that 
Nicholas and Francia could be considered good candidates to be progressed to the next 
phases of the research, with Ruxandra as a strong runner-up. 
Analysis of Distribution Bias and Assumptions 
All the main moral appraisal, self-regulation, and affect variables in the dataset 
were measured through interval25 scales varying from 0 to 100, making them 101-point 
 
25 It could be argued that the scales are actually ratio, and not just interval, depending on whether or not 
the zero score on the 0-100 scale is regarded as a true zero point. However, Stevens’s (1946) traditional 
theory of measurement, which distinguishes between nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio levels of 
measurement, has been repeatedly challenged (see e.g., Velleman & Wilkinson, 1993; Williams, 2020), in 




scales. Following Jöreskog and Sörbom’s (1996) criterion reported by Schumacker and 
Lomax (2004), quantitative variables with 15 or more points in the scale (like those used 
here) can be referenced as continuous; continuous variables show better psychometric 
properties than traditional ordinal Likert-type scales with three, four, or five levels. 
However, because the vignettes depict stories of moral goodness (some truly 
uncommon levels of goodness), violations of the assumption of univariate normality 
were expected in the distribution of several variables. Effectively, the moral appraisal 
variables often exhibited negative skew; in some cases, the mode was the highest point 
in the scale (100). High levels of kurtosis could also be observed in the distributions of 
several moral appraisal variables. Regarding moral self-regulation, several self-
improvement items and the composite mean showed long lower tails, and several self-
defence items and the composite mean exhibited long upper tails. Similarly, several 
positive affect items and the composite mean showed long lower tails, and several 
negative affect items and the composite mean long upper tails. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk normality tests (Tab. A9a) highlighted violation of 
normality for all these variables. However, even more important than violations of 
univariate normality are violations of multivariate normality. Mardia’s (1970) tests 
indicated violation of multivariate normality for kurtosis, but not for skewness (Tab. 
A9b). As noted by Byrne (2016), violations caused by skewness represent an issue for 
the application of parametric testing (based on means), while violations caused by 
kurtosis are particularly critical for the use of asymptotic estimation methods in factor 
analysis and structural equation modelling (based on variance/covariance). 
Attempts to eliminate the distribution bias through transformations could not be 
pursued because of the opposite direction of the skew for self-improvement/positive 




ensuing studies, to reduce its impact a variety of analytic steps were undertaken, for 
example bootstrapping, non-parametric testing, robust and non-asymptotic estimation 
techniques (details to follow where appropriate). 
 
Tables A9a-b:  
Tests of univariate and multivariate normality for key moral appraisal, self-regulation, 
and affect variables (all vignettes aggregated: N=876 observations) 
  Tab. A9a 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova  Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Moral discrepancy  .116 876 <.001  .950 876 <.001 
Goodness of the deed  .232 876 <.001  .755 876 <.001 
Propriety of the deed  .189 876 <.001  .835 876 <.001 
         
SI1/Admirable  .181 876 <.001  .837 876 <.001 
SI2/Awakened  .116 876 <.001  .899 876 <.001 
SI3/Humanity  .139 876 <.001  .881 876 <.001 
SI4/Values  .094 876 <.001  .944 876 <.001 
SI5/BeBetter  .129 876 <.001  .912 876 <.001 
SI6/ForOthers  .106 876 <.001  .917 876 <.001 
SD1/Ordinary  .247 876 <.001  .764 876 <.001 
SD2/MeGreater  .230 876 <.001  .800 876 <.001 
SD3/Praise  .269 876 <.001  .687 876 <.001 
SD4/Untrue  .285 876 <.001  .640 876 <.001 
SD5/Extreme  .205 876 <.001  .842 876 <.001 
SD6/Superior  .274 876 <.001  .660 876 <.001 
Self-improvement scale  .081 876 <.001  .961 876 <.001 
Self-defence scale  .118 876 <.001  .916 876 <.001 
         
PA1/Uplifted  .109 876 <.001  .893 876 <.001 
PA2/Inspired  .142 876 <.001  .876 876 <.001 
PA3/Challenged  .147 876 <.001  .893 876 <.001 
NA1/Conflicted  .246 876 <.001  .786 876 <.001 
NA2/Threatened  .305 876 <.001  .542 876 <.001 
NA3/Guilty  .288 876 <.001  .677 876 <.001 
NA4/Envious  .298 876 <.001  .637 876 <.001 
NA5/Resentful  .313 876 <.001  .515 876 <.001 
Positive affect scale  .109 876 <.001  .916 876 <.001 
Negative affect scale  .166 876 <.001  .860 876 <.001 
Note: a. Lilliefors significance correction 
 
Tab. A9b Statistic Sig. Result (multivariate normality) 
Mardia’s skewness -41594.404 .999 YES 
Mardia’s kurtosis 83.394 <.001 NO 
Overall multivariate normality   NO 
 
 
Relationships Between Key Variables 




Correlation analysis was conducted to investigate the zero-order associations 
between moral comparison and moral self-regulation, which unveiled asymmetric 
probabilities of experiencing certain modes of self-regulation in association with 
different moral comparison types. Although these results were preliminary and the 
analysis was purely correlational, a clear pattern seemed to emerge: when aggregating 
all the evaluations made by participants across all the vignettes that were presented to 
them (N = 87626), moral discrepancy correlated positively with self-improvement (r = 
.601, p < .001) and negatively with self-defence (r = -.395, p < .001), as documented in 
Table A10 (with bootstrap confidence intervals). 
Here (and in the ensuing studies) the Pearson’s r correlation coefficient was used 
(with the related significance test) even if violations of normality in the dataset would, in 
theory, suggest the use of non-parametric coefficients and tests. In such instances, 
traditional statistics textbooks would recommend the use of Spearman’s rho, which 
measures the relationship between two variables based on rank-order. However, 
empirical research based on Monte Carlo simulations (see e.g., Havlicek & Peterson, 
1976) has provided evidence of the robustness of Pearson’s correlation coefficient (and 
the relative significance test) to violations of various parameter assumptions, such as 




26 It must be noted that the aggregation of all evaluations across vignettes violates the assumption of 
independence of the observations, as participants viewed and rated six vignettes randomly selected from a 
pool of twelve. However, the following analysis by vignette showed in most cases the same pattern. 
27 To ensure robustness of Pearson’s r coefficient vs Spearman’s rho coefficient (and the associated 
significance tests), a comparison between the results from the use of the two measures was carried out (for 
further details, see SMA9). As the results corroborated Havlicek and Peterson’s claim reported above, in the 
present study Pearson’s r correlation coefficient was used. Because the ensuing studies were conducted 
among larger samples, Pearson’s r remained the elective measure of bivariate correlation. In addition, 




Table A10:  
Zero-order correlation between moral discrepancy and moral self-regulation measures 
with bootstrap confidence intervals (all vignettes aggregated: N=876 observations) 
   Self-improvement Self-defence 
Moral 
discrepancy 
Pearson Correlation   .601*** -.395*** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   <.001 <.001 
N   876 876 
Bootstrapb 
Bias   <.001 .001 
Std. Error   .023 .034 
BCa 95% C.I. 
Lower   .552 -.464 
Upper   .646 -.327 
 Note:       *** p < .001 (2-tailed) 
                  b. Bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
 
 
The scatter plots in Figures A11a-b illustrate graphically the distributions of these 
moral evaluations and the corresponding self-regulatory modes (all vignettes 
aggregated). The scatter plot in panel “a” clearly shows a strong prevalence of data 
points in the upper/right-hand quadrant (upward comparison and higher levels of self-
improvement) and the lower/left-hand quadrant (downward comparison and lower 
levels of self-improvement), indicating a strong positive correlation between moral 
discrepancy and self-improvement. Similarly, panel “b” clearly shows a prevalence of 
data points in the lower/right-hand quadrant (upward comparison and lower levels of 
self-defence) and the upper/left-hand quadrant (downward comparison and higher 
levels of self-defence), indicating a lower, but still large28 negative correlation between 
moral discrepancy and self-defence. 
  
 
28 Following Hemphill’s (2003) comments on how to interpret correlation coefficients in social psychological 
studies, Gignac & Szodorai (2016) carried out meta-analyses to provide improved guidelines to discern the 
magnitude of correlations, particularly for research on individual differences. They concluded that the 
typical correlation (in absolute value) should be expected to be around .20, and therefore correlations 
above .30 should be considered large, and below .10 small. These guidelines for large correlations 
considerably depart from Cohen’s (1988, 1992) initial recommendations of Pearson’s r values of .50 to 




Figures A11a-b:  
Relations between moral discrepancy and the two modes of moral self-regulation: 







For the most part, the results of correlation analysis with all vignettes aggregated 
held up when analysing the data at the level of the individual vignettes (assuming their 
independence): in seven out of twelve vignettes the correlation pattern remained the 
same, while in the remaining five vignettes only the positive correlation between moral 
discrepancy and self-improvement consistently emerged as significant (Tab. A11). The 
significant correlation between moral discrepancy and self-regulation suggested the 
possibility to modify the conceptual model (Fig. III), enabling the use of the variable 
moral discrepancy and the analysis at total sample instead of by subsample of upward 
and downward “comparers”, as previously hypothesised. 
 
  




Table A11:  
Zero-order correlation between moral discrepancy and moral self-regulation measures 
by vignette 





Pearson Correlation .443*** -.125 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .294 
Wesley 
n=75 
Pearson Correlation .441*** -.079 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .501 
Arnaud 
n=72 
Pearson Correlation .500*** .023 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .848 
Francia  
n=73 
Pearson Correlation .429*** -.304** 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .009 
Matthew 
n=73 
Pearson Correlation .578*** -.340** 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .003 
Sarah 
n=76 
Pearson Correlation .552*** -.361** 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .001 
Joey 
n=72 
Pearson Correlation .500*** -.084 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .483 
Markus 
n=75 
Pearson Correlation .431*** -.455*** 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 <.001 
Ruxandra 
n=74 
Pearson Correlation .534*** -.428*** 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 <.001 
Alvaro 
n=69 
Pearson Correlation .610*** -.372** 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .002 
Sunita 
n=70 
Pearson Correlation .562*** -.483*** 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 <.001 
Nicholas 
n=75 
Pearson Correlation .608*** -.150 
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001 .199 
Note:    ** p < .01 (2-tailed) *** p < .001 (2-tailed) n denotes the sample size by vignette 
 
 
Moral Self-Regulation and Affect 
The other important set of relationships in the conceptual model was the 
association between moral self-regulation and affect. In line with the hypotheses, the 
empirical data from Study 1, when aggregating all the vignettes, showed that self-
improvement strongly positively correlated with positive affect (r = .840, p < .001), and 
self-defence moderately correlated positively with negative affect (r = .285, p < .001). 
Negative affect also negatively correlated with positive affect (r = -.355, p < .001). The 





Table A12:  
Zero-order correlation between moral self-regulation and moral affect measures with 
bootstrap confidence intervals (all vignettes aggregated: N=876 observations) 
  Positive affect Negative affect 
Self-improvement Pearson Correlation  .840*** .050 
Sig. (2-tailed)  <.001 .135 
N  876 876 
Bootstrapc 
Bias  -.001 -.002 
Std. Error  .012 .034 
BCa 95% C.I. 
Lower  .816 -.014 
Upper  .860 .116 
     
Self-defence Pearson Correlation  -.355*** .285*** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  <.001 <.001 
N  876 876 
Bootstrapc 
Bias  <.001 <.001 
Std. Error  .032 .034 
BCa 95% C.I. 
Lower  -.417 .213 
Upper  -.291 .350 
Note:        *** p < .001 (2-tailed). 
                  c. Bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
 
 
The scatter plots in Figures A15a-b illustrate graphically the distributions of the self-
regulatory modes and affective outcomes (all vignettes aggregated). The scatter plot in 
panel “a” clearly shows a strong prevalence of data points in the upper/right-hand 
quadrant (high levels of self-improvement and positive affect) and the lower/left-hand 
quadrant (low levels of self-Improvement and positive affect), indicating a strong 
positive correlation between self-improvement and positive affect. Similarly, panel “b” 
shows a prevalence of data points in the lower/left-hand quadrant (low levels of self-
defence and negative affect) and the upper/right-hand quadrant (high levels of self-
defence and negative affect), indicating a positive but less strong correlation between 






Figures A12a-b:  
Relations between the two modes of moral self-regulation and moral affect: scatter plots 








Correlation analysis at the level of the individual vignettes (assuming their 
independence) showed a replication of the results observed for all vignettes aggregated 
in eight out of twelve vignettes; in the remaining four vignettes only the positive 
correlation between self-improvement and positive affect consistently emerged as 
significant (Tab. A13). 
 
  




Table A13:  
Zero-order correlations between moral self-regulation and affect measures by vignette 




Pearson Correlation .728***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .347** 




Pearson Correlation .784***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .332** 




Pearson Correlation .765***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .438*** 




Pearson Correlation .790***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .365** 




Pearson Correlation .837***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .428*** 




Pearson Correlation .883***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .040 




Pearson Correlation .761***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .114 




Pearson Correlation .834***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .294* 




Pearson Correlation .812***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .114 




Pearson Correlation .872***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .396** 




Pearson Correlation .806***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .209 




Pearson Correlation .803***  
Sig. (2-tailed) <.001  
Self-defence 
Pearson Correlation  .300** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .009 
Note:         * p < .05 (2-tailed)       ** p < .01 (2-tailed)                 *** p < .001 (2-tailed) 






Other Correlation Patterns 
Analysis of zero-order correlations between other critical variables showed that, 
with all vignettes aggregated, the moral self-evaluation was not significantly correlated 
with either broadening (r = .011, p = .756) or defensive self-regulation (r = .001, p = 
.972), and either positive (r = .001, p = .980) or negative affect (r = -.058, p = .084); it also 
did not correlate with the appraisals of the goodness (r = .062, p = .067) and the 
propriety of the deed (r = .020, p = .562). 
By contrast, the goodness of the deed correlated strongly with self-regulatory and 
affective states: positively with self-improvement (r = .647, p < .001) and positive affect 
(r = .607, p < .001), negatively with self-defence (r = -.492, p < .001) and negative affect 
(r = -.077, p = .022). The same pattern was found for the propriety of the deed: positive 
correlation with self-improvement (r = .502, p < .001) and positive affect (r = .430, p < 
.001), negative correlation with self-defence (r = -.415, p < .001) and negative affect (r = 
-.168, p < .001). Details of these correlation patterns can be found in SMA9. 
Multiple Linear Regression 
After obtaining a general overview through the analysis of the moral appraisals, the 
self-regulatory, and the affective variables, including their zero-order correlations, the 
next step was to regress separately the two outcome variables (positive and negative 
affect) on all their main predictors, measuring the variance explained by the models and 
the strength of these relationships. The predictors entered in the forward selection 
procedure were the following: age, religiosity, political orientation29, moral self-
evaluation, agent evaluation, moral discrepancy, goodness of the deed, propriety of the 
 
29 Given the near perfect correlation between the variables of political orientation on economic matters and 





deed, relevance, similarity, courage, care, justice, in-shoes, self-improvement, and self-
defence. A further set of multiple linear regressions was also conducted regressing 
separately self-improvement and self-defence on all their main predictors. The forward 
selection process usually has the advantage to identify fewer significant predictors than 
other procedures, such as the backward elimination process (Field et al., 2012)30. In 
addition, it is a simpler stepwise approach that in this exploratory context was preferred 
to more complex regularised methods. 
Multiple linear regression assumes independence of the observations and normal 
distribution of the residuals of the dependent variable. As previously discussed, these 
assumptions were not met by the data. However, at this stage these analyses were 
purely exploratory and were not associated with any specific decision criteria. They 
aimed to provide some initial evidence of the strength of the main predictors of self-
regulatory and affective outcomes in relation to the conceptual model, and 
encompassed only continuous variables, without analysing interactions. Given the 
purely exploratory purpose, a few sociodemographic variables were added to the 
analysis, even if not included in the conceptual model, to ensure they had no major 
impact on the outcome variables. Indeed, past research has shown that holders of 
traditional religious beliefs and conservative views are more prone to rejection and 
defensive reactions toward deeds that conflict with their morals (with regard to 
homosexuality, see e.g., Janssen & Scheepers, 2019; with regard to vegetarianism, see 
e.g., Hoffarth et al., 2019). 
 
30 In fact, forced entry and backward elimination did produce a larger number of predictors, many of weak 
effect size (e.g., both forced entry and backward elimination in Francia’s vignette found seven significant 




When aggregating all the vignettes, the variance explained in the model with 
positive affect as dependent variable was much greater (adjusted R2 = .715) than the 
variance explained in the model with negative affect as dependent variable (adjusted R2 
= .177). In line with the general assumptions of the conceptual model in Figure III, the 
best predictor of positive affect was self-improvement (β = .754) and the best predictor 
of negative affect was self-defence (β = .298). The variance explained in the model with 
self-improvement as dependent variable was greater (adjusted R2 = .577) than the 
variance explained in the model with self-defence as dependent variable (adjusted R2 = 
.293). The best predictors of self-improvement were agent evaluation (β = .328) and 
goodness of the deed (β = .244), and the best predictors of self-defence were goodness 
of the deed (β = -.267) and propriety of the deed (β = -.196). Moral discrepancy was a 
significant predictor of self-defence. 
Bearing in mind these initial results, a further set of regressions with the forward 
selection procedure was conducted independently for the top vignettes of Francia, 
Nicholas, and Ruxandra. The total variance explained by the models, reflected in the 
adjusted R2, was again considerably higher for the prediction of positive affect and self-






Tables A14a-b:  
Multiple linear regressions for the vignettes with Francia, Nicholas, and Ruxandra 
(forward selection): model summaries. Dependent variables: positive/negative affect, 
self-improvement/self-defence 
 
Tab A14a: Dependent variables - positive and negative affect 
 Vignette 
Dependent variable: positive affect  Dependent variable: negative affect 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 Francia .790 .624 .619 13.743  .525 .276 .244 13.946 
 Nicholas .820 .672 .663 16.817  .506 .256 .224 12.750 
 Ruxandra .812 .659 .655 17.763  .510 .260 .229 15.68701 
 
 
Tab A14b: Dependent variables – self-improvement and self-defence 
 Vignette 
Dependent variable: self-improvement  Dependent variable: self-defence 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 Francia .690 .477 .454 14.734  .435 .189 .178 12.244 
 Nicholas .806 .649 .629 13.965  .244 .060 .046 11.982 
 Ruxandra .758 .575 .550 14.102  .607 .368 .350 18.898 
 
 
The significant predictors and the regression coefficients for Francia, Nicholas, and 
Ruxandra are exhibited in Tables A15a-d. One thing worth noting is that the variable 
religiosity/spirituality appears as a positive predictor of both self-improvement and self-
defence/negative affect; this phenomenon could be explained by the fact that the 
question was inadvertently double-barrelled: conflating in a single construct two 
variables (religiosity and spirituality) that could be non-significantly correlated could 
have caused this inconsistent behaviour. From Study 2 onward, two distinct questions 
were asked. 
Importantly, multicollinearity was never an issue in these analyses, since the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) was never greater than 2.4 (values above 10 are 
considered problematic; see Myers, 1990; full regression output available in SMA10). 




better than using the mean of the dependent variable (intercept-only models, see 
SMA10). 
 
Tables A15a-d:  
Multiple linear regressions for the three main vignettes (forward selection): significant 
coefficients. Dependent variables: positive/negative affect, self-improvement/self-
defence 
 
Tab. A15a: Regression coefficients - Dependent variable: positive affect 





B Std. Error Beta   
 Francia 
(Constant) 14.497 5.981  2.424 .018 
Self-improvement .883 .082 .790 10.786 <.001 
       
 Nicholas 
(Constant) -23.484 11.184  -2.100 .039 
Self-improvement .812 .117 .642 6.924 <.001 
Agent evaluation .428 .170 .234 2.525 .014 
       
 Ruxandra 
(Constant) -10.101 4.194  -2.409 .019 
Self-improvement 1.167 .099 .812 11.806 <.001 
 
 
Tab. A15b: Regression coefficients - Dependent variable: negative affect 
 Vignette Significant Predictors 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta   
 Francia 
(Constant) -10.521 6.745  -1.560 .123 
Self-defence .486 .125 .409 3.879 <.001 
Self-improvement .208 .088 .259 2.376 .020 
Relevance .121 .059 .220 2.056 .044 
       
 Nicholas 
(Constant) 24.244 8.014  3.025 .003 
Propriety -.247 .077 -.332 -3.192 .002 
Self-defence .368 .126 .312 2.914 .005 
Religiosity/Spirituality .106 .046 .244 2.301 .024 
       
 Ruxandra 
(Constant) 5.058 8.410  .601 .550 
Self-improvement .427 .095 .503 4.500 <.001 
Self-defence .231 .085 .303 2.719 .008 





Tab. A15c: Regression coefficients - Dependent variable: self-improvement 
 Vignette Significant Predictors 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta   
 Francia 
(Constant) 9.425 7.966  1.183 .241 
Propriety .524 .091 .529 5.753 <.001 
Similarity .207 .076 .249 2.710 .009 
Religiosity/Spirituality .111 .052 .189 2.144 .036 
       
 Nicholas 
(Constant) -.476 9.550  -.050 .960 
Goodness .533 .108 .459 4.946 <.001 
Similarity .231 .073 .242 3.175 .002 
Religiosity/Spirituality .148 .050 .215 2.962 .004 
Moral discrepancy .275 .108 .235 2.539 .013 
       
 Ruxandra 
(Constant) 7.275 3.681  1.976 .052 
Goodness .223 .066 .330 3.360 .001 
Courage .251 .058 .360 4.314 <.001 
Similarity .160 .068 .210 2.362 .021 
In-Shoes .122 .053 .209 2.312 .024 
 
 
Tab. A15d: Regression coefficients - Dependent variable: self-defence 





B Std. Error Beta   
 Francia 
(Constant) 37.975 6.088  6.238 <.001 
Propriety -.292 .072 -.435 -4.045 <.001 
       
 Nicholas 
(Constant) 28.780 6.146  4.683 <.001 
Goodness -.152 .071 -.244 -2.135 .036 
       
 Ruxandra 
(Constant) 54.761 4.380  12.504 <.001 
Goodness -.464 .073 -.615 -6.376 <.001 
Religiosity/Spirituality .148 .069 .208 2.152 .035 
 
 
Development of Preliminary Path Models 
Path analysis was carried out using the R package lavaan ver. 0.6-5 (Rosseel, 2012) 
assuming independence of the observations. Estimation used robust maximum 
likelihood (MLR), and pathway coefficients were tested 2-tailed at 95% c.l. Composite 





To fulfil parsimony objectives, the analysis was conducted in two phases. In the first 
phase, the models for the three vignettes of Francia, Nicholas, and Ruxandra were fitted 
using the variables in the conceptual model available from this study (i.e., moral 
discrepancy, self-improvement, self-defence, positive affect, and negative affect). The 
model fit was assessed with the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), a 
widely used fit index, highly diagnostic, as it returns a parsimony-adjusted value: were 
the fit satisfactory (RMSEA less than .080) or excellent (less than .050) and the p-value 
non-significant, those models were accepted; were it not satisfactory (RMSEA greater 
than .080) and the p-value significant, a second model was fitted with the addition the 
most impactful predictors (using the results from the multiple regression and the 
modification indices) until the model fit became satisfactory31. 
The diagrams in Figures A13a-c illustrate the path models with satisfactory fit for 
the three above-mentioned vignettes, indicating standardised regression weights and 
RMSEA/p-value. The other main fit indices and the full results are reported in SMA11. 
Only Ruxandra’s model required the additional variable of the goodness of the deed to 
achieve non-significant and satisfactory RMSEA, presumably because of the wide range 




31 It must be emphasised again that path modelling was explicitly used here in a model generative approach, 





Figures A13a-c:  
Path models for the vignettes of Francia, Nicholas, and Ruxandra. Estimator: robust 
maximum likelihood (MLR). Standardised regression weights. Error terms not displayed 






Fig. A13a: Francia 
Fig. A13b: Nicholas 




Findings from the Open-Ended Questions 
Lastly, thematic analysis was conducted for each vignette on the answers to the 
open-ended questions. The aim was to identify additional insight to support the decision 
about which vignettes to progress to the following studies and identify improvements in 
the text or visuals that would make the vignettes suitable to be progressed. 
Six key themes were identified across the twelve vignettes. In a few cases, 
especially the vignettes portraying popular public figures, prior knowledge of the 
protagonist of the story biased the judgment (Cory and Sarah32), for good or bad. Some 
scenarios depicted stories that were considered too heroic and extreme (especially 
Arnaud and Wesley) and others quite ordinary (Matthew and Joey). Other scenarios 
were thought to be lifestyle choices rather than morally motivated good deeds (Markus 
and Ruxandra). In a few cases, there was a perception of obligation to carry out the 
specific deed performed by the protagonist, especially in the vignette portraying Arnaud 
(a policeman). Lastly, Alvaro’s vignette contained multiple actions (a negative one, 
bullfighting, and a positive one, campaigning against bullfighting) and the halo effect of 
the former on the latter biased the judgment of the good deed (i.e., participants 
declared that in their mind Alvaro’s repentance could not wash away the killing of many 
innocent bulls33). 
All these insights seemed to confirm the preliminary findings, suggesting that 
Francia’s and Nicholas’s vignettes could be the best candidates to be progressed to the 
 
32 Although a celebrity too, Francia was not mentioned as a public figure whose knowledge consciously 
affected the results. 
33 This “halo effect” could be ascribed to the phenomenon of identity continuity, according to which 
transformative events in people’s lives can lead them to become “different” persons, but not “new” 
persons. According to this view, the case of the overall poor judgment of Alvaro’s character could be 
explained by participants’ seamless judgment of his identity as a unitary psychological entity made of the 
sum total of all his identities from past to present, with no discontinuity. For a discussion on identity 




next phases of the research, with Ruxandra a third possible option. A summary of the 
key themes is reported in Table A16 and a more detailed analysis with anonymised 
quotes can be found in SMA12. 
 
Table A16:  
Summary of the key themes from the answers to the open-ended questions 
Theme number Theme label Vignettes 
Theme 1 Knowledge of the protagonist Cory, Sarah, Sunita 
Theme 2 Extreme situation Wesley, Arnaud, Francia 
Theme 3 Everyday kindness Matthew, Joey 
Theme 4 Obligation Arnaud, Matthew, Nicholas 
Theme 5 Lifestyles and personal choices Markus, Ruxandra 









The preliminary exploratory investigation conducted in Study 1 was designed to 
meet three key objectives: a) provide insights on the newly developed stimuli, assessing 
their suitability and identifying the best candidates to progress to the next phases of the 
research; b) provide feedback on the preliminary measurement instruments; c) provide 
an initial assessment of the nature and strength of the relationships between some of 
the main variables in the conceptual model. The research questions were framed in the 
context of the conceptual model and nomological network previously illustrated (Fig. III) 
and the results offered answers that facilitated decisions for the next stages of the 
research. 
Stimuli 
The combined analysis of the findings from the closed- and the open-ended 
questions enabled a clear understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the twelve 
vignettes assessed in the study. 
Overall, the written narrative format of the vignettes proved to be adequate for the 
elicitation of comparative and self-regulatory processes. The existing literature in moral 
psychology, experimental philosophy, and neuroscience offered a limited range of 
ready-to-use materials depicting good deeds, for the most part in video format. 
Generally speaking, video clips deliver a richer set of cues than written vignettes (e.g., 
the flow of images in movement, the protagonists’ looks and voices, sometimes even 
background music). Therefore, although examples of written stimuli about good deeds 
do exist in the literature, there was a legitimate question about the suitability of the 
newly developed vignettes to fulfil their purpose in the present research. To make them 
realistic and engaging, the twelve vignettes included both text and visuals. 




 were perceived to portray people performing morally motivated deeds with varying 
gradients of goodness, some more universally regarded as positive (e.g., Francia 
and Cory) and others more polarising (especially Arnaud and Ruxandra); 
 depicted moral actions characterised by diverse combinations of courage, care, and 
justice. High levels of courage and care often overlapped (e.g., Francia, Wesley, 
Cory, Arnaud); care was prevalent in the vignettes with Joey, Matthew, Sarah, and 
Markus; justice was more discriminant and comparatively stronger in Nicholas, 
Alvaro, and Sunita; 
 elicited ability-based moral comparison processes, with most vignettes showing a 
prevalence of upward comparison (e.g., Cory, Francia, Arnaud), and a few indicating 
a prevalence of downward comparison (Ruxandra and Alvaro); 
 activated both modes of moral self-regulation, mainly self-improvement (especially 
Francia), but also self-defence (especially Ruxandra), which correlated respectively 
with positive and negative affect. 
Overall, these results suggested that, while several vignettes met the objectives, 
those portraying Francia (organ donor) and Nicholas (lawyer fighting for social justice) 
showed the mix of suitable characteristics that made them the best candidates to be 
progressed to the following phases of the research. Indeed, Francia focused more on 
care/courage and Nicholas on justice; Francia garnered near-universal positive 
judgments and Nicholas a more diverse range of judgments; both induced participants 
to engage in upward but also downward comparisons; and both elicited a mix of 
broadening and defensive self-regulatory processes, leading to corresponding positive 
and negative affective states. This blend of similarities and differences was considered 
ideal to test a conceptual model across a common core (good deeds performed by moral 




goodness of the deed, proportion of adaptive/maladaptive self-regulatory modes and 
affective states). 
A third vignette, Ruxandra (vegetarian), revealed a highly distinctive profile of moral 
judgments, richer in low scores on goodness and propriety, more downward 
comparisons, stronger self-defensive processes and negative affect (relative to the other 
vignettes). This result is consistent with the moral psychology literature that describes 
denigration of vegans and vegetarians. Minson and Monin (2012) found that people 
expect vegetarians to feel morally superior to them, and the more they anticipate 
superiority, the more they tend to negatively judge them; the anticipated reproach 
constitutes a moral threat that is aversive to the self, instigating the disparagement of 
vegetarians. It could be argued that the same mechanisms could have been at play in 
response to Ruxandra’s vignette, who not only is vegetarian, but also campaigns against 
animal cruelty, which amplifies the moral significance and potentially might have 
magnified the perception of threat. Thanks to these characteristics, after the two top 
vignettes of Francia and Nicholas, Ruxandra would represent an interesting case to 
further explore in the future. 
Moral Self-Regulation and Affect 
Given the absence in the psychological literature of a measurement instrument 
capable of capturing the nuances of the broadening and defensive processes elicited by 
moral exemplars, a new moral self-regulation and affect inventory was developed, so 
that it could apply to a wide array of positive moral scenarios. Due to the restrictions 
imposed by the length of the questionnaire and the accessibility of voluntary 
participants, Study 1 assessed a limited set of items from the full inventory. The key 
objective was to use the results to identify any items that needed to be modified or 




Overall, the answers to the items showed a wide range of values, but also non-
normal distributions, with both skewness and kurtosis. Because of the opposite direction 
of the skew for the self-improvement/positive affect and the self-defence/negative 
affect items, it was not possible to identify one single transformation that could reduce 
the bias for all of them. The solutions adopted hereon to account for violations of 
normality included, depending on the case, bootstrap samples, non-parametric tests, 
robust and non-asymptotic estimation techniques that make fewer or no specific 
demands on the distributions. 
Moral Self-Regulation Inventory 
The six self-improvement items worked well as a scale, which exhibited satisfactory 
internal consistency for most vignettes, particularly for the top three (Francia, Nicholas, 
and Ruxandra). None of the items seemed to require modifications and all were 
progressed to Study 2. 
The self-defence scale showed lower internal consistency. Item SD4 (“This story is 
too good to be true”) did not correlate well with the scale and its removal would 
improve the scale reliability for several vignettes; it was decided to drop it from the 
scale. Item SD5 (“These extreme behaviours should not be considered the standard we 
live by”) was also problematic, but it was reworded to emphasise its uncommon rather 
than extreme nature (“Actions uncommon as this one should not be considered the 
standard we live by”) and brought forward to the following study for further 
assessment. Item SD3 (“Francia’s actions may be good, but I bet she is seeking the praise 
of others”) performed well but was slightly reworded too, so that it focused on one 
specific action (“Francia may have done a good deed, but I bet she is seeking the praise 
of others”). 




Despite the existence in the literature of several scales to measure affect, they 
were deemed too long and partly inadequate to the present research. Thus, new scales 
tailored to measure the affective response to others’ good deeds were developed. A 
subset of them was assessed in Study 1 (three and five items respectively for positive 
and negative affect), with the aim of dropping or modifying those that were 
unsatisfactory. The scales exhibited adequate internal consistency for the top three 
vignettes. In the positive affect scale, item PA3 (“I felt challenged in a positive way”) was 
the weakest, but it was decided to retain it and test it again in Study 2, when a wider set 
of the scale items would be assessed. Item PA2 (“The story was inspiring”) performed 
well but was slightly reworded (“I was inspired by the story”) to put the emphasis on the 
participants’ subjective feeling rather than the story. No modifications were made to the 
negative affect items and all were retained. 
Moral Self-Evaluation 
An important moral appraisal measure was the evaluation of the self, that is, the 
strength of the moral character that participants attributed to themselves. 
Unsurprisingly, on average participants rated their own morality very highly. Although 
measured differently, this phenomenon is in line with previous research on the “better-
than-average effect”, according to which people overwhelmingly rate themselves better 
than an average peer on various attributes (for a review, see e.g., Alicke & Govorun, 
2005). This effect is thought to stem – among other factors – from the need to maintain 
favourable self-views (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009) and relies on various cognitive processes 
of generalisation and abstraction that make people vulnerable to gaps between the 
judgment of their own actions and objective reality (Alicke et al., 2012). The better-than-




with others on moral attributes (relative to competence attributes), giving rise to the so-
called “Muhammad Ali effect” (Allison et al., 1989). 
The moral self-evaluation was also found not to be significantly correlated with 
either self-regulatory mode and either affective state; it also did not correlate with the 
appraisals of the goodness and the propriety of the deed. These results seemed to 
depend on the fact that the self-evaluation scores were quite high for nearly all 
participants, while the appraisals of the deeds and the downstream psychological 
mechanisms of self-regulation and affect exhibited a wider range of values. 
It must be noted that the measure of self-evaluation was collected in this research 
in the first part of the questionnaire (alongside the socio-demographic variables) before 
the presentation of the vignettes. Therefore, it could be argued that it represents a sort 
of trait measure of moral self-evaluation, capturing chronic self-perceptions of moral 
stature crystallised in people’s self-concept and relatively stable over time, although 
modifiable (see Monin & Jordan, 2009). This aspect will be discussed next in more detail. 
Other Measures of Moral Appraisal and Comparison 
The moral appraisal variables measured judgments pertaining to two distinct 
evaluation targets: the moral actions described in the vignettes and the moral character 
ascribed to the protagonists of the stories. At a deeper level, these evaluations subsume 
the two different kinds of epistemic assessments mentioned in the introductory chapter: 
one based on a reality system and the other based on an achievement system (Kelley, 
1971). The items measuring the level of goodness and the level of propriety of the deeds 
belong to the first kind of epistemic assessment: they are judgments that distinguish 
behaviour in terms of what is right and what is wrong based on specific moral standards 
held by participants. Thus, they provide an insight into the moral comparison processes 




level of virtuousness of the deed (its “aretaic” aspect), while the propriety refers to the 
level of obligation of the deed (its “deontic” aspect). The items that measure the moral 
character of the agent and the self belong to the second kind of epistemic assessment: 
they are judgments that imply an evaluation of the moral stature of the person and 
allow to gauge the capability to perform certain moral actions. Thus, they provide an 
insight into the moral comparison processes that Festinger defined “ability-based”. 
Figure A14 displays a conceptual illustration of the two classes of moral judgments 
(action- and person-based) and the corresponding types of moral comparisons (opinion- 
and ability-based) that they imply. 
 
Figure A14:  
A conceptual illustration of the two classes of moral judgments and the underlying types 








Analysis of the direct and the indirect measures of moral comparison revealed a 
dissociation between the two variables, with different patterns emerging from them: 
 forcing a conscious, explicit, direct comparison with the protagonists of the stories 
seemed to make participants surrender a less flattering image of their own relative 
moral standing; 
 inferring implicit comparison processes indirectly from the difference between self-
evaluation and agent evaluation (evaluated at different stages of the 
questionnaire), without necessarily making the comparison salient to conscious 
thought at the time of measurement, allowed to uncover a more psychologically 
meaningful perception of the self/other character gap, more strongly correlated 
with downstream self-regulatory processes. 
It could be argued that the direct and indirect comparison measures capture two 
distinct types of evaluations, the former more dependent on the temporary state 
induced by the vignette (which yielded more upward comparisons), the latter anchored 
to a more stable trait-like evaluation of the moral self-concept (which yielded more 
downward comparisons). The fact that the indirect measure exhibited stronger 
correlations with downstream psychological processes might be explained by this 
anchoring to an enduring ideal reference point based on their best moral performance; 
it could be speculated that this is more likely to drive actual behaviour than a less self-
flattering direct comparison surrendered when a state-like assessment of the moral self 
is made salient in relation to highly praiseworthy moral exemplars. 
From a methodological standpoint, moral discrepancy also provides a measure of 
the output of moral comparisons which is clearly distinct from self-regulation processes. 
This approach marks an important methodological difference from classical social 




measures of comparison and self-regulation. For all these reasons, the indirect measure 
of moral discrepancy was considered the more suitable measure of moral comparisons 
and used in the following studies. 
It is also important to mention here that, in an attempt to achieve parsimony, the 
conceptual model developed at the start of the research restricted the perimeter of 
interest to ability-based comparisons, forgoing opinion-based comparisons. This was 
due to the assumption that the moral actions depicted in the vignettes would be widely 
perceived in a positive light, with little variation around high mean scores. If the 
goodness of the deeds were highly regarded by most participants, its contribution to 
generating variance in the model would be limited. The empirical findings from Study 1 
revealed a more intriguing phenomenon. In some vignettes, especially Ruxandra and 
Alvaro, the deeds garnered widely diverging judgments, with means below the scale 
mid-point; in other vignettes, for instance Nicholas and Sunita, the mean judgments 
were moderately positive, and in others overwhelmingly positive (Francia, Cory, and 
Wesley). Therefore, at this stage, this finding seemed to suggest a differential role 
played by moral comparisons based on opinion and ability as a function of the moral 
scenarios: 
 for uncontested deeds, widely regarded as highly praiseworthy, moral judgments 
underpinning ability-based comparisons could represent the more critical response 
driver, whereas opinion-based comparisons in a parsimonious model of the self-
regulation of virtue could be regarded as redundant (explaining marginal 
incremental variance); 
 for more controversial deeds, with mixed appraisals due to antagonistic moral 
standards, ability-based comparisons could not suffice to fully explain self-




significant extent by opinion-based comparisons implying less positive views about 
the actions and the agents. 
This insight required further empirical scrutiny and was investigated more carefully 
with the availability of the data from the ensuing studies among larger samples. 
Relationships Between the Main Variables 
Correlations 
One of the important preliminary findings from Study 1 was the pattern of 
correlations between moral discrepancy and self-regulation. The existing social 
psychological literature supported the notion that upward and downward comparisons 
could be associated with both self-improvement and self-defence, depending on 
whether they are experienced as opportunities or threats (Sedikides, 2012) and whether 
they are associated with growth or well-being motives (Wood & Taylor, 1991). 
Consequently, the conceptual model adopted the initial assumption of relative 
independence of moral comparisons and self-regulatory modes, deferring further 
analysis once empirical data would become available. Study 1 provided initial evidence 
of the existence of a specific probabilistic correlation pattern, whereby when witnessing 
virtuous acts, at an aggregated level across vignettes, self-improvement appeared more 
likely to occur following upward comparison, and self-defence more likely following 
downward comparison. The strength of these correlations was strong, and the result 
held up for most of the vignettes analysed separately. Participants engaging in upward 
comparisons experienced the moral stories primarily as inspiring opportunities to better 
themselves, whereas those engaging in downward comparisons experienced them 
primarily as threats and tended to self-defend in an effort to safeguard and validate 
their supposed moral superiority. The association between downward comparison and 




to disproportionally protect moral self-beliefs compared to other kinds of beliefs 
(Ellemers et al., 2019; Jordan & Monin, 2008; Mazar et al., 2008): if individuals hold a 
certain self-evaluation about their morality, they are strongly motivated to maintain it 
and defend it from external threats (Pagliaro et al., 2016), adjusting their moral 
reasoning to justify and affirm their self-views (Haidt, 2001). 
Regression and Path Models 
Multiple regression highlighted that self-improvement and self-defence were the 
best predictors of respectively positive and negative affect, and goodness, propriety, 
and discrepancy were among the strongest predictors of the moral self-regulation 
constructs. This analysis could only specify direct associations between predictors and a 
single outcome at a time (Hoyle, 1995), but not indirect pathways or other conditional 
processes between all the variables simultaneously. More specifically, they could not 
feature the mediated paths through which the variables exert their mutual influence. To 
investigate those pathways, preliminary path modelling was carried out for exploratory 
purposes for the top three vignettes (Francia, Nicholas, Ruxandra). While holding the 
conceptual model in the background, the technique of path modelling was used in a 
“model generative” way rather than a strictly confirmatory setting, allowing the 
identification of initial structural models that could be tested again in subsequent 
studies. 
Francia’s and Nicholas’s models resulted in satisfactory fit using only moral 
discrepancy and the two modes of self-regulation to predict moral affect. Ruxandra’s 
vignette required the addition of the goodness of the deed to achieve satisfactory fit, 
corroborating the notion that more controversial moral actions could only be explained 
by a wider range of predictors, particularly those moral appraisals that subsume 





vignettes of the plausibility of the theoretical framework and seemed convincing enough 
to suggest a first revision of the conceptual model (Fig. A15), hence informing new and 
more specific hypotheses for Study 2. 
 
Figure A15:  
Graphical illustration of the revised and simplified conceptual model of the moral 
experience of virtue, observed through the lens of moral self-regulation, inclusive of a 











For the following Studies 2 and 3, the robustness of the self-regulatory framework 
suggested to prioritise the integration of the model with motivational predictors rather 
than personality traits, and so regulatory focus and approach/avoidance (along with self-
esteem) were preferred over humility and narcissism, whose exploration was conducted 
in Study 4. 
Summary of Key Findings and Limitations 
In summary, Study 1 met its three main objectives and offered a wealth of insights 
about: a) the most suitable vignettes for an investigation of the self-regulation of virtue; 




the importance of the measures of act- and person-based judgments to infer moral 
comparison processes; d) the significant associations of upward comparisons with self-
improvement and downward comparisons with self-defence. 
A synthesis of these initial findings is graphically illustrated in the preliminary path 
models (Fig. A13a-c), which enabled to revise and simplify the initial conceptual model 
(Fig. A15), focusing on fewer critical variables. A side-by-side comparison between the 
initial and the revised models can elucidate the significance of the learning distilled from 
this initial study. 
It must be acknowledged though, that these results must be taken with caution. 
The sample was not random or representative; due to resource constraints, it was 
necessary to rely on a convenience sample of voluntary participants recruited during the 
summer. In general terms, the total sample size of 146 participants might look 
satisfactory, but each vignette was allocated to a random selection of about 70 
participants. While being a relatively modest sample size, it is was determined to be 
sufficient to detect a medium-sized effect based on a simplified a priori power analysis. 
Although the research design was mixed and the analytic procedures also 
encompassed more sophisticated techniques such as path modelling, power analysis 
was conducted within the framework of multiple linear regression, assuming 
independence of the observations, normality of the residuals of the dependent 
variables, homoscedasticity of the residuals, and absence of indirect pathways between 
predictors. The data violated these assumptions, but the results can be considered 
robust enough for an early exploratory study. The standardised coefficients from 
multiple regression and the standardised regression weights from path analysis were 
moderate to large (usually above .30 and in several cases above .50) and the pattern 




point estimates might be slightly overestimated due to the above-mentioned 
methodological weaknesses, they should not be too far from the true population values. 
The actual analysis slightly differed from the preregistered plan. No systematic 
frequentist significance testing of the mean differences across vignettes was conducted 
and no Bayes factors were computed. Due to the exploratory nature of the study and for 
the sake of conciseness, the details of a multilevel model analysis were omitted from 
this chapter34. 
Participants provided their answers to nearly all the questions on 0-100 scales using 
slider bars. This format makes the scales virtually continuous, but by no means the 
distributions were automatically assumed to be normal. It was known upfront that the 
nature of the measurement of the phenomenon at hand would likely generate skewed 
distributions, which could have been assimilated to zero-one-inflated beta distributions 
(ZOIB; Liu & Kong 2015), for which more complex Bayesian ordinal regression methods 
could have returned more accurate estimates (see e.g., Bürkner & Vuorre, 2019). The 
decision to simplify the analysis and use traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimates was justified by the exploratory nature of this stage of the research. Other 
important analyses, such as path modelling, relied on robust estimators that did not 
assume normal distributions. In path modelling, all the variables were considered 
observed, using the composite means for each of the scales, thus ignoring the existence 
of latent variables and measurement error. Again, this simplification was deemed to be 
acceptable in the context of an early exploratory study with a relatively small sample. 
 
34 Results from the multilevel model analysis for positive affect indicated a significant random intercept 
effect at both participant and vignette level, and no significant random slope effects, and for negative affect 




Like most empirical research on virtue and good deeds available to date, the 
present research programme, including Study 1, was designed around self-reports. In 
particular, the new moral self-regulation inventory used, at least partly, the so-called 
“indirect” self-reports (especially the self-defence scale) which attempt to obscure the 
constructs being measured through subtle items (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). This strategy 
often allows to reduce demand characteristics. Yet, self-reports remain partly vulnerable 
to various forms of bias. On the one hand, people might want to portray themselves in 
certain ways. When responding to the good deeds described in the vignettes, 
participants might try to present themselves in ways that are consistent with their ideal-
self or their ought-self (Higgins et al., 1986), that is, consistent with the way that they 
would want to see themselves in an ideal world or with the way that they believe was 
socially desirable, aligned to certain social norms. By doing so, they would either 
consciously suppress their true negative thoughts and feelings, or alternatively they 
would show admiration and approval beyond their authentic thoughts and feelings. On 
the other hand, participants might simply be vulnerable to non-conscious self-deception 
processes: they might have no deliberate intention to lie, and yet fail to reveal their true 
thoughts and feelings, again either suppressing or over-emphasising their true internal 
states. These processes of impression management (the former) and self-deception (the 
latter) have been well documented in the social psychology literature and fall under the 
umbrella of social desirability or socially desirable responding (see e.g., Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960; Paulhus, 1994). In impression management individuals consciously 
dissemble and dissimulate (they knowingly lie, fake, exaggerate), in self-deception they 
are convinced of the genuineness of their responses, and yet they self-favour, self-
enhance, self-defend, deny (Paulhus, 1984; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Both processes are 




for them (especially impression management). Because social desirability was not 
measured in Study 1, it could have slightly inflated self-improvement and deflated self-
defence. The exploration of social desirability phenomena in the next studies was 
considered a potential option to reduce the bias of a methodology relying purely on self-
reports. 
A third way in which self-report data could be potentially biased is the presence 
within the sample of participants who respond carelessly or apply insufficient effort in 
their responses (for a review, see Curran, 2016). Whereas in socially desirable 
responding answers to survey questions are not truthful due to consciously or non-
consciously motivated reasons to generate a desired outcome, in careless or insufficient 
effort responding answers are not truthful because of the lack of interest or attention, 
or the desire to minimise effort or time (Curran, 2016). In the past, it was thought that 
careless or insufficient effort responding weakened the relationships among constructs, 
but recent evidence has shown that the effect can be unpredictable, depending on the 
type of careless or insufficient effort responding (Kam & Chan, 2018). In Study 1 no 
specific countermeasures were adopted before data collection to identify and isolate 
this phenomenon; potentially, outlier analysis could have identified careless responders 
(at least partly), but none were removed, providing partial reassurance that strong 
effects caused by careless or insufficient effort responding should not have occurred. As 
an improvement measure, for the following studies it was decided to implement specific 
actions to enhance data quality. 
The preliminary results from Study 1 were put to the test in Study 2, a larger 
exploratory investigation designed to consolidate and deepen understanding of the 




Study 2: Model Assessment 
 
Introduction 
The results from Study 1 provided insights that were instrumental to the choice of 
appropriate stimuli, the selection and improvement of the measurement instruments, 
the choice of a narrower number of variables of interest, and the revision of the 
conceptual model. These findings still needed to be complemented by additional 
information before a model of the self-regulation of virtue could be tested in a 
confirmatory study, specifically: a) validity and reliability of the full moral self-regulation 
and affect inventory, inclusive of all the items generated in the early stage of the 
research; b) evidence of the moderating role of the characteristic adaptations and the 
significance of these variables as additional factors for the understanding of the 
response to moral exemplars. The provision of this information was the objective of the 
present study, which was designed to contribute a more thorough assessment of: 
 the measurement model, or in other words, the measures for the operationalisation 
of the key variables, including the moral comparison variables and the moral self-
regulation and affect inventory; 
 the structural model, that is, the web of mutual relationships across all the key 
variables and the role that each of them plays to explain the phenomenon under 
investigation. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the two vignettes of Francia and Nicholas 
emerged from Study 1 as the best candidates to be progressed to the next stages, each 
of them sharing similarities and differences that made them suitable to develop a 




scenarios. A third promising vignette (Ruxandra) was identified for potential follow-up 
studies. 
Further investigation of participants’ response to the two main moral scenarios was 
expected to facilitate discernment in two important areas: 
1. the possibility to develop a single measurement model of the self-regulation of 
virtue, capable of capturing equally well the latent constructs across the two moral 
scenarios; 
2. the possibility to develop either a single structural model of the self-regulation of 
virtue, capable of showing strong fit with the data for two different moral 
scenarios, or alternatively two separate models, one for each scenario. 
The construction of a single measurement model was an important objective of this 
phase of the research, whereas falling back to the alternative of two slightly different 
structural models (one for each vignette) with a “common core” and specific features 
did not represent a major conceptual impediment to the development of substantive 
theory. Following the plan laid out at the beginning of the project, Study 2 was therefore 
designed to complete the development of the measurement model and advance the 
understanding of the structural model before Study 3. 
Measurement Model 
Moral Self-Regulation and Affect 
In Study 1 only a limited number of items of the moral self-regulation and affect 
inventory could be tested; most of them were retained with no modifications, one was 
dropped and three were slightly reworded based on the findings. Study 2 re-tested them 
and explored the suitability of all the other items that had been previously generated. 
At this stage of the research plan, Study 2 aimed to examine the reliability of the 




moral self-defence scale. As previously discussed, beneath the self-defence items could 
potentially lie one latent factor (self-defence) or two conceptually distinct latent factors 
(self-enhancement and self-protection). The other scales of self-improvement, positive 
affect, and negative affect were hypothesised to be unidimensional, and one latent 
factor was expected to be retrieved from exploratory factor analysis (EFA) for each of 
them. 
Moral Appraisals 
Analysis of the regression and path models of three top vignettes in Study 1 helped 
select a subset of key moral appraisal variables considered critical to the understanding 
of underlying moral comparison processes: the level of goodness and propriety of the 
deed, and evaluations of the moral character of the agent and the self. The difference 
between agent and self-evaluations constituted the variable of moral discrepancy, an 
indirect measure of moral comparison that was preferred to the direct one. 
Other moral appraisal variables used in Study 1 (e.g., the judgments of the level of 
courage, care, and justice, the relevance of the deed, the perception of similarity to the 
moral agent) were abandoned for the sake of parsimony. However, two novel moral 
appraisal variables were considered worthy of investigation and added, both measuring 
the perception of the normativity of the moral action (further details in the Methods 
section of this chapter). 
Characteristic Adaptations 
Study 2 also began the analysis of the role of self-esteem and two motivational 
dispositions (regulatory focus and hedonic orientation) in determining moral 
comparison and self-regulatory mechanisms experienced by participants exposed to the 
moral exemplars in the vignettes. These variables, as discussed in the first chapter, are 




adaptations, that is, relatively stable goals, interpretations, and strategies that concur 
with other dispositions to form the structure of personality. Self-esteem could be 
viewed as a particular kind of interpretation of one’s self-worth, while hedonic 
orientation and regulatory focus represent goal pursuit motives and strategies. 
Hedonic Orientation and Regulatory Focus. Hedonic orientation and regulatory 
focus operate according to the same cybernetic principles as the moral self-regulatory 
functions at the core of this research. As previously clarified, a cybernetic system can 
function through discrepancy-reducing loops, whereby an input is compared to a 
standard and adjustments are made to shift it to a state that is closer to the standard, or 
through discrepancy-enlarging loops, whereby an input is shifted to a state that is 
farther away from the standard or at least not closer to it (Carver & Scheier, 2002). In a 
cybernetic framework, the hedonic orientations of approach and avoidance can be 
considered respectively discrepancy-reducing and discrepancy-enlarging motives or 
tendencies (Carver, 2006), as they involve energisation toward or away from certain 
standards, references, or goals. Regulatory focus as well can be observed from a 
cybernetic viewpoint, in that promotion focus involves growth needs toward the ideal-
self (motion from “0” to “+1”), whereas prevention focus underlies the safeguard of the 
ought-self while maintaining a satisfactory status quo (i.e., preserving “0”) or impeding 
loss of ground (i.e., ensuring “not –1”) (Scholer & Higgins, 2012). 
Promotion/prevention focus and approach/avoidance were conceptualised in the 
present research as relatively stable motivational orientations operationalised as trait 
measures. Many different measurement instruments can be found in the literature for 
these constructs and no consensus exists on which ones are preferable. Some of them 
are based on different theoretical paradigms. For instance, approach and avoidance 




reinforcement sensitivity theory (Gray, 1982). This theory, in its initial formulation, 
postulated the existence of two conceptual nervous systems (Elliot & Thrash, 2002): the 
behavioural activation system (BAS) related to approach, and the behavioural inhibition 
system (BIS) related to avoidance. The BIS/BAS scales developed by Carver and White 
(1994) have enjoyed widespread adoption over the years as a tool to operationalise 
reinforcement sensitivity constructs, but have also shown deficiencies in their 
psychometric properties. When the reinforcement sensitivity theory was substantially 
revised (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), researchers in the field tried to develop new 
measurement instruments that also included the fight/flight/freeze system (FFFS), such 
as the Jackson-5 (Jackson, 2009) and the reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality 
questionnaire (Corr & Cooper, 2016). Approach and avoidance have also been 
conceptualised as neurophysiological reflexes (Lang & Bradley, 2010), sensitivities to 
reward and punishment (Torrubia et al., 2001), or temperaments (Elliot & Thrash, 2002), 
each with their own measurement tools. 
Across these diverse conceptualisations and theoretical traditions, the constructs of 
approach and avoidance share a common essence: they are at least partly heritable and 
biologically based, emerge in early childhood, remaining relatively stable across the 
lifespan, and entail distinct affective tendencies associated with specific motivational 
systems (Elliot & Thrash, 2002). In the present research, approach and avoidance were 
conceptualised as basic temperaments, the affective core of personality (Rihmer et al., 
2010), following the theoretical perspective and operationalisation proposed by Elliot 
and Thrash (2002, 2010). They are conceptually independent of each other, although in 





The measurement of trait regulatory focus was initially proposed by Higgins and 
colleagues in 2001, but researchers have since proposed several new measurement 
instruments, such as the general regulatory focus measure (Lockwood et al., 2002), the 
regulatory focus scale (RFS: Fellner et al., 2007), the regulatory focus strategies scale 
(RFSS: Ouschan et al., 2007), the regulatory focus reference-point scales (Summerville & 
Roese, 2008). One of the reasons that could explain the proliferation of dispositional 
regulatory focus measures lies in its conceptual complexity. The promotion and 
prevention foci imply various distinct components: the self-guides (respectively ideal-
self versus ought-self), motivational needs or concerns (nurturance/achievement versus 
security/maintenance), reference points (gains/non-losses versus losses/non-gains). 
Each measurement instrument tends to rely more strongly on some of these 
components but fails to capture all of them to the same extent. A review by Haws and 
colleagues (2010) based on the analysis of correlation, representativeness, internal 
consistency, stability, and predictive validity (as suggested by Simms and Watson, 2007) 
provided evidence that the theoretical and empirical overlap between these 
instruments is limited. 
Besides, the concept of regulatory focus is so intertwined with that of hedonic 
orientation that balancing approach and avoidance in the expression of the statements 
that form the measurement instruments has proved to be challenging. Higgins himself 
made it clear that regulatory focus and hedonic orientation are conceptually 
independent notions (see e.g., Cornwell & Higgins, 2015a; Higgins, 1997) that should not 
be conflated. It is therefore important that the scale indicators account for both 
approach and avoidance motives while measuring each of the regulatory foci. However, 




tendencies to attain gains and elude losses, neglecting non-gains and non-losses 
(Summerville & Roese, 2008). 
Haws et al. (2010) concluded that, among the instruments reviewed, the original 
regulatory focus questionnaire by Higgins and colleagues (2001) best encapsulated the 
key tenets of the theory and achieved the most reasonable balance between approach 
and avoidance, making it suitable to general-purpose theory testing. For these reasons 
and despite a predominant orientation of the items toward the self-guides and 
subjective past experiences, it is a very widely used measure of dispositional regulatory 
focus and therefore was adopted in this research. Like approach and avoidance, 
promotion and prevention focus are conceptually independent; empirical research has 
generally failed to detect evidence of correlation (e.g., Chung et al., 2014; Higgins et al., 
2001; Polman, 2012), although sometimes a weak positive correlation was found (e.g., 
Cornwell & Higgins, 2015a; Pfattheicher & Keller, 2013). 
Self-Esteem. Along with regulatory focus and approach/avoidance, Study 2 also 
investigated the impact of self-esteem on moral comparison and self-regulation. This 
concept has a long history in psychology. There is widespread evidence that healthy 
levels of self-esteem correlate strongly with goal achievement, quality of interpersonal 
relationships, general well-being, happiness, and life satisfaction, but the causal 
relationships are complex and intricate. Baumeister and colleagues (2003), for example, 
claim that high self-esteem is at least partly the result of good school performance and 
occupational success rather than the reverse, and that high self-esteem has not been 
found to cause better quality of interpersonal relationships, although people who hold 
high self-esteem tend to believe so; on the other hand, the authors also maintain that 
high self-esteem is an important contributor to happiness because of enhanced personal 




As discussed by Baumeister and colleagues (2003), what makes self-esteem 
problematic to study is the fact that it is a heterogeneous concept, which could 
comprise unbiased judgments about the self and at the same time overly inflated or 
deflated self-evaluations that bear little resemblance to objective reality. Consequently, 
the authors claim that sometimes high self-esteem gets conflated with narcissism and 
low self-esteem with humility; and for this reason, depending on their nature and 
categories, high and low self-esteem end up being associated with a diverse range of 
outcomes, positive and negative. 
Tice (1993) claims that folk conceptions about people with high and low self-
esteem often include the belief that they exhibit opposite characteristics, but these 
beliefs may be inaccurate; if individuals high in self-esteem are seen as eager to succeed 
and be liked, it cannot be said that those low in self-esteem want to fail and be disliked. 
The real motivational differences between them are to be found in the fact that people 
with high self-esteem are driven by the desire to succeed, win love and admiration, 
while those with low self-esteem are more concerned about eluding failure, humiliation, 
or rejection (Tice, 1993). These underlying motives (succeeding and eluding) link high 
and low self-esteem quite closely with promotion/approach and prevention/avoidance 
(without overlapping with them), hence the interest in examining empirically their 
relationships with the other main variables in the conceptual model. 
Unlike regulatory focus and hedonic orientation, the operationalisation of self-
esteem has been dominated by one measurement instrument: the Rosenberg self-
esteem scale (RSES), developed by Rosenberg in 1965. Although much debate has 
animated the social psychology literature about its factorial structure (claimed to be 




al., 2014; Salerno et al., 2017), its robust psychometric properties make it the most 
widely used instrument and therefore it was adopted in the present research. 
Structural Model 
One of the overarching objectives of Study 2 was to deepen the understanding of 
the relationships between the main variables in the conceptual model. Some of these 
relationships had already been explored in Study 1, for instance those between moral 
discrepancy and the two moral self-regulation modes, as well as those between the self-
regulation modes and affect; however, the associations of the characteristic adaptations 
between themselves and with the other variables still had to be measured. Analysis of 
the extant literature and the data collected in Study 1 suggested that certain correlation 
patterns could be expected and therefore some directional hypotheses were 
preregistered: 
 positive correlations between self-improvement and positive affect, and between 
self-defence and negative affect; 
 positive correlation between moral discrepancy and self-improvement, and 
negative correlation between moral discrepancy and self-defence (or absence of 
correlation35); 
 positive correlations of promotion focus, approach, and self-esteem with self-
improvement; 
 positive correlations of prevention focus, avoidance, and self-esteem with self-
defence; 
 
35 Following the results from Study 1, the preregistration mentioned absence of correlation with reference 
to the most recurring outcome from the separate analysis for each of the top three vignettes, while the 





 promotion focus, approach, and self-esteem moderators of the relationship 
between moral discrepancy and self-improvement; 
 prevention focus, avoidance, and self-esteem moderators of the relationship 
between moral discrepancy and self-defence. 
These hypotheses are graphically summarised in the revised conceptual model 
illustrated in Figure B1. 
 
Figure B1:  
Graphical illustration of the revised conceptual model of the self-regulation of virtue, 



















Study 2 had a between-subjects design: participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two independent conditions. In each condition, participants were presented with one 
of two moral vignettes: Francia or Nicholas (tested with no modifications from Study 1). 
The study was conducted online, based on a structured questionnaire (see SMB2) 
hosted by Qualtrics and made available to potential participants during the month of 
November 2018. Recruitment was conducted through CloudResearch, formerly known 
as TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016), which uses the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing platform. Voluntary participants filled out the 
questionnaire in return for payment. 
One of the measures introduced in Study 2 to improve data quality was the 
implementation of attention checks: after the presentation of the moral vignettes, 
participants were asked a multiple-choice question about the content of the story that 
they had just read (see SMB2). If participants did not answer correctly, they were gently 
reminded that it was important to know the content of the story to answer the following 
questions, and were subsequently allowed to view the vignette a second time before 
carrying on with the questionnaire. 
Participants 
Sample Size Determination 
The sample size was determined based on several criteria. Power analysis was run 
using G*Power ver. 3.1, under the assumption of multiple linear regression with up to 
fourteen predictors for each outcome variable36. To detect a medium-sized effect with α 
 





= .05 and power set at .80, a minimum sample size of 135 participants per condition 
would be necessary (full analysis available in SMB1). The sample size was actually set at 
250 participants per condition in consideration of the more complex analysis techniques 
(beyond regression) that were planned, specifically factor analysis and path modelling. 
For these techniques, no simple formulaic methods to determine the sample size are 
known. Various rules of thumb have been proposed, for example, ten times the number 
of free parameters (Blunch, 2013). Since these heuristics were often found to be 
inadequate (Wolf et al., 2013), Monte Carlo simulations such as those proposed by 
Muthén and Muthén (2002) are now considered the gold standard, but they can be 
highly resource-demanding and computationally complex (Barrett, 2007). 
A sample of 250 would yield a power of .990 in multiple linear regression (see 
SMB1) and recent models suggest that correlation coefficient estimates tend to stabilise 
when the sample size reaches an order of magnitude of about 250 participants 
(Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013; Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2018). Therefore, a sample size of 
250 participants per vignette was deemed adequate for the present study. 
At the end of data collection, the data file comprised a total of 539 subjects, split 
approximately in half between the two conditions. Among these subjects, 40 did not 
provide consent or dropped out before completing the questionnaire. After their 
removal, the resulting sample consisted of 499 participants. 
Data Exclusions 
Of these 499 participants, 23 answered the check questions incorrectly; they were 
removed from the sample37. Next, an analysis of the actual duration of the questionnaire 
was conducted. Pre-testing suggested an average length of about fifteen minutes. 
 
37 Although the check questions were implemented as a screening tool to improve data quality, the removal 




However, several participants completed it in a much shorter time. Further testing 
showed that the minimum time necessary to quickly read the questions and answer 
them was about eight minutes; 51 participants appeared to have completed the survey 
in less than eight minutes, a time that was deemed insufficient to adequately process 
the information and provide reliable answers to the questions. Therefore, those 
participants were removed from the sample38. 
With these 74 exclusions, the remaining sample size was 425. 
Multivariate Outliers 
At that point, following the preregistered analysis plan, outlier analysis was 
conducted, applying the same methodology as in Study 1, which used the combined 
analysis of centred leverage values, Mahalanobis distance, and Cook’s distance. Analysis 
of the first two values provided information about the data points farthest from the 
centroid of the predictors’ multivariate space, while analysis of the third value 
complemented it with information about the data points with the greatest influence on 
the prediction of the outcome variables. The data points that exceeded two out of three 
of the cutoff points determined by the centred leverage values, Mahalanobis distance, 
and Cook’s distance were considered extreme multivariate outliers. This analysis 
enabled the detection of 13 outliers (for the most part highly influential), which were 
subsequently deleted from the sample. 
Final Sample Composition 
The final sample was composed of 412 participants: 207 respondents allocated to 
Francia’s vignette and 205 to Nicholas’s vignette. It comprised 211 females (51.2%), 200 
 
38 Although the expected average duration of the questionnaire was preregistered with the intention to 
remove participants who completed it in too short a time, the preregistration did not explicitly mention the 




males (48.5%), and one participant who self-reported “other” (non-binary) to the gender 
question (0.2%). Age ranged from 19 to 77 years, with median of 37 and mean of 39 
years (SD = 12). Participants were nearly entirely US nationals (98.1%). There was no 
significant difference in the demographical composition of the sample across the two 
conditions (see SMB3). 
Materials and Procedure 
The study had received prior ethical approval by the Faculty of Science and 
Technology Research Ethics Committee (FSTREC) at Lancaster University (UK). 
Participants were recruited through the MTurk crowdsourcing platform and invited to 
follow a link to an online questionnaire. They read the participation sheet and the 
consent form, learning that they could withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
After providing informed consent to voluntarily take part in the study, participants 
answered the socio-demographic questions, the moral self-evaluation question, the 
characteristic adaptations scales, and then viewed one vignette randomly selected from 
a set of two (Francia or Nicholas). 
Next, participants in either condition evaluated the moral action and the moral 
agent in the vignette; lastly, they rated the items of the moral self-regulation and affect 
inventory, and were given the option to make comments in an open-ended question. 
Following this, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation, and received 
payment after the provision of their unique survey code. 
Measures 
Socio-Demographic Questions 
The first part of the questionnaire included a few socio-demographic questions, 
such as age, gender, nationality, level of religiosity and spirituality, political orientation 




100, using slider bars. The questions were asked as in Study 1, with the only exception 
that religiosity and spirituality were split into two distinct questions following the 
previous results. 
Characteristic Adaptations 
Self-Esteem. Participants filled out the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 
1965), a ten-item measure of global self-worth, with five items relating to positive views 
and five items to negative views of the self-concept (Tab. B1). 
 
Table B1:  
Rosenberg self-esteem items (Rosenberg, 1965) 
Item code Label Item wording 
Es1 Worth I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others 
Es2 Qualities I feel that I have a number of good qualities 
Es3 Able I am able to do things as well as most other people 
Es4 Positive I take a positive attitude toward myself 
Es5 Satisfied On the whole, I am satisfied with myself 
Es6 Failure All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure (R) 
Es7 NoProud I feel I do not have much to be proud of (R) 
Es8 NoRespect I wish I could have more respect for myself (R) 
Es9 Useless I certainly feel useless at times (R) 
Es10 NoGood At times I think I am no good at all (R) 
Note: (R) reverse-coded items 
 
 
The items were presented in randomised order. Participants answered through 
scales ranging from 0 to 100, using slider bars. The anchor points were the same as in 
the original scale: 0 = strongly disagree, 33 = disagree, 67 = agree, 100 = strongly agree. 
Regulatory Focus. The next set of questions measured trait regulatory focus 
through the original regulatory focus questionnaire by Higgins and colleagues (2001). 
This is an eleven-item scale that measures the two constructs of promotion and 





Table B2:  
Regulatory focus items (Higgins, 2001) 
Scale Item 
code 
Label Item wording 
PROMOTION 
FOCUS 
Pm1 Unable Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you 
want out of life? (R) 
Pm2 Psyched How often have you accomplished things that got you “psyched” to 
work even harder? 
Pm3 DoWell Do you often do well at different things that you try? 
Pm4 NoPerform When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I 
don't perform as well as I ideally would like to do (R) 
Pm5 Progress I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life 
Pm6 NoHobby I have found very few hobbies or activities in my life that capture my 
interest or motivate me to put effort into them (R) 
    
PREVENTION 
FOCUS 
Pv1 Cross Growing up, would you ever “cross the line” by doing things that your 
parents would not tolerate? (R) 
Pv2 Nerves Did you get on your parents' nerves often when you were growing up? 
(R) 
Pv3 Rules How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by 
your parents? 
Pv4 Object Growing up, did you ever act in ways that your parents thought were 
objectionable? (R) 
Pv5 Trouble Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times (R) 
Note: (R) reverse-coded items 
 
 
Participants answered using unipolar scales ranging from 0 to 100 (with slider bars), 
whose anchor points were the same as in the original scales, for example: 0 = never or 
seldom, 25 = a few times, 50 = sometimes, 75 = often, 100 = very often. The eleven items 
were presented in randomised order. 
In addition to the original questionnaire, regulatory focus items from other existing 
scales were used39 (Tab. B3). Four items were taken from the general regulatory focus 
measure (Lockwood et al., 2002), two items were borrowed from the regulatory focus 
strategy scale (Ouschan et al., 2007), two items came from the regulatory focus scale 
(Fellner et al., 2007), and two new regulatory focus items were added with the aim of 
 
39 The extra regulatory focus items were added for exploratory purposes in relation to a parallel project and 
are not reported in this thesis. They were selected from different existing scales to expand the coverage of 
dimensions of the construct only partly captured by the original regulatory focus questionnaire (further 




capturing concerns about errors of commission versus omission (Crowe & Higgins, 
1997). 
 
Table B3:  
Additional regulatory focus items and their sources 







(Lockwood et al., 2002) 
PmEx1 I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to 
become the person I ideally want to be, fulfilling my 
hopes and aspirations 
PmEx2 I frequently imagine how I will accomplish my dreams 
and ideals 
Regulatory Focus 
Strategy Scale (Ouschan 
et al., 2007) 
PmEx3 The worst thing you can do when trying to achieve a goal 
is to worry about making mistakes 
Regulatory Focus Scale 
(Fellner et al., 2007) 
PmEx4 I like trying out lots of different things, and am often 
successful in doing so 
Newly developed PmEx5 I would prefer to miss a target rather than do nothing at 
all 





(Lockwood et al., 2002) 
PvEx1 I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to 
become the person I ought to be, fulfilling my duties and 
obligations 
PvEx2 I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my 
life 
Regulatory Focus 
Strategy Scale (Ouschan 
et al., 2007) 
PvEx3 To avoid failure, it is important to keep in mind all the 
potential obstacles that might get in your way 
Regulatory Focus Scale 
(Fellner et al., 2007) 
PvEx4 I always try to make my work as accurate and error-free 
as possible 
Newly developed PvEx5 I would rather do nothing than make a mistake 
 
 
To answer these ten additional items, participants used scales ranging from 0 to 
100 (with slider bars) with the following anchor points: 0 = strongly disagree, 25 = 
disagree, 50 = neither agree nor disagree, 75 = agree, 100 = strongly agree. The ten 
items were presented in randomised order. 
Hedonic Orientation (Approach and Avoidance Temperaments). Next, participants 
answered the twelve questions from the approach and avoidance temperament 
questionnaire (Elliot & Thrash, 2010), chosen as the hedonic orientation measure. Each 




participants answered using scales ranging from 0 to 100 (with slider bars), whose 
anchor points were the same as in the original scales: 0 = strongly disagree, 25 = 
disagree, 50 = neither agree nor disagree, 75 = agree, 100 = strongly agree (Tab B4). 
 
Table B4:  
Approach and avoidance temperament items (Elliot & Thrash, 2010) 
Scale Item 
code 
Label Item wording 
APPROACH Ap1 Energised Thinking about the things I want really energizes me 
Ap2 Excited When I see an opportunity for something I like, I immediately get 
excited 
Ap3 Motivated It doesn’t take a lot to get me excited and motivated 
Ap4 Opportunities I’m always on the lookout for positive opportunities and experiences 
Ap5 GoodThings When good things happen to me, it affects me very strongly 
Ap6 Desire When I want something, I feel a strong desire to go after it 
    
AVOIDANCE Av1 Nervous By nature, I am a very nervous person 
Av2 Worry It doesn’t take much to make me worry 
Av3 Anxiety I feel anxiety and fear very deeply 
Av4 BadExperiences I react very strongly to bad experiences 
Av5 Escape When it looks like something bad could happen, I have a strong urge 
to escape 
Av6 ImagineBad It is easy for me to imagine bad things that might happen to me 
 
 
Importantly, all the characteristic adaptation measures were gathered in the initial 
part of the questionnaire, before presenting participants with the vignettes; this 
ensured they were unbiased by the moral scenarios and could be modelled as 
exogenous variables predicting comparative and self-regulatory processes. 
Moral Appraisals 
The moral self-evaluation question was asked in the first part of the questionnaire, 
alongside the socio-demographic variables. It was measured exactly as in Study 1. 
Next, after viewing one of two vignettes (Francia or Nicholas), participants 
answered a set of moral appraisal questions, evaluating the story and its protagonist. As 
in Study 1, they were asked to evaluate the moral character of the agent (agent 




Participants were also asked two new questions about the perceived normativity of the 
deed through the questions “To what extent do you think most people would consider 
this act a good deed?” (normative judgment) and “If they had a chance, to what extent 
do you think most people would do the same?” (normative behaviour). All these moral 
evaluations were measured through unipolar scales ranging from 0 to 100 (0 = not at all, 
100 = very much) using slider bars. 
As in Study 1, moral discrepancy was computed to measure indirect moral 
comparisons based on ability. Positive values indicated upward comparisons (agent 
evaluation higher than the participant’s self-evaluation), whereas negative values 
indicated downward comparisons (agent evaluation lower than the participant’s self-
evaluation); zero indicated lateral comparisons (agent and self at parity). 
Moral Self-Regulation 
Following the moral appraisals, participants were asked to fill out the moral self-
regulation inventory, rating how true they believed a set of items were in relation to the 
vignette that they viewed. In Study 2, the full item list was presented in randomised 
order: seven self-improvement items and thirteen self-defence items. Participants 
answered using a 0-100 unipolar scale with slider bars, where 0 = not at all true and 100 
= very true. The item lists for moral self-improvement and moral self-defence are shown 






Table B5:  
Moral self-improvement items tested in Study 2 (Francia’s vignette) 
Code Label Item wording 
SI1 Admirable Actions like this are truly admirable 
SI2 Awakened When I read these stories, I feel awakened to the good in the world 
SI3 Humanity This story strengthens my faith in humanity 
SI4 BeBetter Francia has shown me how to be a better person 
SI5 Values Francia and I share the same values 
SI6 BeLike I want to be more like Francia 
SI7 ForOthers I feel like I want to do something good for others 
 
Table B6:  
Moral self-defence items tested in Study 2 (Francia’s vignette) 
Code Label Item wording 
SD1 MeGreater In many ways, I have done greater deeds than Francia 
SD2 Remember 
Reading about Francia’s good deed makes me think about all the good 
deeds I’ve done for others 
SD3 Devalue This is not an act that I value all that much 
SD4 Ordinary It’s not such an extraordinary action 
SD5 People I know people who have done greater deeds than Francia 
SD6 Praise 
Francia may have done a good deed, but I bet she is seeking the praise of 
others 
SD7 Ulterior Francia may have had ulterior motives for doing this 
SD8 Uncomfortable It makes me uncomfortable to dwell on these stories 
SD9 Uneasy I would feel uneasy if I had to interact with Francia 
SD10 Uncommon 
Actions uncommon as this one should not be considered the standard we 
live by 
SD11 NoPraise 
Everyone occasionally does something really good, so Francia isn’t more 
praiseworthy than anybody else 
SD12 Superior Francia probably thinks she’s better than everyone else 
SD13 Seriously Francia takes herself too seriously 
 
 
The items of these two scales could be divided into two broad classes: 
 cognitions related to the moral action, for example self-improvement item 
SI1/Admirable and self-defence item SD4/Ordinary, or related to the moral agent, 
for example self-improvement item SI5/Values and self-defence item SD7/Ulterior; 
 behavioural tendencies (or action readiness/preparedness), for instance self-
improvement item SI7/ForOthers and self-defence item SD9/Uneasy. 
Compared to the scales used in Study 1, one new self-improvement item (SI6) and 
eight new self-defence items (SD2, SD3, SD5, SD7, SD8, SD9, SD11, and SD13) were 




reworded (SD6 and SD10) based on the findings. From a theoretical standpoint, most of 
the self-defence items fall under the wider umbrella of self-protection, while for 
example items SD1, SD2, and SD5 directly or indirectly reflect self-enhancement 
mechanisms. 
Moral Affect 
Following the moral self-regulation measures, participants were asked to rate how 
true they believed a set of affect statements were in relation to how they felt after 
viewing the vignettes. As in Study 1, the items were divided into the two scales of 
positive and negative affect. They were presented in randomised order and measured 
through unipolar 0-100 scales using slider bars, where 0 = not at all true and 100 = very 
true. 
The range of the subjective feelings measured by the moral affect scales tested in 
Study 2 was broader than that used in Study 1: it included six positive affect items and 
eight negative affect items. Compared to the set used in Study 1, the positive affect 
scale had three new items (PA3, PA4, and PA5) and the negative affect scale had three 
new items as well (NA2, NA3, and NA8). The wording of item PA2 in the positive affect 
scale was slightly modified following the results of Study 1. The full list of moral affect 






Table B7:  
Positive moral affect items tested in Study 2 (Francia’s vignette) 
Code Label Item wording 
PA1 Uplifted I felt uplifted 
PA2 Inspired I was inspired by the story 
PA3 Moved I was moved 
PA4 Proud I felt proud of what Francia did 
PA5 Happy It made me feel happy 
PA6 Challenged I felt challenged in a positive way 
 
Table B8:  
Negative moral affect items tested Study 2 
Code Label Item wording 
NA1 Conflicted I had a mix of conflicting feelings 
NA2 Detached I felt detached 
NA3 Vulnerable I felt vulnerable 
NA4 Threatened I felt as if I was threatened by something 
NA5 Guilty It made me feel guilty 
NA6 Envious To be honest, I felt envious 
NA7 Resentful I felt resentful 




The dataset was analysed using R ver. 3.6, RStudio ver. 1.240, IBM SPSS Statistics 
ver. 25-26, the PROCESS macro ver. 3.3 (Hayes, 2018), and the Monte Carlo PCA for 
Parallel Analysis application ver. 2.5 (Watkins, 2006). 
For Study 2 various analysis techniques, primarily descriptive and exploratory, were 
employed: outlier analysis to identify extreme data points, factor analysis to explore the 
dimensionality of the moral self-regulation and affect inventory, regression and 
correlation analysis to estimate importance, type of relationship, and effect size of 
critical predictors (especially the characteristic adaptations), moderation analysis to test 
the interactions hypothesised in the conceptual model, path modelling to further refine 
 




the models, and structural invariance analysis to determine if one path model was 






Results and Preliminary Reflections 
Descriptive Statistics 
In Study 2 there were no missing data, except for eleven participants who did not 
answer the political orientation questions (variables that are not part of the conceptual 
model). The descriptive statistics of the main socio-demographic variables are reported 
in Table B9. No significant difference was detected between the two vignettes (SMB3). 
 
Table B9: 
Descriptive statistics of the main socio-demographic variables (total sample) 









Religiosity 31.68 36.41 1.74 27.96 34.78 
Spirituality 47.37 37.04 1.80 43.71 50.85 
Political Orientation 
(Social Matters) 
38.16 31.96 1.56 35.06 41.02 
Political Orientation 
(Economic Matters) 




Self-Esteem. The descriptive statistics for the items of the Rosenberg self-esteem 
scale revealed a wide range of values. The mean scores of the items relative to negative 
aspects of the self-concept were lower than the mid-point of the scale; conversely, the 
mean scores of the items relative to positive aspects of the self-concept were higher 
than the mid-point. As expected, the negative items exhibited positive skewness and the 
positive items negative skewness; however, these values were not overly problematic. 
Across all the ten items, the distributions also showed limited kurtosis (not critical). 
After reverse-coding the negative items, the distribution of the composite mean of 
the Rosenberg self-esteem scale showed a long lower tail and was not normally 




significant differences were observed in the self-esteem scale across the two vignettes 
(for details, see SMB4). 
Regulatory Focus. The descriptive statistics for the dispositional regulatory focus 
scales revealed satisfactory ranges. After reverse-coding items and taking the average, 
the distribution of the promotion focus scale was approximately normal, with mean 
63.37 (SD = 16.00), skewness 0.02 and kurtosis -0.41. The distribution of the prevention 
focus scale was not normal, with mean 61.97 (SD = 19.54), skewness -0.22 and kurtosis -
0.49. No significant differences were observed in the promotion and prevention focus 
scales across the two vignettes (see SMB4 for details). 
Hedonic Orientation. The descriptive statistics for the approach and avoidance 
temperament scales revealed wide ranges for all the items. After averaging the 
corresponding items, the distribution of the approach scale showed a long lower tail 
(skewness -0.85) and was moderately pointy (kurtosis 1.16), with mean 64.25 (SD = 
17.30). The distribution of the avoidance scale was nearly symmetric (skewness 0.05) 
but platykurtic (kurtosis -0.96), with mean 49.90 (SD = 24.57). Both scales were not 
normally distributed. No significant differences were observed in the approach and 
avoidance scales across the two vignettes (details in SMB4). 
Moral Appraisals 
The means and the distributions of the moral appraisal variables exhibited the same 
patterns as in Study 1. Participants rated their own morality very highly: the distribution 
of the moral self-evaluation presented a long lower tail, with mean 80.93 (SD = 15.61), in 
line with the value measured in Study 1. 
The distributions of the agent evaluation, goodness and propriety of the deed were 
also asymmetric, with high mean scores and long lower tails. Only the variable 




both vignettes and was more symmetric (and slightly platykurtic). All the moral appraisal 
variables were not normally distributed. 
The mean scores of the moral appraisals of the agents and the deeds for the two 
vignettes are illustrated in Figure B2 (full details in SMB5). 
 
Figure B2:  
Mean scores for the moral appraisals for the two vignettes, with bootstrap standard 




With regard to the moral discrepancy, for both vignettes the values were positive 
(although not far from zero), indicating an overall upward moral comparison. Francia’s 
mean score was 10.93, whereas Nicholas’s was 3.82 (significantly lower, see SMB5). 
Another way to look at the moral comparisons is to examine the frequencies of the 
three types of comparisons for each of the two vignettes, that is, the percentage of 
participants who engaged in upward, downward, and lateral comparisons. The results of 









































predominant, but in Francia’s it did so to a greater extent than in Nicholas’s, where 
downward comparison was significantly more marked due to the more mixed appraisal 
of the moral character of the agent (for detailed results of a chi-square test, including 
contingency tables with standardised residuals, see SMB5). Again, this pattern was 
consistent with the findings from Study 1. 
 
Figure B3:  





Moral Self-Regulation: Item and Scale Analysis 
The moral self-regulation items showed for both vignettes negative skewness for 
the self-improvement indicators and positive skewness for the self-defence indicators. A 
few items across both scales also exhibited high kurtosis and all of them violated the 
assumption of normality (details in SMB7). 
Overall, the moral self-regulation scales showed satisfactory internal consistency. 





























and self-defence scales; within each vignette, Cronbach’s alpha was excellent for 
Nicholas and satisfactory for Francia (Tab. B9). 
The seven-item self-improvement scale at total sample level could improve by 
removing item SI7/ForOthers, which did not correlate well with the scale, especially in 
Nicholas’s vignette (Tab. B9). However, elimination of this item would cause the 
reliability of Francia’s scale, which was already lower, to drop further down, which was 
not desirable. At this stage, the existing seven-item scale was deemed to be an 
appropriate solution for the self-improvement scale for both vignettes. 
The thirteen-item self-defence scale performed much better than in Study 1, when 
only six items were tested among a smaller sample. Its internal consistency could even 
improve for both vignettes by removing item SD2/Remember (Tab. B10), which 
correlated less strongly with the scale; SD2 was therefore dropped from the self-defence 






Table B10:  
Possible improvements in internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) for the self-
improvement and self-defence scales (total sample and by vignette) 
Vignette 
Moral self-regulation scales 
Self-improvement  Self-defence 
original scale 
with 7 items 
reduced scale 
if any item deleted 
 
original scale 
with 13 items 
reduced scale 
if any item deleted 















Note: in parenthesis the items that, if removed, would improve Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
 
Deletion of item SD2/Remember had implications in terms of the expected 
dimensionality of the self-defence scale. Item SD2 was one of the items developed to 
capture self-enhancing mechanisms, alongside SD1/MeGreater and possibly others, such 
as SD5/People. In theory, these items – depending on participants’ response – could 
aggregate to form a self-enhancement factor, distinct from a self-protection factor that 
would aggregate the remaining items. Reliability analysis revealed two insights: a) item 
SD2 did not correlate strongly with the self-defence scale; b) SD1 and SD5 (the other 
possible self-enhancement items) correlated strongly with the self-defence scale (see 
SMB10). Consequently, once item SD2 was dropped, a bidimensional structure for the 
self-defence scale was no longer likely. In fact, all the twelve remaining items correlated 
moderately or strongly with the scale (except for SD10 and a few others, which needed 




items would be too few to form a reliable factor (the literature suggests that at least 
three items should aggregate to form a robust factor41). 
From a theoretical standpoint, Alicke and Sedikides (2009) acknowledge that it is 
often difficult in practice to clearly distinguish between self-enhancing and self-
protecting processes in the absence of a baseline level of functioning indicating levels of 
aspiration (for self-enhancement) and tolerance (for self-protection). Moreover, they 
point out that sometimes self-enhancement may serve self-protection interests, as it is 
often the case with narcissists (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). To complement these 
theoretical considerations and the previous empirical findings, the dimensionality of the 
self-defence scale was tested through exploratory factor analysis, whose results are 
presented later in this section. 
Prior to that, the reconfigured scales (self-improvement with seven items and self-
defence with twelve) were analysed in terms of distributions and biases: clear 
asymmetries and tailedness were observed, and both distributions violated assumptions 
of normality at total sample as well as at individual vignette level. The descriptive 
statistics, normality tests, histograms with the full distributions, and probability plots are 
available in SMB6. 
The composite mean scores of all seven self-improvement items for the two 
vignettes are displayed in Figure B4: all of them were strongly endorsed by participants, 
particularly in Francia’s vignette, which overall generated more self-improvement than 
Nicholas’s, consistent with the pattern that emerged in Study 1. 
  
 
41 Costello and Osborne (2005) recommend an even stricter standard, with at least five items per factor, but 
the more generally accepted criterion is a minimum of three items per factor, provided the sample size is 




Figure B4:  
Mean scores of the self-improvement items for the two vignettes, with bootstrap 




The composite mean scores of the twelve retained self-defence items for the two 
vignettes are displayed in Figure B5: overall, they were less strongly endorsed by 
participants than the self-improvement items; yet, self-defence processes appeared 
sizeable, particularly in Nicholas’s vignette, which elicited more self-defence than 




































































Figure B5:  
Mean scores of the twelve retained self-defence items for the two vignettes, with 




Moral Affect: Item and Scale Analysis 
Analysis of the individual items of the moral affect scales revealed patterns similar 
to those observed in Study 1: negative skewness for measures of positive affect, positive 
skewness for measures of negative affect. Considerable kurtosis recurred across several 
items. The assumption of normality was violated across all items for both vignettes 
(details in SMB9). 
Reliability analysis of the positive and negative affect scales (six and eight items 
respectively) was carried out. At total sample level, both scales showed a satisfactory 
degree of internal consistency (better for Francia than for Nicholas). However, two items 
did not perform well (see Tab. B11). Cronbach’s alpha would improve for the positive 
affect scale with the removal of item PA6/Challenged, which did not perform well in 
































































































Cronbach’s alpha would also slightly improve for the negative affect scale with the 
removal of item NA6/Envious. Therefore, items PA6 and NA6 were dropped from their 
respective scales. More detailed reliability analyses are presented in SMB11. 
 
Table B11:  
Possible improvements in internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) for the positive and 
negative affect scales (total sample and by vignette) 
Vignette 
Moral affect scales 
Positive affect  Negative affect 
original scale 
with 6 items 
reduced scale 
if any item deleted 
 
original scale 
with 8 items 
reduced scale 
if any item deleted 


















Note: In parenthesis the items that, if removed, would improve Cronbach’s alpha. 
 
 
The reconfigured scales (positive affect with five items and negative affect with 
seven) were analysed in terms of distributions and biases: clear asymmetries and 
tailedness were observed, and both distributions violated assumptions of normality at 
total sample as well as at individual vignette level. The descriptive statistics, normality 
tests, histograms with the full distributions, and probability plots are available in SMB8. 
The composite mean scores of the five retained positive affect items for the two 
vignettes are displayed in Figure B6: all of them were strongly endorsed by participants, 
particularly in Francia’s vignette, which overall generated more positive affect than 





Figure B6:  
Mean scores of the five retained positive affect items for the two vignettes, with 




The composite mean scores of the seven retained negative affect items for the two 
vignettes are displayed in Figure B7: overall, they were less strongly endorsed by 
participants than the positive affect items; yet, negative affective states were 
substantial, particularly in Nicholas’s vignette, which elicited them more strongly than 
Francia’s vignette. When comparing the two vignettes, on average two items scored in 
the opposite direction relative to all the others: NA3/Vulnerable and NA5/Guilty were 
endorsed more for Francia’s than for Nicholas’s vignette. These items were carefully 
considered in terms of their inter-correlations and communalities. More detailed 

























































Figure B7:  
Mean scores of the seven retained negative affect items for the two vignettes, with 




Correlations Between the Main Variables 
Correlation analysis was carried out, as in Study 1, by computing zero-order 
Pearson’s coefficients across characteristic adaptations, moral discrepancy, moral self-
regulation, and moral affect variables (see summaries in Tab. B12-B13, and the full 
output in SMB12-SMB13). 
Among the total sample, Study 2 found evidence of a weak positive correlation 
between promotion and prevention focus, and a weak negative correlation between 
approach and avoidance temperaments (Tab. B12). Promotion focus was strongly 
positively correlated with approach, while prevention focus was weakly negatively 
correlated with avoidance. Quite striking were also the associations of self-esteem with 
approach, promotion, and prevention (all positive), and with avoidance (negative). 
Both approach and promotion focus correlated positively with self-improvement, 
whereas self-defence was associated positively with avoidance and negatively with 





























































These results suggested the possible redundancy of self-esteem in the conceptual 
model: given the above-mentioned strong correlation patterns, dropping the construct 
could potentially enable a higher degree of parsimony without significant loss of 
information. Results also suggested the possible substitutability of approach and 
promotion focus for the prediction of moral discrepancy and self-improvement: indeed, 
approach and promotion correlated strongly with each other, and both predicted moral 
discrepancy and self-improvement (approach more strongly associated with self-
improvement and promotion focus with moral discrepancy). Based on this pattern, it 
would be plausible to hypothesise a parsimonious model whereby just one of them (e.g., 
promotion focus) predicted both moral discrepancy and self-improvement. 
 
Table B12: 
Zero-order correlations across characteristic adaptations, moral discrepancy, and moral 
self-regulation (total sample) 
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Promotion 
focus 
Correlation .157** .551*** -.509*** .709*** -.163** .180*** -.164 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 <.001 <.001 <.001 .001 <.001 .001 
         
2. Prevention 
focus 
Correlation 1 .000 -.153** .205*** -.128** .015 -.217*** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .995 .002 <.001 .009 .756 <.001 
         
3. Approach 
Correlation  1 -.100 .433*** -.140** .243*** .003 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .043* <.001 .005 <.001 .954 
         
4. Avoidance 
Correlation   1 -.606*** .188*** .032 .100 
Sig. (2-tailed)    <.001 <.001 .524 .042* 
         
5. Self-
esteem 
Correlation    1 -.240*** .087 -.081 
Sig. (2-tailed)     <.001 .079 .101 
         
6. Moral 
discrepancy 
Correlation     1 .363*** -.441*** 
Sig. (2-tailed)      <.001 <.001 
         
7. Self-
improvement 
Correlation      1 -.488*** 
Sig. (2-tailed)       <.001 
         
8. Self-
defence 
Correlation       1 
Sig. (2-tailed)        





Among the total sample, moral discrepancy correlated negatively with approach, 
promotion, prevention, and self-esteem, and positively with avoidance. It was also 
positively associated with self-improvement and negatively associated with self-defence, 
replicating the findings form Study 1. 
When examining the correlations between moral discrepancy and self-regulation 
within each vignette, Nicholas reproduced the same pattern as the total sample, while 
Francia was partly inconsistent (no significant correlation was detected between moral 
discrepancy and self-improvement; see SMB13 for further details). The scatter plots in 
Figures B8a-b42 illustrate graphically the distributions of the moral evaluations and the 
corresponding self-regulatory modes for Francia’s vignette (also fitting the regression 
lines). Panel “a” of the Figure shows that participants self-improved more or less 
strongly regardless of whether they engaged in upward or downward comparisons. 
However, in this sample, the number of participants who engaged in downward 
comparison was quite small (only 31), so stronger evidence would be desirable. It should 
also be remembered that these are only zero-order correlations in a bivariate system; 
path modelling can determine regression weights with higher levels of accuracy within 








Figures B8a-b:  
Relations between moral discrepancy and the two modes of moral self-regulation in 







Regarding the relationships between self-regulation and affect, results from the 
correlation analysis were consistent with those from Study 1: positive correlation 
between self-improvement and positive affect, as well as between self-defence and 
negative affect (Tab. B13). Whereas the correlation between self-improvement and 
positive affect was high already in Study 1, the correlation between self-defence and 
negative affect was stronger in the present study (r = .692, p < .001 at total sample) than 
in Study 1 (r = .285, p < .001 at total sample), when only a few items were tested. The 
same pattern was consistently observed in both vignettes: Francia r = .740, p < .001, 
Nicholas r = .663, p < .001 (see SMB13 for details). 
 
  





Zero-order correlation between moral self-regulation and moral affect (total sample) 
  Positive affect Negative affect 
Self-improvement 
Pearson Correlation  .874*** -.238*** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  <.001 <.001 
     
Self-Defence 
Pearson Correlation  -.513*** .692*** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  <.001 <.001 
Note:        *** p < .001 (2-tailed). 
                  c. Bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
 
 
Because these correlation coefficients were very high (about .7 or higher in 
absolute value), it was legitimate to carefully consider to what extent these measures 
assess truly distinct constructs. In light of this, a revised configuration of the model was 
contemplated, that is, a solution that: 
 conflated indicators of positive cognitions/action tendencies and positive affect into 
a broader moral cognitive/conative/affective self-improvement scale; 
 conflated indicators of negative cognitions/action tendencies and negative affect 
into a broader moral cognitive/conative/affective self-defence scale. 
To empirically test this modified configuration of the measures of moral self-
regulation, exploratory factor analysis was conducted. 
Moral Self-Regulation Scale Dimensionality: Exploratory Factor Analysis 
To investigate the dimensional structure of the four scales of the moral self-
regulation and affect inventory, EFA was conducted. Principal axis factoring was 
employed to handle non-normal distributions and a Monte Carlo simulation was run 
using the Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis application. At total sample level, after 
aggregating all the 31 cognitive, conative, and affective moral self-regulation indicators, 
two or three factors emerged from an initial extraction, a parallel analysis, and an 




improvement items; b) one or two factors for the nineteen cognitive/conative/affective 
self-defence items. The three-factor solution was hardly interpretable, due to multiple 
cross-loadings of equal magnitude; on the contrary, the two-factor solution was neat, 
with all the nineteen self-defence items aggregating together (explaining 40.7% of the 
total variance) and loading separately from the twelve self-improvement items 
(explaining 14.3% of the total variance). At this stage, the factor loadings could be 
considered acceptable, although with some weaknesses: about half of them were 
greater than .700, particularly for the self-improvement factor, and all were greater than 
.400. Table B14 exhibits the factor loadings of the two-factor solution, while further 







Exploratory factor analysis of the full 31-item moral self-regulation inventory: factor 
loadings (total sample) 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
 Self-defence Self-improvement 
 (variance explained = 40.7%) (variance explained = 14.3%) 
NA4/Threatened .826  
NA7/Resentful .819  
SD9/Uneasy .768  
SD12/Superior .764  
SD13/Seriously .716  
SD6/Praise .702  
SD8/Uncomfortable .683  
SD4/Ordinary .668  
SD1/Greater .668  
NA8/Irritated .654  
SD3/Devalue .640 -.313 
SD7/Ulterior .628  
NA3/Vulnerable .615  
NA1/Conflicted .605  
SD11/NoPraise .599  
NA5/Guilty .563  
NA2/Detached .508  
SD10/Uncommon .411  
SD5/People .406  
PA2/Inspired  .879 
SI3/Humanity  .853 
PA1/Uplifted  .837 
PA3/Moved  .835 
PA5/Happy  .832 
SI4/BeBetter  .820 
SI6/BeLike  .793 
SI2/Awakened  .788 
PA4/Proud  .752 
SI5/Values  .679 
SI1/Admirable -.309 .643 
SI7/ForOthers  .518 
Note: Extraction method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
           Rotation method: oblimin with Kaiser normalisation (rotation converged in 7 iterations). 
           Factor loadings below .3 are not reported in the table. 
 
 
Results partly held up when the analysis was carried out at the level of the 
individual vignettes. For Francia, a two-factor solution emerged, closely replicating the 
pattern observed for the total sample (see SMB15). For Nicholas, a three-factor solution 




cognitive/conative/affective self-improvement, 2) cognitive/conative self-defence, and 
3) negative affect. However, one item did not load on any factor, and several cross-
loadings of a similar magnitude emerged (see SMB16 for details). Although at a 
superficial glance it looked mathematically the most appropriate solution, it was not 
statistically straightforward and substantively interpretable with ease. 
At the present stage of the research, it appeared that the measurement model 
would fit Francia’s vignette more comfortably than Nicholas’s. The two-factor solution 
was retained as the lead option for the measurement model, deferring re-evaluation to 
Study 3 among a larger sample with confirmatory techniques. Hereon, the broader 
cognitive/conative/affective constructs were used for moral self-improvement and self-
defence. 
Multiple Linear Regression 
Multiple linear regression was carried out to identify the strongest predictors and 
their effect sizes. The analysis reproduced the same method used in Study 1, but the 
two criteria (dependent variables) were now the broader cognitive/conative/affective 
self-improvement and self-defence scales. The crucial insight expected from the analysis 
was the contribution of the characteristic adaptations to the explanation of the variance 
of the outcome variables, but also a replication of the role played by moral comparisons 
based on the critical moral appraisals. 
The predictors entered in the forward selection procedure were the following: age, 
religiosity, spirituality, political orientation43, self-esteem, promotion focus, prevention 
 
43 As in Study 1, the very strong correlation between the variables of political orientation on economic 
matters and political orientation on social matters (r = .834, p < .001) suggested to average the two variables 




focus, approach, avoidance, self-evaluation, agent evaluation, moral discrepancy, 
goodness and propriety of the deed. 
For the total sample, the models explained just above half of the variance of the 
dependent variables (adjusted R square); at the level of the individual vignettes, the fit 
was slightly better for Nicholas than for Francia (Tab. B15). 
 
Table B15: 
Multiple linear regressions at total sample and by vignette (forward selection): model 
summaries. Dependent variables: self-improvement/self-defence 
Vignette 
 Dependent variable: self-improvement  Dependent variable: self-defence 
 R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
 R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Tot. sample  .721 .520 .515 15.57001  .717 .514 .501 12.34800 
Francia  .634 .402 .393 14.85618  .715 .511 .491 11.78669 
Nicholas  .779 .607 .596 15.65991  .748 .560 .546 12.30510 
 
 
For the total sample, the characteristic adaptations appeared to be significant 
predictors of moral self-regulation: approach for self-improvement, prevention focus 
and avoidance for self-defence. A similar outcome emerged at the level of the individual 
vignettes except for avoidance, which did not appear among the significant predictors of 
self-defence for Francia. 
The substitutability in the conceptual model of approach and promotion focus 
emerged again: with both variables entered as independent variables in the regression, 
approach (but not promotion) was a significant predictor of self-improvement; if 
approach were not entered in the regression, promotion focus would appear as a 
significant predictor. 
As expected, the sign of the coefficients showed positive relationships between 
approach and self-improvement, and between avoidance and self-defence (Nicholas). 




be positively correlated with self-defence; in fact, it turned out to be negatively 
associated with it, both at total sample and by individual vignette. Another interesting 
pattern was the significance of moral discrepancy as a predictor of self-defence only in 
Nicholas’s vignette; as noted earlier on, one possible explanation of this phenomenon is 
that the forward selection process usually tends to identify fewer significant predictors 
than other procedures, such as the backward elimination process (Field et al., 2012). 
Religiosity (but not spirituality) appeared as one of the significant predictors, but with 
contradictory results: at total sample, it was positively correlated with both self-
improvement (β = .116, p = .002) and self-defence (β = .112, p = .006). The correlation 
with self-improvement was driven by Nicholas’s subsample (β = .160, p = .004), whereas 
the correlation with self-defence was driven by Francia’s subsample (β = .198, p < .001). 
It is not easy to interpret these findings, since it could have been anticipated that 
Nicholas’s deed (the safeguard of homosexuals’ civil rights) and not Francia’s deed 
(organ donation) would have caused moral defensiveness among holders of traditional 
religious beliefs (consistent with existing research, see e.g., Janssen & Scheepers, 2019). 
Effectively, in Study 2 conservative political views did correlate positively with self-
defence at total sample (β = .166, p < .001) as well as within each of the two 
subsamples. As a general remark, it must be noted that all these standardised regression 
coefficients were relatively weak. Multicollinearity was never an issue in this analysis, 
since the VIF was never greater than 2.8 (well below the cutoff point of 10), as can be 
seen in the full output available in SMB17. Additionally, the best regression models (with 
predictors) for both vignettes were better than using the mean of the dependent 
variable (intercept-only models, see SMB17). The main results of the regression analysis 





Multiple linear regressions at total sample and by vignette (forward selection): 
significant coefficients. Dependent variables: self-improvement/self-defence 
 
Tab. B16a: Regression coefficients - Dependent variable: self-improvement 
 Significant Predictors Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
Tot. sample 
(Constant) -20.851 5.215  -3.998 <.001 
Propriety of Deed .599 .053 .548 11.267 <.001 
Approach .190 .046 .147 4.139 <.001 
Goodness of Deed .283 .061 .222 4.653 <.001 
Religiosity .072 .023 .116 3.122 .002 
Francia 
(Constant) -32.390 9.970  -3.249 .001 
Propriety of Deed .553 .083 .403 6.687 <.001 
Agent Evaluation .493 .109 .273 4.537 <.001 
Approach .197 .065 .173 3.050 .003 
Nicholas 
(Constant) -12.592 7.083  -1.778 .077 
Propriety of Deed .564 .073 .579 7.743 <.001 
Goodness of Deed .253 .076 .229 3.336 .001 
Approach .178 .064 .128 2.797 .006 
Religiosity .108 .037 .160 2.938 .004 
Political Orientation -.099 .041 -.130 -2.416 .017 
 
Tab. B16b: Regression coefficients - Dependent variable: self-defence 
 Significant Predictors 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
Tot. sample 
(Constant) 79.359 5.977  13.278 <.001 
Goodness of Deed -.231 .058 -.232 -3.994 <.001 
Political Orientation .095 .023 .166 4.125 <.001 
Prevention Focus -.175 .033 -.195 -5.371 <.001 
Propriety of Deed -.140 .046 -.163 -3.061 .002 
Avoidance .059 .030 .083 1.934 .054* 
Agent Evaluation -.207 .063 -.192 -3.262 .001 
Religiosity .054 .020 .112 2.764 .006 
Age -.091 .054 -.062 -1.683 .093 
Promotion Focus -.179 .057 -.164 -3.147 .002 
Approach .120 .046 .119 2.584 .010 
Francia 
(Constant) 126.286 10.794  11.700 <.001 
Goodness of Deed -.574 .141 -.268 -4.081 <.001 
Prevention Focus -.197 .043 -.235 -4.548 <.001 
Religiosity .092 .026 .198 3.552 <.001 
Promotion Focus -.320 .066 -.322 -4.830 <.001 
Propriety of Deed -.175 .068 -.147 -2.584 .011 
Agent Evaluation -.254 .101 -.163 -2.509 .013 
Approach .171 .066 .174 2.604 .010 
Political Orientation .070 .032 .122 2.218 .028 
Nicholas 
(Constant) 55.038 6.376  8.632 <.001 
Goodness of Deed -.260 .063 -.318 -4.111 <.001 
Political Orientation .120 .032 .213 3.779 <.001 
Prevention Focus -.143 .048 -.150 -2.978 .003 
Propriety of Deed -.167 .057 -.231 -2.944 .004 
Avoidance .120 .039 .157 3.081 .002 
Moral Discrepancy -.109 .053 -.145 -2.068 .040 





The Moderation Hypothesis 
One of the hypotheses of Study 2 was an interaction between moral discrepancy 
and the variables of regulatory focus, hedonic orientation, and self-esteem. The 
presence of a significant interaction term between these variables would reveal a 
moderating role exerted by the characteristic adaptations (an example is illustrated in 
Fig. B9). 
Specifically, the preregistered moderation effects contemplated that: 
 moral discrepancy would lead to higher degrees of self-improvement in the 
presence of high promotion focus, approach, and self-esteem, as opposed to lower 
degrees of self-improvement in the presence of low promotion focus, approach, 
and self-esteem; 
 moral discrepancy would lead to higher degrees of self-defence in the presence of 
high prevention focus44, avoidance, and self-esteem, as opposed to lower degrees 
of self-defence in the presence of low prevention focus, avoidance, and self-
esteem. 
 
Figure B9:  
Two equivalent representations of the conceptual model of moderation: the example of 




44 The hypothesis of a positive moderating effect of prevention focus on self-defence was based on the 
assumption of a positive correlation between the two constructs. However, regression analysis uncovered a 




The moderation analysis was conducted with the PROCESS macro ver. 3.3, one by 
one for each characteristic adaptation interacting with moral discrepancy, each time 
controlling for the effect of all the other characteristic adaptations. For instance, as in 
Figure B9, when testing the moderating effect of approach on the relationship between 
moral discrepancy and self-improvement, the effect was modelled controlling for 
promotion focus, prevention focus, avoidance, and self-esteem45. For exploratory 
purposes, the analysis was extended to include each characteristic adaptation in the 
prediction of both self-improvement and self-defence (beyond the preregistered 
hypotheses) and was carried out at the level of the two individual vignettes. All the 
variables were treated as observed using composite means. 
Overall, the analysis showed no systematic evidence of interactions for either 
vignette; therefore, an overarching moderation effect was not supported by the data. 
The only exception was a negative interaction between approach and moral discrepancy 
in relation to self-defence in Nicholas’s vignette, which was significant (confidence 
interval not straddling zero); the effect size of the interaction increased as approach 
tended to higher levels, but it remained weak. A summary of the results of the 
moderation analysis for the two vignettes is reported in Table B1746 (further details in 
SMB18). 
At this point, with the results of correlation and moderation analysis taken 
together, it seemed reasonable to drop self-esteem and carry on with a more 
parsimonious model that retained regulatory focus and approach/avoidance. 
 
45 The inclusion of self-esteem in the moderation analysis, although redundant in the overall model, is 
explained by the fact that it was preregistered. 
46 The moderation coefficients reported in Table B17 are unstandardised. They can be interpreted as 
follows: when the moderator (e.g., approach) is zero, a 1-unit change in the independent variable (moral 
discrepancy) corresponds to a change of the dependent variable (e.g., self-improvement) equal to the value 





Moderation analysis for the characteristic adaptations for the two vignettes. Dependent 
variables: self-improvement/self-defence. Predictor: moral discrepancy 
Moderators for each 
dependent variable 










       
      Promotion focus .1744 -.0043 .4692  .2986 .0030 .3789 
      Approach .1747 -.0041 .4132  .2995 .0031 .3155 
      Self-esteem .1722 .0016 .7493  .2972 .0018 .5521 
      Prevention focus .1761 .0043 .3281  .2964 .0010 .7759 
      Avoidance .1723 -.0014 .7659  .2980 -.0021 .4417 
        
Dependent variable: 
self-defence 
       
      Prevention focus .2696 .0029 .4408  .3637 -.0007 .8036 
      Avoidance .2779 -.0054 .1009  .3637 -.0006 .7868 
      Self-esteem .2749 .0052 .1089  .3654 -.0017 .5094 
      Promotion focus .2696 .0037 .3545  .3693 -.0033 .1933 
      Approach .2687 -.0028 .4658  .3884 -.0061*** <.001 
Note:        *** p < .01 (2-tailed). 
                  Bootstrap results are based on 500 bootstrap samples. 
 
 
The Mediation Hypothesis and Path Models 
Because based on the empirical evidence the notion of an overarching moderating 
effect exerted by the characteristic adaptations was no longer tenable, an alternative 
hypothesis was explored: instead of moderators, regulatory focus and hedonic 
orientation were considered predictors (exogenous variables) of moral comparisons and 
self-regulatory processes (endogenous variables), with moral comparisons as mediators 
of self-regulation. To test mediation, unlike with the moderation hypothesis, instead of 
running a set of separate mediation analyses, a single full path model was tested, first 
among the total sample, and then (failing structural invariance tests) for each of the two 
vignettes. The key constructs were modelled as observed variables using the 
corresponding composite mean scores. The analysis was carried out with the R package 




estimator or the weighted least squares adjusted for mean and variance (WLSMV) 
estimator to handle multivariate non-normality of the distributions (see Savalei, 2018); 
the free parameters were tested 2-tailed at 95% c.l. 
Assessment of the goodness-of-fit of the hypothesised models against the empirical 
data was based on the joint analysis of the following key fit indices (“scaled” whenever 
appropriate): 
 absolute fit indices, e.g. the chi-square statistic (and its p-value), and the GFI (with its 
“parsimony-adjusted” parent-measure, the AGFI); 
 relative fit indices, e.g. the CFI and TLI; 
 non-centrality-based fit indices, e.g. the RMSEA (and its p-value). 
Among the above-mentioned indices, the RMSEA (with its p-value) is probably the 
most widely used and recommended (Schreiber et al., 2006). In the context of this 
analysis, the chi-square statistic was reported for the sake of completeness rather than 
for its diagnosticity, given its high sensitivity to factors such as sample size, multivariate 
non-normality of the distributions, number of parameters to be estimated, size of the 
correlations, and so forth (Kline, 2016). 
The models were considered to have satisfactory fit if the scaled RMSEA were non-
significant and lower than .080 (excellent fit if lower than .050), and if scaled CFI, scaled 
TLI and GFI were greater than .900 (excellent fit if greater than .950). 
The hypothesised model for the analysis included all the pathways that could be 
assumed to be significant based on available findings. Self-improvement would be 
predicted by moral discrepancy and promotion focus (or approach); self-defence would 
be predicted by moral discrepancy, prevention focus and avoidance; moral discrepancy 
would be predicted by promotion focus (or approach); promotion focus would covary 





prevention focus; self-improvement and self-defence would show residual covariances 
(see Fig. B10). 
 
Figure B10:  
Hypothesised path diagram of the revised conceptual model with the key characteristic 
adaptations as exogenous predictors, moral discrepancy as endogenous mediator, and 
cognitive/conative/affective self-regulation modes as endogenous outcomes. All 














Note: the letters represent the pathways whose coefficients were hypothesised to be significantly different from zero. 
 
 
Path Model Fitted to the Total Sample 
The path model fitted to the total sample included the variable vignette (the 
experimental manipulation) as an additional predictor47 to test its ability to determine 
differential ability-based comparisons and moral self-regulation modes. In this case, the 
WLSMV estimator was used. The optimised path diagram is illustrated in Figure B11, 
while the complete output of the analysis is available in SMB19.  
 





Figure B11:  
Optimised path diagram for the total sample. All variables treated as observed, using 
composite mean scores for the scales. Estimator: weighted least squares adjusted for 
mean and variance (WLSMV). Standardised regression weights. Error terms not 



















The negative sign of the regression weights from vignette to moral discrepancy and 
self-improvement indicates that Francia’s vignette induced significantly higher levels of 
upward comparison and self-improvement than Nicholas’s vignette48. 
Overall, the goodness-of-fit was inadequate, as shown in Table B18: in particular, 
the RMSEA of .149 with significant p-value indicated poor fit. However, it must be said 
that the present model was fitted with observed variables, assuming perfect 
measurement with no error. It was a pragmatic approach suitable to an early 
exploratory study with a limited sample size, but not accurate. In the next stage of the 
research (Study 3), with a fresh larger sample drawn from the same population, latent 
variables were constructed and fitted to the full structural models, allowing a higher 
 
48 The values of the regression weights with vignette as predictor (-.12 and -.18) in Figure B11 are 
standardised. The corresponding unstandardised values are respectively -.056 and -.074 (see SBM19) and 
are meaningless from a substantive viewpoint, as they depend on the dummy coding of the vignettes. 








Main fit indices for the optimised model for the total sample 
 Total sample 
Chi-Square (scaled) 162.006 
df (scaled) 16 
p-value (scaled) <.001 
  
RMSEA (scaled) .149 
p-value (scaled) <.001 
  
CFI (scaled) .527 





Structural Invariance Between Vignettes 
To test whether one single path model could be adequate for both vignettes, 
structural invariance between the two subsamples/vignettes (Francia versus Nicholas) 
was tested. At a model-wide level, this was achieved by comparing an unconstrained 
model, whereby all parameters were freely estimated for each vignette, with a fully 
constrained model, whereby all parameters (regression weights and intercepts) were 
constrained to be equal between vignettes. If the chi-square difference for the 
corresponding degree of freedom difference were significant, there would be evidence 
for lack of invariance, hence distinct models would be needed for each vignette. 
Results of structural invariance tests showed that the two vignettes were 
significantly different (see Tab. B19; full output in SMB20), indicating that two separate 






Structural invariance test by vignette (total sample) 
Model df AIC BIC χ2 χ2 diff. df diff. Sig. 
Unconstrained 18 24659 24868 75.969    
Fully constrained 31 24683 24840 125.481 51.04 13 <.001*** 
Note:    ***  p < .001 (2-tailed). 
 
 
Because comparing an unconstrained with a fully constrained model provides a 
model-wide test of invariance, once ascertained that the path models significantly 
differed by vignette, there was an interest in determining which specific pathways were 
the drivers of the overall effect. This was done by constraining individual pathways of 
interest (one at a time) to be equal between vignettes, and then comparing the 
unconstrained with these single-constrain models. Here, the most interesting paths to 
test were those linking moral discrepancy with self-improvement and self-defence 
(paths A and B in Fig. B11), since in Study 1 they behaved slightly differently across the 
three main vignettes of Francia, Nicholas, and Ruxandra (Fig. A13a-c). Additionally, given 
the unclear association patterns found in the literature, some of the covariances 
between the characteristic adaptations were tested for invariance too, for example 
those between promotion and prevention focus (path I), approach and avoidance (path 
J), prevention focus and avoidance (path K). The results of these tests are reported in 







Structural invariance tests by vignette: models with paths A, B, I, J, and K constrained to 
equality by vignette and tested against the unconstrained model 
Model df AIC BIC χ2 χ2 diff. df diff. Sig. 
Unconstrained 18 24659 24868 75.969    
Path A constrained 19 24670 24876 89.110 15.484 1 <.001*** 
Path B constrained 19 24664 24869 82.993 6.2492 1 0.012* 
Path I constrained 19 24664 24869 82.609 5.8695 1 0.015* 
Path J constrained 19 24672 24877 90.843 13.812 1 <.001*** 
Path K constrained 19 24661 24866 79.969 3.5066 1 0.061 
Note:   ***  p < .001               *  p < .05 
 
 
Only path K was invariant between vignettes, while all the others were significantly 
different. Lack of invariance of path A was highly significant at the .001 level. Once 
again, it must be emphasised that these results are still preliminary, being based on 
relatively small samples and models with inadequate fit indices obtained with observed 
instead of latent variables. 
Path Models Fitted by Vignette 
The results of path analysis by vignette indicated that the models did not achieve 
satisfactory fit for either Francia’s or Nicholas’s subsamples (see Tab. B21; full output in 
SMB21). However, as expected following invariance tests, in both cases the fit was 
substantially better than for the total sample. 
 
Table B21: 
Main fit indices for the optimised models for the two vignettes 
 Francia Nicholas 
Chi-Square (scaled) 27.597 32.650 
df (scaled) 12 10 
p-value (scaled) .006 <.001 
   
RMSEA (scaled) .079 .105 
p-value (scaled) .052 .012 
   
CFI (scaled) .925 .928 
TLI (scaled) .870 .850 
GFI .996 .998 







The optimised path models for the two vignettes (following the results from 
invariance tests) are displayed in Figures B12a-b, which also document the significant 
regression weights and the RMSEA with its p-value. 
 
Figures B12a-b:  
Optimised path diagrams for the two vignettes. All variables treated as observed, using 
mean scores for the scales. Estimator: robust maximum likelihood (MLR). Standardised 























As expected, the pathway between moral discrepancy and self-improvement was 
different for the two vignettes, significant for Nicholas and non-significant for Francia 
(although this could be an artefact of the methodology). Similarly, the covariance 
between promotion and prevention focus was significant for Nicholas and non-
significant for Francia; the covariance between approach and avoidance was significant 
for Francia and non-significant for Nicholas. The covariance between prevention focus 
and avoidance should have been invariant between vignettes, but turned out to be 
significant for Nicholas and non-significant for Francia. 
Although knowingly provisional and inadequate, the path models in Figures B12a-b 
represent the final and most important output of Study 2. They were used as input for 






Study 2 completed the preliminary exploratory and generative stage of the research 
plan (Fig. IV), consolidating important learning for the development of the measurement 
and structural models of the self-regulation of virtue. 
Measurement Model 
Item Selection 
Study 2 allowed to remove a few poorly performing indicators from the moral self-
regulation and affect inventory: one from the self-defence scale (SD2), one from the 
positive affect scale (PA6), and one from the negative affect scale (NA6). It also helped 
identify other potentially weaker items (e.g., SI7, SD5, SD10, NA2, NA5) which showed 
lower factor loadings onto their corresponding factors. At this stage, they were not 
dropped to avoid the risk of overfitting, but would be carefully re-evaluated in Study 3 in 
terms of inter-correlations, factor loadings, internal consistency, goodness-of-fit, and 
error. 
Merging of Cognitive/Conative/Affective Items 
Study 2 was instrumental to the fundamental decision about the consolidation of 
the indicators of the four scales of the preliminary self-regulation and affect inventory 
into two broader cognitive/conative/affective scales. These were still labelled moral self-
improvement and moral self-defence, but must now be intended in their more 
comprehensive connotation, comprising thoughts/action tendencies and feelings 
elicited by the moral actions depicted in the vignettes. This data-driven solution is not 
only empirically, but also theoretically plausible, since affect in this research was 
measured through self-reports. Self-reported measures of affect are known to be 
mediated by people’s ability to directly access bodily cues necessary for the experience 




of the components of emotion is neurophysiological/motor changes in the body 
(Scherer, 2005), which are experienced, among other cues, in the form of feelings (Izard, 
2007). The ability to access and become aware of these bodily changes is called 
“interoception”. Recent research and theorising have established that interoception 
comprises the conversion of sensory information (e.g., visceral and muscular cues) into 
afferent signals and their transmission to the central nervous system to form mental 
representations of inner states (Feldman Barrett et al., 2005). In a review published in 
2016, Tsakiris and Critchley claimed that interoceptive signals actively interact with 
cognition, “influencing attention and perception, guiding decision-making and shaping 
memory and emotion processing” (p. 1). If feelings arising from bodily experiences are 
cognitively processed to form complex mental representations of inner states, it is likely 
that self-reports coalesce into undivided cognitive/affective experiences, resulting in 
strongly correlated measures. 
Additionally, the supposed dualism between cognitive and affective aspects of 
moral judgment has been at the centre of philosophical speculation even before 
psychology was established as a science, with the opposing traditions of the 
“rationalistic” and the “sentimentalist” schools (Cushman et al., 2010). In psychology, 
Kohlberg’s work inherited the dominant Kantian view in Western ethics that for 
centuries put moral reasoning at the core of moral judgment, proposing a cognitive-
developmental approach that was highly influential (see e.g., Kohlberg, 1976). A few 
decades later, Haidt and colleagues (see e.g., Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Kesebir, 
2010) offered a socio-intuitionist perspective which, in contrast, highlighted the 
importance of intuitions as basic semi-innate units that underlie more complex 
culturally-dependent moral compounds strongly influenced by emotions; in this 




judgment (McIntyre, 2012), feelings are the key ethical currency and cognitions are 
relegated to post-hoc rationalisations (Ellemers et al., 2019). Attempts were made 
during the last few years to reconcile these opposite views of morality: Dedeke (2015) 
reviewed theorising and empirical research on ethical decision making from the 1980s 
onward and put forward a cognitive-intuitionist model of moral judgment, which 
proposed an integration of cognitive/deliberative and affective/intuitive mechanisms. 
The debate is still open, but the notion of a close interplay between deliberative and 
intuitive processes in moral judgment is gaining traction (Ellemers et al., 2019), echoing 
the more recent advances in the field which no longer see controlled deliberative 
processes and automatic heuristic processes as mutually exclusive and clearly separable 
(for a review, see e.g., Gawronski & Creighton, 2013). If further empirical evidence is 
obtained and integrative theories solidify, it could become easier to provide further 
explanations of why in the present study it appeared difficult to disentangle self-
reported cognitive/affective regulatory processes. 
Dimensional Structure 
Study 2 also provided important insights into the dimensional structure of the 
moral self-regulation scales. EFA among the total sample indicated that, from a 
substantive standpoint, a two-factor solution could be more easily explained; analysis of 
the empirical data revealed that this solution was completely satisfactory for Francia’s 
vignette, but slightly weaker for Nicholas’s, for which a three-factor solution statistically 
showed better fit (albeit hardly interpretable). 
As previously discussed, theoretical considerations would make it preferable to 
develop a single valid and reliable measurement instrument of the self-regulation of 
virtue capable of capturing the same phenomenon across the two (or more) moral 




regulation inventory is supposed to measure the same phenomenon (e.g., experiences 
of broadening and defensive moral self-regulation) regardless of the stimuli; on the 
other hand, a slightly different emphasis on specific components of those experiences 
could be justified by the varying content of the stimuli, while still pertaining to the same 
category of experience. The issue becomes apparent when items referred to certain 
components of that experience behave too differently across conditions, so that their 
presence in a single measurement instrument is no longer legitimate. Items NA5/Guilty 
and NA3/Vulnerable provide two interesting examples: Francia’s action of donating a 
kidney to a friend triggered among participants a sense of guilt and vulnerability that 
was not induced to the same extent by Nicholas’s commitment against social 
discrimination. These items were still retained after Study 2, but remain candidates for 
exclusion from the final inventory, with final assessment deferred to confirmatory 
techniques (CFA and measurement invariance) planned for Study 3 among a larger 
sample. 
In principle, a second round of factor analysis, with a confirmatory procedure, could 
have been conducted on the data from Study 2 as a complement to the exploratory 
procedure detailed earlier in this chapter. However, this is not a recommended practice: 
the risk of conducting EFA (or PCA49) and CFA sequentially on the same dataset is that 
the solution could be too sample-specific, hence with low generalisability (the issue of 
“overfitting”), particularly if the results of EFA are used to influence decisions about the 
subsequent CFA (see e.g., Fokkema & Greiff, 2017). Therefore, in Study 2 only 
exploratory factor analysis was carried out, in line with the nature of the present stage 
 
49 PCA is the commonly used acronym for principal component analysis, a similar exploratory technique 
used when the dimensional structure is not known (for a clear summary of the difference between the two 




of the research, deferring confirmatory analysis to the subsequent Study 3 among a new 
sample. 
Structural Model 
Study 2 enabled strong progress in the definition of the relationships across key 
constructs in the nomological network. 
Moral Comparison and Self-Regulation 
At total sample level, results reproduced the pattern of relationships between 
moral comparisons and self-regulation already emerged in Study 1: upward comparison 
was more likely to lead to moral self-improvement, downward comparison to moral self-
defence. 
Structural Invariance 
Structural invariance was rejected, suggesting that specific models were necessary 
for each vignette. Notably, the magnitude of the association between moral discrepancy 
and moral self-regulation was much stronger in Nicholas’s condition, where the 
standardised coefficients exceeded .50. Further evidence will be necessary for Francia’s 
vignette, where only the pathway between moral discrepancy and self-defence was 
significant, and the effect size was moderately low. 
Characteristic Adaptations 
The study also provided evidence about the importance of the characteristic 
adaptations as predictors of the moral experience of virtue. Among these, self-esteem – 
given the very strong correlations with promotion focus, approach, and avoidance – 
turned out to be redundant and was dropped from the model for the sake of parsimony. 
Importantly, the role of regulatory focus and hedonic orientation as moderators was not 
supported by the data. Although theoretical predictions would have suggested a 




showed no systematic significance. The result was consistent across the two vignettes 
for all the four motivational variables, except for approach in the prediction of self-
defence (with low effect size). 
Whereas the moderation hypothesis was not supported, the mediation hypothesis 
was. In the revised path models, moral discrepancy functioned as a partial mediator of 
promotion focus (or approach) in the prediction of moral self-improvement (with also a 
link to moral self-defence), whereas prevention focus and avoidance directly predicted 
self-defence. These path models did not achieve satisfactory fit, but represent a 
necessary intermediate step before the specification of full structural equation models 
fitted among a larger sample using latent variables in Study 3. 
Direct Effects on Moral Self-Regulation and Moral Discrepancy. An important 
finding concerned the direction of the effects of the motivational variables on moral 
self-regulation. The path models confirmed the hypothesis that promotion focus or 
approach positively predicted self-improvement, aligning with claims that self-
improvement is underpinned by promotion-orientated strategies and approach motives 
(Sedikides & Hepper, 2009). Indeed, promotion focus and approach represent 
respectively advancement motives towards ideals (Higgins, 1997) and energisation 
toward desired goals (Elliot & Thrash, 2010). The prediction that participants high in 
promotion and approach would tend to score higher (relative to those low in promotion 
and approach) on self-improvement was met on the basis of a psychological motion 
toward a desirable moral ideal, that is: a perception of the moral agents as admirable 
(SI1) moral exemplars, with whom participants shared the same altruistic values (SI5) 
and sense of humanity (SI3); a perception of their actions as uplifting (PA1) and inspiring 
(PA2) which made participants feel vicariously proud (PA4), wanting to be more like 




The hypothesis of the positive association between avoidance and self-defence was 
also met for both vignettes. Avoidant participants susceptible to thoughts/feelings of 
anxiety and worry tended to self-defend: the moral exemplars triggered a greater sense 
of threat (NA4) and more negative feelings of conflict (NA1), resentment (NA7) or even 
irritation (NA8) (Nicholas’s vignette), or alternatively a greater sense of vulnerability 
(NA3) and guilt (NA5) (Francia’s vignette). They were also associated with motivated 
aggrandising self-serving judgments about themselves (SD1, SD5) or dismissive 
trivialising judgments about the moral agents (SD6, SD7, SD12, SD13) and their actions 
(SD3, SD4, SD10). 
Particularly interesting is the case of the relationship between prevention focus and 
self-defence. The two variables were predicted to correlate positively and instead 
turned out to be negatively associated. The result at total sample was upheld in the 
analysis by individual vignette and was of moderate effect size. The original hypothesis 
was based on relationship patterns between the motivational dispositions: Elliot and 
Thrash (2010) found a strong positive correlation between chronic prevention focus and 
avoidance temperament (r = .57, p < .001), and so in theory both could have correlated 
positively with self-defence. Additionally, extant research pointed toward the 
contrasting judgments usually expressed by people high in promotion versus prevention 
focus in the presence of transgressions of moral standards (the latter tend to blame 
significantly more harshly than the former; see Cornwell & Higgins, 2015b). Because the 
actions in both vignettes were initially thought to be supererogatory, it was anticipated 
that people high in promotion focus would rate them as highly praiseworthy, indicative 
of immaculate intentions toward an ideal greater good, and that people high in 
prevention focus would construe them as transgressions of ethical norms to comply 




therefore would judge them more harshly and even blame them. The issue with the 
latter hypothesis was likely the fact that it would predict moral actions considered 
strongly supererogatory, which perhaps was not the case for the deeds performed by 
Francia and Nicholas. Although Francia’s action was construed as less obligatory than 
Nicholas’s, neither of them was considered so strongly supererogatory to cause people 
high in prevention focus to consistently blame them in self-defence50. 
It is interesting to note that prevention focus, while correlating negatively with self-
defence, did not correlate positively with self-improvement: the prevention system did 
not systematically lead participants to feel inspired and uplifted by an admirable moral 
action (absence of correlation with self-improvement), but simply inhibited the 
instantiation of defensive self-regulation (negative correlation with self-defence), thus 
functioning as a safeguarding “hygiene factor” when self-threat and advancing drives 
are modest. 
Additionally, in all path models, the regression weight between prevention focus 
and moral discrepancy was not significant (prevention could be associated with either 
upward or downward comparison), and at total sample prevention was also unrelated to 
goodness and propriety (prevention could be associated with more or less positive 
judgments about the deed). A possible explanation for these patterns is that people high 
in prevention focus are not motivated by ideal exemplars, such as those in the two 
vignettes, but rather by unsuccessful others from whom they can learn what they should 
not do, as they provide a palette of the kind of failures that they strive to prevent 
(Lockwood & Matthews, 2007). This interpretation is supported by studies where 
prevention-primed and chronically prevention-orientated students appeared to be more 
 
50 This could have been the case for Arnaud’s vignette in Study 1 (the story of the policeman who sacrificed 




motivated by unsuccessful target students than by successful ones because the former 
represented the kind of end-states that they aimed to avoid, motivating them to work 
harder at averting a similar negative outcome (Lockwood et al., 2002). If for individuals 
high in prevention focus the source of motivation originates more strongly from 
unsuccessful or negative referential targets, it is easy to see why, after viewing the 
vignettes, they tended not to consider the moral agents particularly praiseworthy and 
not to strongly endorse the self-improvement items. 
Assuming that a causal interpretation is plausible, overall the findings about the 
functioning of the four motivational constructs in their direct relationships with moral 
self-regulation can be summarised as follows: 
 the promotion and the approach motivational systems have a direct effect on the 
activation of moral self-improvement states (and they could be mutually 
substitutable in the models); 
 the avoidance system has a direct effect on the activation of moral self-defence 
mechanisms; 
 the prevention system has a direct effect on the inhibition of moral self-defensive 
processes, but no effect on the activation of moral self-improvement. 
Indirect Effects on Moral Self-Regulation Via Moral Comparisons. Promotion and 
approach orientations also had an indirect effect on moral self-regulation via moral 
comparative processes. Indeed, they were found to lead to downward comparisons, 
which in turn fed defensive regulation. This is in line with the mechanism, identified by 
Scholer and colleagues (2014), according to which individuals tend to inflate their self-
evaluations to eagerly sustain promotion and advancement motives toward 
desired/ideal goals. It must be noted that those findings concern primed states. 




individuals need to constantly fuel the mechanism of self-inflation to maintain high 
levels of volition during goal pursuit. This can be effective in an achievement framework, 
but in the moral domain a systematic tendency to engage in downward comparisons is 
potentially maladaptive, since it tends to lean individuals toward defensive regulation, 
as they strive to preserve stability of their inflated self-concept, constantly seeking 
validation of their perceived moral superiority. In line with this reasoning, in Study 2 
participants who scored high, for example, in promotion focus held high self-esteem and 
high consideration of their own morality, which led to the perception of the moral 
agents in the vignettes as threats to their moral status (high scores on NA4), triggering 
self-aggrandising judgments (high scores on SD1) and self-protecting trivialisation or 
outright dismissal of the virtuous actions (high scores on SD3, SD4, etc.). 
Prevalence of Motivational versus Comparative Forces. These findings show that 
in the model the promotion and approach systems, depending on the mechanism that is 
elicited, could potentially lead to two opposite outcomes: they could lead directly to 
self-improvement and indirectly to self-defence through the mediation of moral 
discrepancy (in downward comparison). This apparently counterintuitive phenomenon 
could also be explicated by the interplay between the motivational and the comparative 
psychological functions. The literature offers evidence that individuals high in promotion 
and approach can be more focused on the pursuit of their own goals and less interested 
in comparisons with others, typically because they hold high self-esteem (Taylor et al., 
1995) and a more stable self-concept (Campbell, 1990). Therefore, when the drive 
toward a desired ideal of virtue is the predominant motive and moral comparisons 
remain in the background, individuals may have a prevailing tendency to self-improve. 
By contrast, if the juxtaposition and contrast of information about self and agent are 




approach (with high self-regard) may tend to perceive the moral agents as 
“competitors” who endanger their supposed moral superiority; consequently, they may 
show a tendency to self-defend in order to defuse the threat. 
A closer inspection of the models also reveals that for Nicholas’s vignette 
comparative processes were stronger predictors of moral self-regulation, while for 
Francia’s vignette motivational tendencies played a more substantial role. This could be 
linked to the fact that the average value of moral discrepancy was lower in Nicholas’s 
subsample, that is, fewer participants on average engaged in upward comparison and 
more participants engaged in downward comparison (relative to Francia). It could be 
argued that, overall, participants perceived a higher degree of moral character proximity 
to Nicholas than Francia, whose very high stature could have been considered hardly 
attainable. This phenomenon could have heightened the saliency of moral comparisons 
in Nicholas’s subsample. The literature on social comparison supports the notion that 
people often discount comparisons with others who are too dissimilar and prefer more 
realistic comparisons with more similar targets, capable of providing information that is 
more relevant and actionable for the self (Wheeler, 1991). This is also in line with the 
framework proposed by Festinger (1954) in his original description of social comparison 
theory and is particularly true when people are motivated by epistemic needs (i.e., 
truth). 
The idea that people might have stronger or weaker dispositions to compare 
themselves with others has led researchers to develop a scale to measure individual 
differences in the orientation to engage in social comparisons. To this end, Gibbons and 
Buunk (1999) validated the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure 
(INCOM), whose relationships with key variables in the conceptual model was explored 




Strengths and Limitations 
The progress in terms of model generation achieved with Study 2 was substantial. 
The two best vignettes from Study 1 proved to be successful in eliciting among 
participants differential moral experiences, which were measured in terms of 
comparative and self-regulatory processes. A unidimensional structure for each of two 
moral self-regulation scales was identified, conflating cognitive/conative and affective 
components of the moral experience of virtue; also, a preliminary choice of items was 
made, dropping those that showed poor communalities with the corresponding 
constructs. Parsimonious path models were also fitted to the total sample and by 
individual vignette, abandoning redundant variables (self-esteem) and determining the 
role of the motivational dispositions as predictors, not moderators. In a nutshell, the key 
objectives were met. 
At the same time, it is fair to acknowledge that the measurement model still had to 
fully prove its reliability and validity. Some items, particularly in the self-defence scale, 
still required further assessment and only a more precise confirmatory technique, such 
as CFA, would be capable of validating the scales. To accomplish this, a new larger 
sample size would be necessary. Even more importantly, the structural models 
generated with a simplified path analysis did not achieve satisfactory fit. Therefore, it 
remained to be seen whether the models would be capable to adequately explain the 
phenomenon at hand. A confirmatory technique, such as full structural equation 
modelling (SEM), would be necessary to provide the evidence. That too would require a 
new larger sample. 
The final sample size of just above four hundred participants for Study 2 was 
adequate, but it was smaller than the planned five hundred. A certain loss of 




incorrect answers to the check questions, completion time incompatible with adequate 
information processing, and presence of extreme outliers (as defined in the 
preregistration). All of these were justifiable reasons, yet the bottom line was a certain 
loss of power. This is always undesirable, but in this case, wise decisions in the planning 
stage helped contain the possible drawbacks. A priori power analysis had indicated that, 
setting alpha and beta respectively at .05 and .20, a total sample of 218 participants 
would be necessary for a robust multiple regression analysis capable of detecting a 
medium-sized effect. The actual total sample size was almost twice as large, so it was 
adequate not only for regression but also for path analysis. 
Once the analysis was completed, it was important to reflect on the data quality 
from the study, particularly because the sample was drawn from the MTurk 
crowdsourcing platform. Dropping 87 participants from the initial sample of 499, albeit 
justifiable, represented a loss of nearly 20% of “information capital”, which is not 
negligible. There has been debate among academics over the past couple of years about 
how valid and reliable MTurk samples could be considered for academic research. 
Whereas in the first years of operation published studies seemed to attest the validity 
and reliability of the data collected through these platforms (see e.g., Behrend et al., 
2011; Buhrmester et al., 2011), more recently various kinds of concerns have been 
raised: 
 the non-naïveté of participants, often unemployed, who take a large number of 
surveys (Chandler et al., 2014) as their primary source of income (Paolacci et al., 
2010); 
 the risk that participants take part in the same study multiple times (Woods et al., 




 the risk that the surveys are taken by “farmers”, individuals who do not have 
platform membership credentials, but bypass location and other restrictions using 
server farms (Chmielewski & Kucker, 2020); 
 the risk that, instead of human participants, the surveys are filled out by “web-
bots”, automated computer programmes (robots) that perform repetitive tasks in a 
short time (Chmielewski & Kucker, 2020), following random algorithms; 
 evidence that a conspicuous share of participants does not pay enough attention 
and answers carelessly (Aruguete et al., 2019; Curran, 2016) to save time. 
Crowdsourcing platforms and researchers have since implemented several 
practices to improve data quality, for instance the use of captcha technologies 
(Aruguete et al., 2019), geolocation/IP address verification (Peer et al., 2017), 
procedures for screening participants who have previously completed the same or 
related studies (Chandler et al., 2014), attention checks in the form of instructed 
response questions (Kam & Chan, 2018) or treatments that slow down survey 
presentation to encourage thoughtful responding (Paolacci et al., 2010), and so forth. 
Some of these recommended practices were adopted in the present study (IP address 
verification, duration screening, check questions, etc.) to improve data quality, but the 
issue of the declining value of certain crowdsourcing platforms remains, especially 
MTurk. 
To be fair, Study 2 was in line with other online studies in terms of loss of 
participants (for a review, see Thomas & Clifford, 2017) and therefore cannot be 
considered eccentric in this respect. Yet, careful consideration of MTurk data quality was 





In sum, Study 2 achieved to identify one preliminary measurement model and two 
preliminary structural models of the self-regulation of virtue, completing the initial stage 
of the research. Study 3 used these models as input into confirmatory methods that 






Study 3: Model Improvement 
 
Introduction 
The exploratory stage of Studies 1-2 culminated in the definition of specific 
measurement instruments for a set of observed variables and preliminary latent 
variables, and the specification of a network of provisional relationships between them. 
Exploratory factor analysis returned a unidimensional structure for the latent variables 
of moral self-improvement and self-defence, and path modelling – applied to an 
experimental design – provided a grid of associations and probabilistic causal links. At 
this point, the results needed to be assessed in a confirmatory study among a new 
sample from the same population. 
The goal of Study 3 was to conceptually replicate the findings from Study 2, 
retesting and improving: a) the measurement model of the moral self-regulation 
inventory, and b) the structural models of the antecedents and mediators of the self-
regulatory response to moral exemplars. To meet this objective, the two vignettes of 
Francia and Nicholas were tested again within the same experimental survey design as 
in Study 2, this time among a fresh sample of larger proportions, so that confirmatory 
analysis techniques could confidently be applied. The fact that the preregistered analysis 
plan involved confirmatory techniques such as CFA and full SEM did not mean that the 
study would be limited to the purpose of mere validation of the output of Study 2. 
Regardless of the goodness of the fitted models, the research data were intended to be 
used to enhance as much as possible the quality of the findings within the constraints of 
the available resources; for that reason, after fitting the hypothesised models, theory- 





As in the previous studies, CFA was expected to lead to one single measurement 
model, common for both vignettes, for the latent variables of moral self-improvement 
and self-defence. The fulfilment of this expectation depended on measures of validity 
and reliability applied to the total sample; in other words, the measurement model had 
to show strong psychometric properties regardless of the content of the individual 
vignettes and the characteristics of the sample. For that to be true, the measurement 
model needed to be invariant, particularly in relation to the vignettes, but also to the 
type of moral comparison (upward, downward, or lateral) and participants’ gender (as 
an example of sample characteristics). As discussed earlier, this objective required 
striking a balance, avoiding overfitting and underfitting, through the selection of a set of 
core self-regulatory indicators that satisfied conditions of robustness for both vignettes, 
even in the presence of two scenarios deliberately selected after Study 1 to be different 
enough to stretch the generalisability of the models. Because some items of the moral 
self-regulation inventory retained from Study 2 were not strongly correlated with their 
respective latent variables, they were scrutinised with particular attention to ensure 
strong psychometric properties of the final inventory. Specifically, these items were 
SI7/ForOthers, SD5/People, SD10/Uncommon, NA2/Detached, and NA5/Guilty, all 
showing poor factor loadings in Study 2, but not dropped from their latent variables to 
avoid costly decisions when the sample was not large enough and the analysis technique 
was merely exploratory. 
One of the consequences of retaining these supposedly poorer indicators was a 
larger measurement error and a drop of the goodness-of-fit. Indeed, in Study 2 the 
results of path modelling did not yield adequate fit indices for either the individual 
vignettes or the total sample. This was due partly to the use of a streamlined approach 




self-regulatory scales, but also to the larger error that could have been caused by 
computing scale composite means with weaker items. With Study 3, the use of a 
confirmatory technique such as CFA should ensure the assessment of the moral self-
regulation inventory through a stronger statistical technique, which in turn should result 
in better model fit thanks to the reduced measurement error. 
Study 3 also intended to complement these fundamental variable-centred analyses 
with person-centred analyses. In fact, latent variable modelling can also be applied to 
identify clusters of participants who share common response patterns to certain 
variables of interest. The convergence of the findings from these two types of analyses 
would corroborate the robustness of the results, solidifying the theoretical advances 
that they underpin. Further details are discussed in the following sections of this 
chapter. 
Study 3 would complete the analysis of the antecedents and mediators of the moral 
response to virtuous actions. The behavioural consequences included in the initial 
conceptual model (Fig. III) were intentionally left out of the present inquiry and deferred 
to a final fourth study. The measurement of behavioural effects of moral self-
improvement in Study 4 would complete the current research programme, providing 











Study 3 had a between-subjects design, whereby participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two independent conditions. In each condition, participants were 
presented with one of two moral vignettes: Francia or Nicholas (see AB1). 
The study was conducted online and preregistered on the OSF website. A 
structured questionnaire hosted by Qualtrics (see SMC2) was made available to 
potential participants during the month of June 2019 through CloudResearch (the same 
platform used for Study 2, for consistency reasons) in return for payment. Repeat 
participants from the previous study were automatically excluded via the MTurk worker 
code. 
To improve data quality, and particularly to control for careless responding, 
instructed response questions were added to the attention checks already implemented 
in Study 2. As per Kam and Chan’s (2018) recommendation, the presence of these 
questions was introduced and explained in the participation sheet; participants were 
asked to answer exactly as indicated in two corresponding questions51. The instructed 
response questions were located at two different points in the questionnaire: one in the 
first part, randomised within the regulatory focus items, and the other after the 
presentation of the vignette, randomised within the moral self-regulation inventory. 
Participants 
Sample Size Determination 
The sample size was determined based on several criteria. First, power analysis 
using G*Power ver. 3.1, for a multiple linear regression suggested that, to detect a 
 
51 An example of instructed response question is: “I am competent in panabogy, and please answer ‘Not 




medium-sized effect based on six predictors (those from the path model in Study 2) with 
α = .05 and power set at .80, a minimum sample size of 92 participants per condition 
would be necessary (see SMC1). This number was substantially augmented in 
consideration of the complex analyses that were planned (beyond regression), the 
number of questions and items within the scales (to be factor-analysed), the length of 
the questionnaire, and the cost of the study. Notably, the sample size had to be 
adequate to conduct full structural equation modelling separately for each of the two 
vignettes. For all these reasons, and in the absence of simple formulaic methods to fulfil 
these criteria, a total sample of 1,100 participants (550 per condition) was deemed 
appropriate. 
Data Exclusions 
At the end of data collection, the dataset comprised a total of 1,202 subjects, split 
approximately in half across the two conditions. Of these, 53 did not provide consent, 52 
answered the check questions incorrectly, 61 answered the instructed response 
questions incorrectly, and 49 dropped out without finishing the questionnaire52; as 
planned in the preregistration, they were removed from the sample. 
As in Study 2, an analysis of the actual duration of the questionnaire was 
conducted. Pre-testing suggested an average length of about 8 minutes. However, 68 
participants completed the survey in less than 3 minutes, a time considered insufficient 
to adequately process the questions and provide reliable answers. Consistently with the 
preregistration plan, those participants were also removed from the sample. With all 
these exclusions, the remaining sample size was 1,024. 
Multivariate Outliers 
 




At that point, outlier analysis was conducted, replicating the same methodology 
applied in the two previous studies, using the combined analysis of centred leverage 
values, Mahalanobis distance, and Cook’s distance. The observations that exceeded two 
out of three of the cutoff points determined by those values were considered extreme 
multivariate outliers. This analysis enabled the detection of 42 outliers, which were 
subsequently deleted from the sample, following the preregistered plan. 
Final Sample Composition 
After the above-mentioned exclusions, the final sample was composed of 982 
participants: 490 respondents allocated to Francia’s vignette, 492 respondents to 
Nicholas’s vignette. It comprised 460 females (46.8%), 517 males (52.6%), and 5 
participants (0.5%) who self-reported “other” (non-binary or transgender) to the gender 
question. Age ranged from 18 to 75 years, with median of 34 and mean of 36 years (SD = 
11). All participants were US residents, of which 969 (98.7%) were US nationals and the 
remaining 13 (1.3%) from other nationalities. The median completion time was 11 
minutes. There were no significant differences in the socio-demographical composition 
of the sample across the two conditions (see SMC3). 
Materials and Procedure 
The study had received prior ethical approval by the Faculty of Science and 
Technology Research Ethics Committee (FSTREC) at Lancaster University (UK). 
Participants were recruited through the MTurk crowdsourcing platform and invited 
to follow a link to an online questionnaire hosted by Qualtrics (see SMC2). They read the 
participation sheet, learned that they could withdraw at any time without giving a 
reason, and provided informed consent to voluntarily participate. 
Next, participants answered the socio-demographic questions, the moral self-




randomly selected from a set of two (Francia or Nicholas). The two vignettes were 
tested with no modifications from Study 2. In either condition participants evaluated the 
moral action and the moral agent in the story through various appraisal questions and 
the self-regulation items; toward the end, they were given the option to make 
comments in an open-ended question. Following this, they were debriefed and thanked 
for their participation, and received payment after the provision of their unique survey 
code. 
Measures 
The measures were essentially the same as in Study 2. The only minor differences 
consisted in the deletion of the self-esteem scale, the additional regulatory focus items, 
and three moral self-regulation items. Following the exploratory stage results, the 
cognitive/conative and affective items of the moral self-regulation scales were merged, 
thus forming the broadened constructs of moral self-improvement and self-defence 
shown in Tables C1-C2 (with the new labels). These two revised scales constituted the 






Table C1:  
Moral self-improvement items tested in Study 3 (Francia’s vignette) 
Code/label Item wording 
SI1/Admirable Actions like this are truly admirable 
SI2/Awakened When I read these stories, I feel awakened to the good in the world 
SI3/Humanity This story strengthens my faith in humanity 
SI4/BeBetter Francia has shown me how to be a better person 
SI5/Values Francia and I share the same values 
SI6/BeLike I want to be more like Francia 
SI7/ForOthers I feel like I want to do something good for others 
SI8/Uplifted I felt uplifted 
SI9/Inspired I was inspired by the story 
SI10/Moved I was moved 
SI11/Proud I felt proud of what Francia did 
SI12/Happy It made me feel happy 
 
Table C2:  
Moral self-defence items tested in Study 3 (Francia’s vignette) 
Code/label Item wording 
SD1/MeGreater In many ways, I have done greater deeds than Francia 
SD2/Devalue This is not an act that I value all that much 
SD3/Ordinary It’s not such an extraordinary action 
SD4/People I know people who have done greater deeds than Francia 
SD5/Praise Francia may have done a good deed, but I bet she is seeking the praise of others 
SD6/Ulterior Francia may have had ulterior motives for doing this 
SD7/Uncomfortable It makes me uncomfortable to dwell on these stories 
SD8/Uneasy I would feel uneasy if I had to interact with Francia 
SD9/Uncommon Actions uncommon as this one should not be considered the standard we live by 
SD10/NoPraise 
Everyone occasionally does something really good, so Francia isn’t more 
praiseworthy than anybody else 
SD11/Superior Francia probably thinks she’s better than everyone else 
SD12/Seriously Francia takes herself too seriously 
SD13/Conflicted I had a mix of conflicting feelings 
SD14/Detached I felt detached 
SD15/Vulnerable I felt vulnerable 
SD16/Threatened I felt as if I was threatened by something 
SD17/Guilty It made me feel guilty 
SD18/Resentful I felt resentful 
SD19/Irritated The story irritated me 
 
 
For what concerns the characteristic adaptations, Study 3 used: 





 the original eleven items from the regulatory focus questionnaire (Higgins et al., 
2001). 
The other key measures, for example moral self-evaluation, agent evaluation, 
goodness and propriety of the deed, and so forth did not change from the previous 
study. 
Analytic Approach 
Study 3 represented the initial step of the second stage of the research plan (Fig. 
IV): the confirmatory/integrative stage. The final dataset was analysed using R ver. 3.6 (R 
Core Team, 2020), RStudio ver. 1.3 (RStudio Team, 2020)53, and IBM SPSS Statistics ver. 
25-26. 
Data analysis comprised the usual preliminary inspection of descriptive statistics 
and assumptions for statistical testing and estimation, and then – following the 
preregistered plan – primary and secondary analyses were conducted: 
 primary analyses encompassed confirmatory factor analysis and full structural 
equation modelling (testing respectively the hypothesised measurement and 
structural models through confirmatory methods) as well as strategies for 
optimising/integrating the models; 
 secondary analyses comprised further investigation of the measurement invariance 
across groups (at both measurement and structural level) and latent profile analysis 
(LPA) to identify clusters of participants with specific characteristics54. 
Figure C1 summarises the analytic approach, detailing the stages and the tools 
employed in the present study.  
 
53 Specific R packages used for analysis and visualisation are referenced in text in the following sections. 
54 LPA was mentioned as a possible secondary analysis in the preregistration of Study 2, but it was 




Figure C1:  




It must be emphasised again that in the primary analyses, regardless of the 
goodness of the models initially fitted, alternative models (optimised and integrated) 
were generated and compared to the hypothesised ones. Features of the alternative 
models include, for instance, removal of weaker items from the latent variables, as well 
as inclusion or exclusion of specific variables and pathways in the structural models. 
Regarding the secondary analyses, further methodological details about latent profile 





Results and Preliminary Reflections 
The dataset from Study 3 was virtually complete. Only thirty-nine participants did 
not answer the political orientation questions (not a critical variable in the model). 
Descriptive Statistics 
The central tendency measures and the distributions of the socio-demographical 
variables, the moral self-evaluation, the motivational dispositions, and the primary 
moral appraisals exhibited very similar patterns to those observed in Study 2, providing 
further evidence of the stability of these measurements. For the sake of brevity, only the 
mean scores and standard errors for some of the main variables are reported in Figures 
C2-C6; the full analysis is documented in SMC3-SMC5. 
 
Figure C2:  
Mean scores for the socio-demographical variables and the moral self-evaluation (total 




































Figure C3:  
Mean scores for the motivational disposition scales (total sample), with bootstrap 




Figure C4:  
Mean scores for the moral appraisal variables by vignette, with bootstrap standard 





























































Figure C5:  





Figure C6:  




























Moral Discrepancy by Vignette
Agent Evaluation (0-100) - Self-Evaluation (0-100)


































The composite mean scores of the moral self-improvement and self-defence scales 
were respectively 69.81 (SD = 23.60) and 16.79 (SD = 18.63). The moral self-regulation 
items reproduced similar patterns to those observed in Study 2. The mean scores and 
the standard errors are illustrated in Figures C7-C8, while the full descriptive statistics 
are available in SMC6-SMC7. 
 
Figure C7:  
Mean scores of the twelve self-improvement items for the two vignettes, with bootstrap 









































































































Figure C8:  
Mean scores of the nineteen self-defence items for the two vignettes, with bootstrap 





The primary analyses included confirmatory testing of the measurement model (the 
latent variables) as well as the structural models (the mutual relationships across the 
variables). As in Study 2, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and full structural equation 
modelling (SEM) were conducted with the R package lavaan ver. 0.6-6, using the robust 
maximum likelihood (MLR) estimator (unless otherwise stated), with regression weights 
tested 2-tailed at 95% c.l. Complementary analyses (e.g., internal consistency of the 
scales) utilised other R packages, such as psych ver. 1.9.12 (Revelle, 2019). 
The assessment of the goodness-of-fit followed the criteria set out in the 
preregistration. As for Study 2, the fitted models were assessed through the joint 
analysis of the following key fit indices (“scaled” whenever appropriate, given the use of 









































































































































statistic and its p-value were reported for the sake of completeness). Models were 
deemed to show satisfactory fit if the scaled RMSEA were non-significant and lower than 
.080 (excellent fit if lower than .05055) and if CFI, TLI and GFI were greater than .900 
(excellent fit if greater than .950). 
Testing the Measurement Model: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
To test goodness-of-fit of the measurement model, CFA was carried out among the 
total sample for all the six latent variables of the conceptual model: the two endogenous 
variables of moral self-improvement and self-defence, and the four exogenous variables 
of promotion and prevention focus, approach and avoidance. Each of the two self-
regulation latent variable models was fitted with the same unidimensional structure that 
emerged from EFA on the total sample in Study 2. The hypothesised structure of the 




55 There was an unintentional oversight in the preregistration, where models were said to be satisfactory if 
the scaled RMSEA were non-significant and lower than .80 (instead of the correct value of .080), and 





Figure C9:  
Hypothesised model of the latent variable self-improvement and its twelve 




























Figure C10:  
Hypothesised model of the latent variable self-defence and its nineteen 





























Figure C11:  











Figure C12:  















Figure C13:  











Figure C14:  











Results from CFA for the endogenous latent variables exhibited satisfactory RMSEA 
values, below the cutoff point of .080, for both self-improvement and self-defence, but 
with significant p-values (see Tab. C3); the other fit indices were nearly adequate for 




of the models, despite the strong internal consistency, as shown by Cronbach’s alpha 
and McDonald’s omega greater than .90 for both self-improvement and self-defence 
(Tab. C4). 
 
Table C3:  
Main fit indices from CFA for the endogenous latent variables (total sample) 
 Self-improvement Self-defence 
Chi-Square (scaled) 372.714 921.003 
df (scaled) 54 152 
p-value (scaled) <.001 <.001 
   
RMSEA (scaled) .078 .072 
p-value (scaled) <.001 <.001 
   
CFI (scaled) .945 .861 
TLI (scaled) .933 .843 
GFI .976 .851 
AGFI .961 .619 
 
Table C4:  
Internal consistency of the endogenous latent variables (total sample) 
 Self-improvement Self-defence 
Cronbach’s alpha .953 .933 
McDonald’s omega .956 .934 
 
 
The factorial structure of the endogenous latent variables is one of the reasons that 
accounts for the overall insufficient goodness-of-fit. Self-improvement showed strong 
loadings for nearly all indicators (Tab. C5a), but two were not above the desirable level 
of .700, namely SI7/ForOthers and SI5/Values. These items were candidates for deletion 
following Study 2, where they had already factor loadings below .700. 
The picture looked less satisfactory for self-defence: nine items out of nineteen 
showed factor loadings below .700, some of them in the region of .400 and .500, for 
instance SD15/Vulnerable, SD9/Uncommon, SD13/Conflicted; these indicators had poor 




Tables C5a-b:  
Factor loadings from CFA for the endogenous latent variables (total sample) 
 






SI1/Admirable .720 <.001 
SI2/Awakened .810 <.001 
SI3/Humanity .836 <.001 
SI4/BeBetter .757 <.001 
SI5/Values .700 <.001 
SI6/BeLike .772 <.001 
SI7/ForOthers .556 <.001 
SI8/Uplifted .876 <.001 
SI9/Inspired .893 <.001 
SI10/Moved .873 <.001 
SI11/Proud .832 <.001 











SD1/MeGreater .709 <.001 
SD2/Devalue .749 <.001 
SD3/Ordinary .693 <.001 
SD4/People .524 <.001 
SD5/Praise .773 <.001 
SD6/Ulterior .702 <.001 
SD7/Uncomfortable .690 <.001 
SD8/Uneasy .772 <.001 
SD9/Uncommon .418 <.001 
SD10/NoPraise .698 <.001 
SD11/Superior .785 <.001 
SD12/Seriously .765 <.001 
SD13/Conflicted .543 <.001 
SD14/Detached .566 <.001 
SD15/Vulnerable .415 <.001 
SD16/Threatened .740 <.001 
SD17/Guilty .487 <.001 
SD18/Resentful .757 <.001 
SD19/Irritated .769 <.001 
 
The other reason why the RMSEA p-values were significant became clear when 
analysing the measurement error within these latent variables. Several error terms 
covaried significantly, contributing to generating unexplained variance that resulted in 
the poor fit indices (for the complete CFA output, see SMC8). Potentially, the problems 
related to low factor loadings and correlated errors could be addressed by simplifying 
the moral self-regulation inventory and dropping a few unsatisfactory indicators. 
CFA for the exogenous latent variables was also carried out. The regulatory focus 
and hedonic orientation scales exhibited acceptable but not entirely satisfactory 
psychometric properties. Prevention focus, approach, and avoidance showcased better 




Promotion focus exhibited less desirable fit indices, with the RMSEA above the cutoff 
point for acceptance of .080 and significant p-value, suggesting rejection of the model. 
Reliability analysis showed similar patterns, with satisfactory values of Cronbach’s 
alpha and McDonald’s omega for prevention focus, approach, and avoidance, and 
weaker values for promotion focus (Tab. C6-C7). 
 
Table C6:  







Chi-Square (scaled) 109.661 8.275 21.678 48.226 
df (scaled) 9 5 9 9 
p-value (scaled) <.001 .142 .010 <.001 
     
RMSEA (scaled) .107 .026 .038 .067 
p-value (scaled) <.001 .930 .867 .036 
     
CFI (scaled) .893 .998 .992 .981 
TLI (scaled) .822 .995 .985 .969 
GFI .994 .999 .999 .993 
AGFI .981 .998 .996 .979 
 
Table C7:  






Cronbach’s alpha .724 .838 .850 .898 
McDonald’s omega .725 .856 .851 .903 
 
 
One of the reasons for the lower levels of fit and reliability of promotion focus was 
the low factor loadings of two items (Tab. C8a): Pm6R/Hobbies (.373) and Pm1R/Unable 
(.452). Despite being part of a validated scale, widely used in psychological research, 
these items had to be removed from the promotion focus scale to make the latent 




The factor loadings of all the other indicators of the motivational dispositions were 
acceptable (Tab. C8b-d). Some of them barely exceeded the value of .500 (e.g., 
Pv5R/Trouble in the prevention focus scale) and certainly contributed to the 
measurement error. However, these factor loadings were not so small as to justify their 
removal from such short, validated scales. The modification indices also prompted other 
possible actions to improve their goodness-of-fit (full output of the initial CFA for the 
exogenous latent variables available in SMC9). 
 
Tables C8a-d:  
Factor loadings from CFA for the exogenous latent variables (total sample) 
 






Pm1R/Unable .452 <.001 
Pm2/Psyched .602 <.001 
Pm3/DoWell .599 <.001 
Pm4R/NoPerform .638 <.001 
Pm5/Progress .736 <.001 
Pm6R/NoHobby .373 <.001 
 






Pv1R/Cross .880 <.001 
Pv2R/Nerves .730 <.001 
Pv3/Rules .558 <.001 
Pv4R/Object .901 <.001 
Pv5R/Trouble .509 <.001 
 






Ap1/Energised .796 <.001 
Ap2/Excited .800 <.001 
Ap3/Motivated .578 <.001 
Ap4/Opportunities .666 <.001 
Ap5/GoodThings .642 <.001 
Ap6/Desire .744 <.001 
 






Av1/Nervous .874 <.001 
Av2/Worry .769 <.001 
Av3/Anxiety .881 <.001 
Av4/BadExperiences .697 <.001 
Av5/Escape .670 <.001 
Av6/ImagineBad .690 <.001 
 
Overall, the results from CFA revealed satisfactory fit for several latent variables, 
but not for all, particularly promotion focus and self-defence; the data also indicated 
that goodness-of-fit and reliability could improve with a few data-driven modifications. 




scale, items SI5, SI7, SD4, SD7, SD9, SD13, SD14, SD15, and SD17 from the moral self-
regulation inventory, and allow the specification of a few error covariances across self-
regulation indicators (see next). 
Strengthening the Measurement Model. A second run of CFA was carried out on 
the revised latent variables with a view to enhancing their overall goodness-of-fit and 
expecting improvements particularly for promotion focus and self-defence. Results from 
the second run of CFA displayed clear improvements to the goodness-of-fit for both the 
endogenous and exogenous latent variables. After the second run, both self-
improvement and self-defence showcased excellence across virtually all the key fit 
indices, as shown in Table C9 (full output available in SMC10). 
 
Table C9:  
Comparison between the main fit indices from the two runs of CFA for the endogenous 
latent variables (total sample) 
  Self-improvement  Self-defence 
  CFA first run CFA second run  CFA first run CFA second run 
Chi-Square (scaled)  372.714 124.991  921.003 198.611 
df (scaled)  54 33  152 50 
p-value (scaled)  <.001 <.001  <.001 <.001 
       
RMSEA (scaled)  .078 .053  .072 .055 
p-value (scaled)  <.001 .237  <.001 .067 
       
CFI (scaled)  .945 .981  .861 .953 
TLI (scaled)  .933 .974  .843 .938 
GFI  .976 .991  .851 .941 
AGFI  .961 .982  .619 .894 
 
Table C10:  
Comparison between the internal consistency from the two runs of CFA for the 
endogenous latent variables (total sample) 
  Self-improvement  Self-defence 
  CFA first run CFA second run  CFA first run CFA second run 
Cronbach’s alpha  .953 .955  .933 .935 






The factorial structure of the optimised ten-item self-improvement and twelve-item 
self-defence scales is documented in Tables C11a-b. Only two self-defence indicators 
had factor loadings slightly below .700, but overall the scales showed better 
psychometric properties compared to the first run, including better internal consistency 
(see Tab. C10). 
 
Tables C11a-b:  
Factor loadings from the second run of CFA for the endogenous latent variables (total 
sample) 
 






SI1/Admirable .713 <.001 
SI2/Awakened .795 <.001 
SI3/Humanity .820 <.001 
SI4/BeBetter .741 <.001 
SI6/BeLike .751 <.001 
SI8/Uplifted .884 <.001 
SI9/Inspired .898 <.001 
SI10/Moved .881 <.001 
SI11/Proud .832 <.001 
SI12/Happy .879 <.001 
 
 






SD1/MeGreater .724 <.001 
SD2/Devalue .748 <.001 
SD3/Ordinary .693 <.001 
SD5/Praise .758 <.001 
SD6/Ulterior .685 <.001 
SD8/Uneasy .772 <.001 
SD10/NoPraise .707 <.001 
SD11/Superior .794 <.001 
SD12/Seriously .775 <.001 
SD16/Threatened .707 <.001 
SD18/Resentful .735 <.001 
SD19/Irritated .766 <.001 
 
 
Other than the deletion of the items with poor factor loadings, the latent variables 
were also modified with the addition of two error covariances between self-
improvement indicators and four error covariances between self-defence indicators. The 
factor structure of the revised latent variables, including the error covariances, are 








Figure C15:  
Unidimensional structure of the revised latent variable of self-improvement and its ten 











Figure C16:  
Unidimensional structure of the revised latent variable of self-defence and its twelve 















The structure of the correlations across all the twenty-two retained self-regulation 
indicators at total sample is graphically depicted in Figure C17, realised with the R 
package corrr ver. 0.4.2 (Kuhn et al., 2020). The two “constellations” of self-
improvement and self-defence can be easily recognised at the two sides of the graph. 
The item pairs whose error terms significantly covaried are located at the periphery of 
the two constellations, for instance SI2-SI3, SD5-SD6, and SD16-SD18. The items that 
most strongly correlated negatively (SI1-SD2) are themselves rather peripheral to their 
respective self-regulatory constellations. The items that had the strongest factor 
loadings on the self-improvement construct (SI8, SI9, and SI10) are approximately at the 
centre of the self-improvement constellation. By contrast, the self-defence constellation 
is more scattered, and the items with the highest loadings (SD11 and SD12) do not 
constitute a real barycentre toward which the other items gravitate. 
 
Figure C17:  
Graphical illustration of the zero-order correlations across the twenty-two retained 
moral self-regulation indicators (total sample) 
 







Regarding the exogenous latent variables, the second run of CFA enhanced the 
goodness-of-fit of both promotion focus and avoidance temperament. For promotion 
focus, beside the deletion of the two weak items, one error covariance between items 
Pm3-Pm5 was added, drastically improving the model fit; for avoidance, no items were 
deleted and the mere addition of one error covariance between items Av1-Av2 brought 
the RMSEA to non-significance (Tab. C12). These modifications also resulted in an 
improvement of Cronbach’s alpha and McDonald’s omega for promotion focus 
(obviously not for avoidance, which retained the same items: see Tab. C13). 
 
Table C12:  
Comparison between the main fit indices from the two runs of CFA for the exogenous 
latent variables of promotion focus and avoidance (total sample) 
 
 Promotion Focus  Avoidance 
 CFA first run CFA second run  CFA first run CFA second run 
Chi-Square (scaled)  109.661 .064  48.226 29.192 
df (scaled)  9 1  9 8 
p-value (scaled)  <.001 .801  <.001 <.001 
       
RMSEA (scaled)  .107 <.001  .067 .052 
p-value (scaled)  <.001 .952  .036 .395 
       
CFI (scaled)  .893 1.000  .981 .990 
TLI (scaled)  .822 1.008  .969 .981 
GFI  .994 1.000  .993 .996 
AGFI  .981 1.000  .979 .986 
 
Table C13:  
Comparison between the internal consistency from the two runs of CFA for the 
exogenous latent variables of promotion focus and avoidance (total sample) 
  Promotion Focus  Avoidance 
  CFA first run CFA second run  CFA first run CFA second run 
Cronbach’s alpha  .724 .735  .898 .898 








The factorial structure of the revised scales is documented in Tables C14a-b (full 
output of the second run of CFA for the exogenous latent variables available in SMC11). 
 
Tables C14a-b: 
Factor loadings from CFA for the endogenous latent variables (total sample) 
 





Pm2/Psyched .557 <.001 
Pm3/DoWell .763 <.001 
Pm4R/NoPerform .510 <.001 
Pm5/Progress .240 <.001 
 
 






Av1/Nervous .817 <.001 
Av2/Worry .785 <.001 
Av3/Anxiety .868 <.001 
Av4/BadExperiences .716 <.001 
Av5/Escape .677 <.001 
Av6/ImagineBad .707 <.001 
 
The factorial structure of the two revised exogenous latent variables is illustrated in 
Figures C18-C19. 
 
Figure C18:  
Dimensional structure of the revised latent variable of promotion focus and its four 












Figure C19:  
Dimensional structure of the revised latent variable of avoidance temperament and its 









The structure of the correlations across all the retained twenty-one motivational 
indicators at total sample is graphically depicted in Figure C20. 
 
Figure C20:  
Graphical illustration of the zero-order correlations across the twenty-one retained 
motivational dispositions indicators (total sample) 
 







The two constellations of prevention focus and avoidance stand apart on the right-
hand side of the graph, whereas promotion focus and approach tend to stick together to 
form one single constellation on the left-hand side. Even after the removal of the two 
items with poor loadings, promotion focus appears to be the least cohesive construct 
among the motivational dispositions, with its four remaining items clearly spreading 
wide in the graph with comparably weaker links: Pm2 very close to the approach items, 
Pm4 (reverse scored) on the opposite side forming a bridge towards prevention (positive 
correlation) and avoidance (negative correlation), and Pm3 and Pm5 (the two items with 
correlated errors) standing in between. 
In sum, the revised CFA of the latent variables provided evidence of the validity and 
reliability of the single measurement model (at total sample level, common for the two 
vignette) for the six unidimensional latent constructs of the conceptual model. This 
measurement model was utilised to test the full structural models, separately for the 
two vignettes and together at total sample. 
Testing the Structural Model: Full Structural Equation Modelling 
Initial Structural Models. Given lack of structural invariance in Study 2, separate 
structural models were hypothesised for each of the two vignettes. Two initial structural 
models were fitted using the single measurement model that emerged from CFA in the 
present study and specifying the significant pathways identified in Study 2. The 
hypothesised models are illustrated in Figures C21a-b. They differ from the models 
obtained as the final output of Study 2 in that here latent variables (instead of observed) 
were used for moral self-regulation and motivational dispositions56; additionally, to 
make the confirmatory tests more stringent, in this initial step all the latent variables 
 
56 In this thesis, the usual convention adopted in SEM diagrams was followed, using rectangles to indicate 






were fitted without allowing any covariance between error terms. The absence of a 
pathway linking moral discrepancy and self-improvement in Francia’s vignette descends 
from the Study 2 findings, but the coefficient was expected to be significant in Study 3, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
Figures C21a-b:  
Hypothesised models for the two vignettes following Study 2. Indicators and errors/ 


















The results showed that the goodness-of-fit of the fitted models was considerably 
improved compared to Study 2, yet it remained unsatisfactory. The RMSEA was close to 
the cutoff point for excellence for both vignettes, but the p-values were still significant; 
CFI and TLI were below the expected cutoff point of .900 (Tab. C15). 
 
Table C15:  
Main fit indices of the initial structural models for the two vignettes 
 Francia Nicholas 
Chi-Square (scaled) 2119.883 2168.247 
df (scaled) 891 890 
p-value (scaled) <.001 <.001 
   
RMSEA (scaled) .053 .054 
p-value (scaled) .030 .006 
   
CFI (scaled) .884 .893 
TLI (scaled) .877 .886 
GFI .956 .944 
AGFI .949 .935 
 
 
A more detailed inspection of the fitted models confirmed the expected overall 
pattern of the regression weights, as illustrated in Figures C22a-b. The main 
inconsistency between hypothesised and fitted models was the non-significance of the 
covariance between approach and avoidance in Francia’s vignette. The details of the full 







Figures C22a-b:  
Initial structural models for the two vignettes. Estimator: robust maximum likelihood 
(MLR). Standardised regression weights. Indicators and errors/disturbances not 























Enhancing the Structural Models. As a whole, the main indices still revealed that 
the data did not adequately fit the hypothesised models; however, a few simple theory- 
and data-driven modifications proved to be effective. 
First and foremost, as expected, in Francia’s vignette moral discrepancy significantly 
predicted self-improvement, so this pathway was added to the model. Second, in 
Francia’s subsample a few covariances across the motivational dispositions were 
modified to adhere to the data: the non-significant covariance between approach and 
avoidance was removed; covariances between prevention focus and promotion focus, 
approach, and avoidance were added. No major changes were needed to the pathways 
in Nicholas’s subsample, but one error covariance was allowed within two self-defence 
error terms (SD16-SD18). Third, the substitutability of promotion focus and approach in 
the prediction of self-improvement emerged again, but this time the larger sample 
showed a slightly stronger effect size for approach (with negligible impact on the fit 
indices), whereas in Study 2 they were equivalent; therefore, approach was fitted in the 
models as a direct predictor of self-improvement (replacing promotion), while 
promotion remained the better predictor of moral discrepancy. 
With this rationale and the support of the modification indices, revised models 
were fitted for the two vignettes. The main fit indices are reported in Table C16, the 
path diagrams are illustrated in Figures C23a-b, and the full output of the SEM is 






Table C16:  
Main fit indices of the revised structural models for the two vignettes 
 Francia Nicholas 
Chi-Square (scaled) 2065.060 2081.104 
df (scaled) 890 889 
p-value (scaled) <.001 <.001 
   
RMSEA (scaled) .052 .052 
p-value (scaled) .120 .086 
   
CFI (scaled) .889 .900 
TLI (scaled) .882 .894 
GFI .957 .946 
AGFI .950 .937 
 
 
The fit indices of the revised models were satisfactory: the RMSEA was very close to 
the excellence cutoff point and its p-value non-significant; the other indices were for the 
most part adequate. However, the models still showed a critical weakness: the 
covariances between the two modes of moral self-regulation. These fairly large 
covariances of the outcome variables (-.26 for Francia and -.57 for Nicholas) must be 
intended as residual covariances, that is, covariance of the latent variable disturbances. 
The inclusion of further predictors currently not modelled could potentially enhance the 
models. Residual covariances were already present in the final output of path modelling 
in Study 2, but at that stage the use of observed variables and the smaller sample size 
suggested not drawing conclusive inferences. The fact that here the full structural 
models fitted among a larger sample using latent variables revealed these covariances 
again, with approximately the same effect sizes, unequivocally meant that the search for 
parsimony somewhat compromised the quality of the models, which is always the result 








Figures C23a-b:  
Revised structural models for the two vignettes. Estimator: robust maximum likelihood 
(MLR). Standardised regression weights. Indicators, errors/disturbances and covariances 






















To integrate the models with relevant variables, it was necessary to go back to the 
theoretical framework: when narrowing down the conceptual model and nomological 
network, the key predictors of moral self-regulation were identified in characteristic 
adaptations and moral comparisons. Among the characteristic adaptations, self-esteem 
was abandoned due to evidence of redundancy. Moral comparisons based on ability 
were prioritised (operationalised with the moral discrepancy indicator), whereas those 
based on opinions were omitted from the models for the sake of parsimony; it is 
precisely this choice that now needed to be reconsidered. Seeking to match this 
theoretical consideration with empirical findings from the research, when re-examining 
the multiple linear regression in Study 2, it appeared that two influential variables 
predicting moral self-regulation not included in the current models were the judgments 
of the goodness and the propriety of the deeds (see Tab. B17a-b). As shown in Figure 
A14, these variables are those that subsume opinion-based comparisons. The 
convergence of these empirical and theoretical considerations clearly suggested that 
these variables could be the best candidates for inclusion in new integrated structural 
models. 
From a conceptual perspective, in these integrated structural models opinion-based 
judgments/comparisons were hypothesised to precede ability-based comparisons. This 
is because it could be argued that agreement on the goodness and propriety of the deed 
could be viewed as a prerequisite for engaging in ability-comparison of one’s moral 
virtue with that of the agent. In the absence of agreement, people would have fewer 
reasons to feel compelled to ask themselves if they would be so virtuous as the moral 
agent to perform the same deeds. Consequently, they would be less likely to self-





This conceptual framework was put to the test in new integrated structural models 
inclusive of goodness and propriety of the deeds as predictors of moral discrepancy and 
moral self-regulation. The plausibility of these assumptions would be confirmed by the 
emergence of significant pathways, improved fit indices, and reduced (or levelled) 
residual covariances between the outcome variables. The results showed that the 
hypothesised pathways between the moral comparisons were significant, the residual 
covariances of the self-regulatory constructs became very small and non-significant (see 
Fig. C24a-b), and the overall fit indices remained essentially the same (Tab. C17). 
Because satisfactory models not only account for goodness-of-fit but also limited error 
(Beatty et al., 2015), these new integrated models must be considered substantively and 
statistically better models than the previous ones even if the main fit indices remained 
largely unchanged. 
 
Table C17:  
Main fit indices of the integrated structural models for the two vignettes 
 Francia Nicholas 
Chi-Square (scaled) 2262.164 2281.365 
df (scaled) 972 969 
p-value (scaled) <.001 <.001 
   
RMSEA (scaled) .052 .052 
p-value (scaled) .094 .057 
   
CFI (scaled) .884 .900 
TLI (scaled) .876 .893 
GFI .975 .958 
AGFI .971 .952 
 
 







Figures C24a-b:  
Integrated structural models for the two vignettes (with goodness and propriety of the 
deed). Estimator: robust maximum likelihood (MLR). Standardised regression weights. 
Indicators, errors/disturbances and covariances across error terms not graphically 






















A meaningful consideration emerged comparing the more parsimonious models in 
Figures C23a-b (without opinion-based comparisons) and the integrated models in 
Figures C24a-b (with opinion-based comparisons), particularly for Nicholas’s vignette. 
When in Nicholas’s integrated model the goodness and propriety of the deed are taken 
into account, moral discrepancy (i.e., ability-based comparison) loses a substantial share 
of its power to predict moral self-regulation in favour of judgments underlying opinion-
based comparisons. In fact, in Nicholas’s subsample, the regression weight of the 
pathway linking moral discrepancy with self-improvement was non-significant, and the 
regression weight of the pathway linking it with self-defence dropped from -.61 to -.16. 
At the same time, the total variance explained of the dependent variables roughly 
doubled from about 30% to about 60% thanks to the strong contribution of opinion-
based comparisons (Tab. C18). These phenomena could be explained considering that a 
sizeable portion of participants who viewed Nicholas’s vignette did not believe the deed 
was admirable and worth imitating; if these participants had no intention to be and 
behave like the moral agent (as they did not judge the action positively), they most likely 
did not engage in self-regulatory processes instigated by ability-based comparisons, but 
self-defended mainly as a direct result of the less positive judgment of the deed. By 
contrast, Francia’s subsample judged the deed nearly universally praiseworthy and 
admirable, so the inclusion in the model of judgments underlying opinion-based 
comparisons only slightly reduced the size of the effect of moral discrepancy as a 
predictor of self-improvement and self-defence, but without dramatically altering the 





Table C18:  
Total variance explained of the dependent variables for the two vignettes in the revised 
models (more parsimonious) and the integrated models (with the addition of opinion-
based comparisons) 
 Francia Nicholas 
Self-improvement:   
     revised model .253 .302 
     integrated model .366 .610 
   
Self-defence:   
     revised model .204 .376 
     integrated model .394 .615 
 
 
The structural model integrated with judgments underlying opinion-based 
comparisons was also fitted to the total sample (full output in SMC15). This model was 
fitted using the robust maximum likelihood (MLR) estimator, with the mean structure, 
and the variable vignette was dummy coded as in Study 2. The fit indices are shown in 
Table 19 and the structural model is illustrated in Figure 25. This final model fitted to the 
total sample documents the fundamental regulatory mechanisms across vignettes, that 
is, those processes that appear to exist regardless of the moral scenario. 
 
Table C19:  




Chi-Square (scaled) 3782.408 
df (scaled) 1011 
p-value (scaled) <.001 
  
RMSEA (scaled) .053 
p-value (scaled) .002 
  
CFI (scaled) .885 










As in Study 2, the negative sign of the regression weight between the variables 
vignette and goodness indicates that Francia’s vignette elicited significantly more 
positive judgments about the goodness of the deed relative to Nicholas’s vignette. 
 
Figures C25:  
Integrated structural model for the total sample. Estimator: robust maximum likelihood 
(MLR). Standardised regression weights. Indicators and errors/disturbances not 













The secondary analyses concerned both measurement and structural models, and 
sought to: a) provide evidence of the psychometric properties of the models 
(measurement and structural invariance); b) develop a person-centred analysis (latent 
profile modelling) to complement the variable-centred analyses based on CFA and SEM. 




The construction of a new measurement instrument for investigating the self-
regulation of virtue was conducted assuming that one single instrument could be 
identified and utilised to measure the response to moral exemplars, independent of the 
content of their acts. To assess the extent to which the new self-improvement and self-
defence scales measured the same constructs across different groups, analysis of 
measurement invariance was conducted. 
Three sets of analyses were carried out: the first evaluated whether participants 
exposed to Francia’s vignette interpreted the moral self-regulatory constructs in a 
similar way to those exposed to Nicholas’s vignette (invariance between vignettes); the 
second assessed whether participants who engaged in upward moral comparisons 
interpreted them in a similar way to those who engaged in downward and lateral 
comparisons (invariance across moral comparison types); the third tested whether male 
participants interpreted them in a similar way to female participants (invariance 
between genders). 
Of these three sets, analysis of invariance between vignettes returned more 
unbiased results, thanks to the equivalent size of the two groups (n = 490 for Francia, 
492 for Nicholas), whereas for the moral comparison types the analyses were partly 
affected by the large differential in group sizes (n = 692 for upward comparison, 212 for 
downward comparison, 78 for lateral comparison), which to a certain extent also 
affected the gender contrasts (n = 517 for male, 460 for female57). 
Four kinds of tests were carried out for the above-mentioned contrasts, each with 
increasing levels of parameter restrictions: 
 
57 The sample for the computation of the invariance tests across genders was reduced to 977, with the 
deletion of 5 participants who declared “other” to the gender question (a group of 5 participants would be 




1. configural invariance tested the hypothesis of equal form of the latent variables 
across groups, or in other words, the hypotheses of the same number of factors 
and of their association with the same indicators across groups; 
2. weak invariance (or metric invariance) tested the hypothesis of equal factor 
loadings of the indicators to the latent variable across groups; 
3. strong invariance (or scalar invariance) tested the hypothesis of equal means for 
the indicators of the latent variable across groups; 
4. strict invariance tested the hypothesis of equal residual variances of the observed 
scores not accounted for by the factors across groups. 
The criterion used here to assess measurement invariance across groups followed 
the suggestions reported by Kline (2016) and Byrne (2016), who recommend using 
changes in CFI (ΔCFI) equal to or less than .010 as reasonable evidence of invariance. 
Other criteria were also considered and reported in SMC17, for example the differences 
in RMSEA (ΔRMSEA). The traditional significance of the chi-square difference was also 
tested and reported in the full output in SMC17 for the sake of completeness, but not 
adopted in the formal assessment, due to its well-known oversensitivity to sample size 
(Rutkowski & Svetina, 2014) and violations of distributional assumptions (Chen, 2007). 
Analysis of ΔCFI provided an accurate outlook (Tab. C20). All invariance analyses 






Table C20:  





















1. Configural invariance - - - - - - 
2. Weak invariance .008* .005* .008* .010* <.001* .001* 
3. Strong invariance .006* .007* .012 .009* <.001* .001* 
4. Strict invariance .004* .001* .013 .021 .001* .002* 
Note:   * cutoff criterion for reasonable invariance: ΔCFI ≤ .010. 
 
 
The results showed strict invariance between vignettes and genders for both self-
improvement and self-defence. Invariance across comparison types was weak for self-
improvement and strong for self-defence. Considering that the cutoff point of .010 for 
ΔCFI is regarded by some scholars as too stringent58, and the high frequency in the 
literature of violations of strict invariance (Kline, 2016) and even strong invariance 
(Vandenberg & Lance, 2000), the measurement invariance of the moral self-regulation 
inventory appears to be remarkable. 
An examination of the data by vignette allowed to identify the items that exhibited 
the largest discrepancies between vignettes in terms of factor loadings (slopes) and 





58 Based on their Monte Carlo simulation studies, Rutkowski and Svetina (2014) found deficiencies in the 
traditional cutoff points, especially for weak invariance, and therefore recommend more liberal criteria, 




Tables C21a-b:  
Factor loadings (slopes) and means (intercepts) from CFA for self-improvement by 
vignette
 Tab. C21a 
Factor loadings 
Self-improvement 
  Francia Nicholas Δ 
SI1/Admirable .581*** .776*** -.195 
SI2/Awakened .781*** .798*** -.017 
SI3/Humanity .791*** .835*** -.044 
SI4/BeBetter .707*** .778*** -.071 
SI6/BeLike .707*** .790*** -.083 
SI8/Uplifted .847*** .905*** -.058 
SI9/Inspired .883*** .907*** -.024 
SI10/Moved .872*** .882*** -.010 
SI11/Proud .787*** .886*** -.099 
SI12/Happy .854*** .889*** -.035 
Note:  *** p < .001 
Delta with the highest absolute value in boldface 
 Tab. C21b 
Mean structure 
Self-improvement 
  Francia Nicholas Δ 
SI1/Admirable 5.904*** 3.230*** 2.674 
SI2/Awakened 2.797*** 2.262*** .535 
SI3/Humanity 3.053*** 2.365*** .688 
SI4/BeBetter 2.184*** 1.999*** .185 
SI6/BeLike 2.466*** 2.150*** .316 
SI8/Uplifted 2.639*** 2.044*** .595 
SI9/Inspired 2.664*** 2.097*** .567 
SI10/Moved 2.742*** 2.044*** .698 
SI11/Proud 2.900*** 2.309*** .591 
SI12/Happy 3.003*** 2.077*** .926 
Note:  *** p < .001 
 
 
Tables C22a-b:  
Factor loadings (slopes) and means (intercepts) from CFA for self-defence by vignette
 Tab. C22a 
Factor loadings 
Self-defence 
  Francia Nicholas Δ 
SD1/MeGreater .726*** .725*** .001 
SD2/Devalue .797*** .733*** .064 
SD3/Ordinary .663*** .723*** -.060 
SD5/Praise .764*** .755*** .009 
SD6/Ulterior .668*** .693*** -.025 
SD8/Uneasy .799*** .739*** .060 
SD10/NoPraise .657*** .751*** -.094 
SD11/Superior .775*** .810*** -.035 
SD12/Seriously .777*** .769*** .008 
SD16/Threatened .834*** .603*** .231 
SD18/Resentful .769*** .687*** .082 
SD19/Irritated .805*** .739*** .066 
Note:  ***  p < .001 
Delta with the highest absolute value in boldface 
 
Tab. C22b  
Mean structure 
Self-defence 
  Francia Nicholas Δ 
SD1/MeGreater .671*** .749*** -.078 
SD2/Devalue .580*** .734*** -.154 
SD3/Ordinary .611*** .793*** -.182 
SD5/Praise .766*** .803*** -.037 
SD6/Ulterior .828*** .980*** -.152 
SD8/Uneasy .561*** .640*** -.079 
SD10/NoPraise .904*** .928*** -.024 
SD11/Superior .714*** .711*** .003 
SD12/Seriously .653*** .758*** -.105 
SD16/Threatened .479*** .511*** -.032 
SD18/Resentful .453*** .522*** -.069 
SD19/Irritated .455*** .544*** -.089 




Analysis of slope deltas for self-improvement and self-defence allowed to identify 
the items with the largest differentials, and these items were tested for measurement 
invariance. They were constrained one by one to be equal across vignettes and then 






Tables C23a-b:  
Measurement invariance tests by vignette: models with items with largest differentials 
between vignettes constrained to equality and tested against an unconstrained model 
 
Table C23a: Self-improvement 
Model df AIC BIC χ2 χ2 diff. df diff. Sig. 
Unconstrained 66 84360 84673 273.34    
SI01 constrained 68 84496 84800 413.35 78.358 2 <.001*** 
SI11 constrained 67 84399 84708 314.48 29.372 1 <.001*** 
SI06 constrained 67 84401 84709 315.56 33.723 1 <.001*** 
SI04 constrained 67 84407 84715 322.04 37.652 1 <.001*** 
SI08 constrained 67 84415 84723 329.94 27.83 1 <.001*** 
 
Table C23b: Self-defence 
Model df AIC BIC χ2 χ2 diff. df diff. Sig. 
Unconstrained 100 100927 101318 530.94    
SD16 constrained 101 100937 101324 543.66 5.9348 1 0.015* 
SD10 constrained 101 100926 101312 532.03 1.2549 1 0.263 
SD18 constrained 101 100930 101316 536.34 3.1885 1 0.074 
SD19 constrained 101 100926 101312 532.12 0.62095 1 0.431 
SD02 constrained 101 100929 101315 535.23 4.9277 1 0.026* 
SD03 constrained 101 100928 101314 534.20 3.419 1 0.064 
Note:   ***  p < .001 (2-tailed) *  p < .05 (2-tailed) 
 
 
For self-improvement, five indicators out of ten were not invariant, especially item 
SI01/Admirable, yet without jeopardising the overall strict invariance of the model. By 
contrast, only two were not invariant in the self-defence latent variable, especially item 
SD16/Threatened. This is consistent with the stronger metric invariance achieved by the 
self-defence scale (see Tab. C20). 
Structural Invariance Between Vignettes 
Tests of invariance were also conducted at the structural level to provide further 
evidence of the distinctiveness of the individual structural models for each vignette. The 
analysis followed the same procedure as in Study 2, with the exception that now latent 
variables were used. First, an unconstrained model was fitted, then it was compared to a 
fully constrained model (slopes and intercepts constrained to equality) and the 




freedom was assessed. The result was significant (Tab. 23a), indicating – as expected – 
lack of invariance. At that point, the most dissimilar pathways were tested for structural 
invariance one by one against the unconstrained model (Tab. 23b). The full output is 
available in SMC18. 
 
Tables C23a-b: 
Structural invariance tests by vignette: models with pathways with largest differentials 
between vignettes constrained to equality and tested against an unconstrained model 
 
Table C23a: structural invariance test – unconstrained vs fully constrained models 
Model df AIC BIC χ2 χ2 diff. df diff. Sig. 
Unconstrained 1936 390415 391970 5550.0    
Fully constrained 1993 390797 392073 6045.5 373.01 57 <.001*** 
 
Table C23b: structural invariance tests – unconstrained model vs models with most dissimilar pathways 
constrained to equality 
Model df AIC BIC χ2 χ2 diff. df diff. Sig. 
Unconstrained 1936 390415 391970 5550.0    
Path A constrained 1937 390415 391965 5551.9 1.617 1 0.204 
Path B constrained 1937 390417 391967 5554.1 2.7595 1 0.097 
Path C constrained 1937 390421 391971 5557.5 5.3814 1 0.020* 
Path D constrained 1937 390422 391972 5558.2 5.2318 1 0.022* 
Path E constrained 1937 390415 391965 5552.1 2.3028 1 0.129 
Path F constrained 1937 390428 391978 5564.9 14.178 1 <.001*** 
Path G constrained 1937 390418 391968 5555.1 4.491 1 0.034* 
Path H constrained 1937 390418 391968 5554.9 5.0498 1 0.025* 
Note:  *  p < .05 level (2-tailed)                                               ***  p < .001 (2-tailed) 
 Path A = moral discrepancy / self-improvement 
 Path B = goodness of deed / self-improvement 
 Path C = propriety of deed / self-defence 
 Path D = propriety of deed / moral discrepancy 
 Path E = prevention focus / goodness of deed 
 Path F = promotion focus / prevention focus 
 Path G = approach / avoidance 
 Path H = approach / prevention focus 
 
 
Only a few pathways that appear to be different between vignettes (significant in 
one and non-significant in the other) reached statistical significance; those that were 
truly divergent were especially the covariances between the characteristic adaptations. 




contribute more than the pathways across endogenous variables to determine lack of 
invariance of the structural models; the divergence in the regression weights linking 
moral discrepancy and self-improvement, which is significant in Francia’s vignette but 
not in Nicholas’s, is not so large as to cause the models to produce a significant 
difference in the overall model fit. 
A Person-Centred Analysis: Latent Profile Modelling 
The next analysis moved the focus from the variables to the participants, with the 
aim to identify clusters of individuals who are similar within themselves (homogeneity 
criterion) and different from others (separation criterion). There are various kinds of 
“person-oriented approaches” – as Bergman and Magnusson (1997) defined them – that 
generate clusters of individuals; the family of methods chosen for this specific analysis, 
latent variable mixture models, uses probabilistic models which have stronger 
properties than other cluster analyses (e.g., K-means) that use distance algorithms (He & 
Fan, 2019). Within the family of latent variable mixture models, latent profile analysis 
(LPA) enables to aggregate individuals with similar response patterns to certain sets of 
quantitative questionnaire items that underlie specific latent constructs. One of the 
critical assumptions of LPA is that the observed indicators are measured through 
continuous variables59, as is the case for the variables that were analysed here: moral 
self-regulation and motivational dispositions. 
Clustering participants with one of the latent variable mixture models was a 
preregistered secondary analysis and was performed as an additional exploration of the 
data from Study 3, in order to shed further light on nuances of the self-regulation of 
virtue and its antecedents. Although these methods have become popular only recently, 
 
59 A conceptually similar, but distinct, type of latent variable mixture modelling (latent class analysis) can be 




the literature in the social, behavioural, and health sciences provides several examples. 
Collins and Lanza (2010) report the case of modelling the latent variable of drinking 
motivation from a sample of high school seniors, which allowed to identify the four 
clusters of experimenters, thrill-seekers, relax-seekers, and all-round drinkers who are 
simultaneously motivated by all the previous factors (Coffman et al., 2007). It is easy to 
see how distinguishing these independent clusters might lead to more effective targeted 
interventions. 
In LPA, participants’ clusters are referred to as “profiles”. The idea behind LPA is 
that latent profiles are “organising principles” that cause participants to respond 
differentially to certain observed indicators, much like in CFA latent variables cause the 
observed indicators to aggregate according to distinct covariance patterns. And like with 
CFA, thanks to LPA it is possible to reduce the dimensionality of the phenomenon at 
hand, isolating and highlighting the essential elements that inspection of the individual 
observations across indicators would make painstakingly slow and complex (if possible 
at all) to identify. 
CFA and LPA are not mutually exclusive or competing methods (Robins et al., 1996). 
One of the reasons why they could be employed in the analysis of the same dataset is 
that the phenomenon under investigation can have both continuous and categorical 
features (Collins & Lanza, 2010): indeed, self-improvement and self-defence can be 
viewed as mechanisms that can be experienced as a “quantity”, on a spectrum from 
weak hints to strong manifestations, but can also be observed as a set of various 
expressive “categories”, each qualitatively distinct from the others. Thus, these 
operationalisations allow answering a wider set of research questions. 
As is often the case with LPA (see Marsh et al., 2009), no specific predictions about 




limited information was available prior to data collection. The analysis was performed 
with the R package tidyLPA ver. 1.0.5 (Rosenberg et al., 2018). This package, which is 
based on the tidyverse code collection, does not directly handle the modelling, but it 
interfaces with mclust ver. 5.4.5 (Scrucca et al., 2016), which computationally carries out 
the mixture modelling. tidyLPA uses the expectation-maximisation (EM) algorithm to 
generate the maximum likelihood solution. 
The analysis consisted of three steps60, through which three kinds of models – each 
with specific types of parametrisations for means, variances, and covariances – were 
fitted and compared. While the means were estimated allowing them to freely vary 
across all models, variances and covariances were modelled fixing or constraining them 
in various ways. Models 1 and 2 meet the classical assumption of local independence, 
based on which – conditional on the latent variable – the observed indicators are 
independent (Collins & Lanza, 2010); that is, within the latent profile, covariances are set 
to zero. This assumption is relaxed in Model 3, where covariances (as well as variances) 
are constrained to be equal61. Thus, Models 1-3 were fitted in a sequence with 
decreasing levels of parameter restrictions: 
 Step 1, Model 1: class-invariant parametrisation estimates profiles with equal 
variances and covariances constrained to zero (the most restrictive); 
 Step 2, Model 2: class-varying diagonal parametrisation estimates profiles with 
varying variances and covariances constrained to zero; 
 Step 3, Model 3: class-invariant unrestricted parametrisation estimates profiles 
 
60 Full LPA usually consists of six steps and six corresponding models. However, Models 4 and 5 were not 
computed because they can only be fitted by tidyLPA in association with the MPlus software, and Model 6 
was dropped because with large datasets it requires hardware capabilities beyond those of an ordinary 
personal computer. Model numbers from 1 to 6 are a specific feature of the tidyLPA package in R. 
61 According to Marsh et al. (2009), only the models that meet the assumption of local independence can be 
considered “classical” latent profile models, while the others should be viewed as other forms of latent 




with equal variances and equal covariances (the least restrictive). 
At each step, a varying number of profiles was extracted. Because the optimal 
number of profiles was unknown a priori, the procedure was repeated as many times as 
necessary, until the size of the last profile became so small that too few observations 
could be assigned to it62. Within each step, models with varying numbers of profiles 
were fitted and compared through multiple indices/information criteria, for example the 
log-likelihood, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC), the sample size-adjusted Bayesian information criterion (SABIC), and others. 
Thanks to its correction for sample size and the penalty for parameter complexity, in this 
analysis the SABIC was regarded as the most diagnostic criterion, although all of them 
were considered. There is no cutoff point for information criteria such as the SABIC; 
when comparing models, the smaller the value, the better the fit. 
Once the models with the ideal number of profiles were extracted from each step 
of the procedure, those models were compared using the information criteria. After 
analysis of all the indices, particularly the SABIC, the preferred model was selected and 
interpreted qualitatively. It must be noted that models cannot be chosen purely based 
on information criteria; the model with the best fit must also be meaningful from a 
substantive viewpoint and contribute to explaining the phenomenon at hand (Marsh et 
al., 2009; He & Fan, 2019). 
The above procedure was carried out twice among the total sample: first to fit 
profiles of moral self-regulation, collapsing all the broadening and defensive items into 
one single inventory of twenty-two items, and then to fit profiles of motivational 
dispositions, collapsing the regulatory focus and hedonic orientation items into one 
 
62 The maximum number of profiles in a single step for the current dataset was ten for self-regulation and 




single motivation inventory of twenty-one items. Moral comparison types were not 
extracted from LPA, as they were already available (see Fig. C6). 
Moral Self-Regulation Profiles. The best model from the LPA on moral self-
regulation yielded three self-regulatory profiles from class-varying diagonal 
parametrisation (Model 2, see Tab. C24). The proportion of participants who fell into 
each profile varied from 26% to 43% (each participant could only belong to one profile). 
 
Table C24:  
Overall fit indices and information criteria for the moral self-regulation profiles 
Fit index / 
Information criterion 
Model 1 (step 1) Model 2 (step 2) Model 3 (step 3) 
10 profiles 3 profiles 2 profiles 
Log Likelihood -91991.281 -89609.401 -91654.886 
AIC 184484.561 179486.802 183905.772 
BIC 185711.849 180142.007 185362.871 
SABIC 184914.668 179716.420 184416.417 
AWE 188192.272 181465.255 188308.024 
CLC 183984.425 179220.758 183311.717 
KIC 184738.561 179623.802 184206.772 
 
 
The three profiles are illustrated in Figure C26, which also indicates their relative 
size in percentage. 
The three clusters of the model with the best fit were labelled based on a 
qualitative evaluation of their profile shape across the indicators: full-out improvers, 
improvers, mixed defenders. Their main characteristics are briefly described below: 
 full-out improvers: this group displays the highest degree of self-improvement and 
at the same time the minimum level of self-defence (null or close to null for most 
items). It is the smallest of the three self-regulation clusters, with 26% of 
participants; 
 improvers: this group is characterised by strong self-improvement, although to a 




more strongly than full-out improvers. It is the largest cluster, composed by 43% of 
participants; 
 mixed defenders: this group, despite an overall slight prevalence of self-
improvement over self-defence, is the cluster that comparatively shows (by a 
margin) the highest level of defensive mechanisms. It is a sizeable profile, 





Figure C26:  
































Overall, it can be noticed that the two high self-improvement clusters have similar 
profile shapes, except that the full-out improvers score on average about 10 points 
higher on the self-improvement items and 10 points lower on self-defence items 
(relative to the improvers). The mixed defenders are a heterogeneous cluster of 
participants who on average score around the midpoint of the scale for most self-
improvement items, but at the same time endorse slightly below the midpoint of the 
scale also the self-defence items, especially SD6/Ulterior and SD10/NoPraise. 
The full LPA output for moral self-regulation can be found in SMC19, while the 
descriptive statistics of the three self-regulatory profiles are available in SMC20. 
Motivational Dispositions Profiles. The best model from the LPA on regulatory 
focus and hedonic orientation yielded six motivational profiles from class-invariant 
unrestricted parameterisation (Model 3, see Tab. C25). The proportion of participants 
who fell into each profile varied from 2% to 28% (again, each participant could only 
belong to one profile). The six profiles are illustrated in Figure C27, which also indicates 
their relative size in percentage. 
 
Table C25:  
Overall fit indices and information criteria for the motivational dispositions profiles 
Fit index / 
Information criterion 
Model 1 (step 1) Model 2 (step 2) Model 3 (step 3) 
19 profiles 10 profiles 6 profiles 
Log Likelihood -90502.304 -90416.827 -89824.114 
AIC 181880.608 181691.655 180372.228 
BIC 184022.249 183789.289 182142.260 
SABIC 182631.153 182426.777 180992.541 
AWE 188352.092 188030.076 185720.659 
CLC 181006.407 180835.503 179649.861 




Figure C27:  

























Preventing Avoiders (14%) Approaching Avoiders (14%) Active Approachers (17%)
Non-Avoiding Preventers (2%) Relaxed Preventers (25%) All-Rounders (28%)
Promotion Prevention Approach 
Avoidance 
270 
The six clusters of the model with the best fit were labelled based on a qualitative 
evaluation of their profile shape across the indicators: active approachers, relaxed 
preventers, non-avoiding preventers, approaching avoiders, preventing avoiders, all-
rounders. Their main characteristics are described below: 
 active approachers: this group is composed of participants who score high on 
approach, promotion focus and prevention focus (around 70 on the 0-100 scale), 
while at the same time endorsing the lowest levels of avoidance (around 20 on the 
0-100 scale). It is a medium-sized profile made up of 17% of participants; 
 relaxed preventers: this group has a similar pattern to the previous one, with a 
prevalence of approach, promotion focus and prevention focus (between 60 and 69 
on the 0-100 scale, and higher on prevention focus relative to the other groups) and 
at the same time low avoidance, particularly the items referring to anxiety, worry 
and nervousness (hence the label “relaxed”). They make up a total of 25% of the 
sample; 
 non-avoiding preventers: this is the smallest group (only 2% of participants). 
Participants in this profile exhibit a prevalence of prevention focus and low 
avoidance, while maintaining relatively robust levels of promotion focus; 
 approaching avoiders: this medium-sized group (14%) has the peculiarity of 
showing at the same time high levels of approach and avoidance (around 80 on the 
0-100 scale), which among the total sample are weakly inversely correlated; 
 preventing avoiders: this group (14% of participants) shows the highest level of 
avoidance (above 80 on the 0-100 scale) and at the same time scores relatively high 
on prevention focus (about 65). Participants in this profile are also considerably 
lower than average on promotion focus and approach; 




all the four motivational traits, with a relatively flat profile. 
The full LPA for motivational dispositions is available in SMC21, while the 
descriptive statistics for the six motivational profiles are in SMC22. 
Associations Between Profiles. In the variable-centred analysis, the structural 
equation models had provided initial evidence of a causal chain of comparative and self-
regulatory effects induced by the experimental manipulation of vignettes portraying 
moral exemplars; the models also included associations of exogenous motivational 
dispositions with moral comparisons and moral self-regulation. Now, latent profile 
modelling enabled the aggregation of specific groups of participants characterised by 
higher probabilities of endorsing certain motivational traits and experience certain 
moral self-regulatory modes when exposed to acts of virtue; in addition, previous 
analysis of moral evaluations of the self and the moral character of the agents had also 
allowed to distinguish three further groups of participants who engaged in upward, 
downward, and lateral comparisons. If through the variable-centred analysis specific 
correlation patterns emerged between motivational, comparison, and self-regulation 
variables, at this point it was of interest to analyse if any significant associations existed 
between motivational, comparison, and self-regulation clusters of participants. 
To analyse these associations, chi-square and likelihood ratio tests were performed: 
first between motivational groups (the six motivational profiles from LPA) and 
comparison groups (the three clusters of upward, downward, and lateral “comparers”), 
then between comparison groups (the same three categories mentioned above) and 
self-regulation groups (the five self-regulatory profiles from LPA), and lastly between 
motivational groups (the six motivational profiles from LPA) and self-regulation groups 




These analyses were performed among the total sample of 982 participants. The 
results are reported in Table C26. All the associations were highly significant, and the 
effect size measured through Cramér’s V (equivalent to the percentage of the maximum 
possible variation of the variables) was of moderate strength for one of them 
(association between comparison and regulatory groups) and weaker for the others. 
 
Table C26:  
Tests of associations between motivational dispositions profiles, comparison type 
groups, and moral self-regulation profiles, with corresponding effect sizes (total sample) 







Motivational dispositions profiles * moral comparison groups    
     Value 30.675a 30.313 .125 
     df 10 10  
     Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) .001 <.001  
    
Moral comparison groups * moral self-regulation profiles    
     Value 172.407b 180.794 .296 
     df 4 4  
     Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) <.001 <.001  
    
Motivational dispositions profiles * moral self-regulation 
profiles 
   
     Value 33.887c 33.936 .131 
     df 10 10  
     Asymptotic Significance (2-sided) <.001 <.001  
Note:   a. 2 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.43. 
             b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.19. 
             c. 1 cell has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.20. 
 
 
Pearson’s chi-square and the likelihood ratio are omnibus tests that indicate 
whether the null hypothesis of a uniform distribution of participants across groups (the 
independence hypothesis) should be rejected. Results showed that the independence 
hypothesis should be rejected across the board. 
When the null hypothesis is to be rejected, as in this case, it is of interest to detect 




Analysis of the standardised residuals provided the answer. In a nutshell, what emerged 
is the following (in brackets the value of the standardised residuals63): 
 association between comparison groups and self-regulation profiles: downward 
comparers tended to be more than proportionally represented among the mixed 
defenders (8.8) and less than proportionally represented among the full-out 
improvers (-6.2) and improvers (-3.7). Conversely, upward comparers tended to be 
more than proportionally full-out improvers and improvers (2.4 both profiles), and 
less than proportionally mixed defenders (-4.4); 
 association between motivational profiles and self-regulation profiles: non-avoiding 
preventers tended to fall more than proportionally in the mixed defenders profile 
(2.1), whereas relaxed preventers were more than proportionally unlikely to fall in 
the full-out improvers profile (-2.0); 
 association between motivational profiles and comparison groups: approaching 
avoiders were more than proportionally likely to engage in lateral comparisons 
(3.1), while preventing avoiders were more than proportionally unlikely to engage 
in lateral comparisons (-2.2). 
The full results of the chi-square and likelihood ratio tests, including the residuals, 
are available in SMC23. 
Flow Analysis. An attractive way to represent graphically the flow of participants 
from motivational profiles to self-regulation profiles via comparison groups is 
represented by network diagrams, for instance Sankey or alluvial diagrams. They enable 
to visualise response patterns across the key variables in the form of “transition 
trajectories” that cluster participants’ experience along the causal pathways (see Fig. 
 
63 Standardised residuals are z-scores and therefore they can be considered significant if greater in absolute 




C28). In this study, Sankey diagrams can effectively provide an overview of the 
proportion of individuals that flow across the various stages of the psychological process 
of the response to moral exemplars. In these plots, the boxes are the nodes and the 
arrows are the links that connect the nodes; the thicker the boxes and the links, the 
higher their value (number of individuals at each stage transitioning along the respective 
trajectories). 
The Sankey diagram in Figure C28 was created in R with the package flipPlots ver. 
1.2.0 (Displayr, 2019), which uses in the background the package networkD3 ver. 0.4 
(Allaire et al., 2017) to generate the network graph. The contingency tables across the 
variables are available in SMC24. 
 
Figure C28:  
Sankey diagram illustrating participants’ flow across clusters along the causal pathways 








Study 3 was designed to provide a conceptual replication of the results from Study 
2. The provisional measurement and structural models were further improved and the 
identification of specific participants’ profiles with common response patterns added 
new perspectives to the findings. In this respect, Study 3 accomplished what it was 
designed to deliver. 
Measurement Model 
Endogenous Latent Variables 
With a few modifications, the measurement model for the moral self-regulation 
inventory yielded satisfactory fit, with the main indices within or close to the excellence 
cutoff points. The measurement model hypothesised based on Study 2 required two 
kinds of interventions: the removal of a few self-regulation items (two from the self-
improvement and six from the self-defence scales) and the specification of a few error 
covariances (two for self-improvement and four for self-defence64). 
The removal of a few indicators from the scales was due to factor loadings equal to 
or smaller than .7, which were causing undesirable measurement error. These items 
were not necessarily poorly designed. The main issue consisted in the lack of 
measurement invariance between vignettes; in other words, they did not function the 
same way across the two vignettes, as slightly different reactions were elicited by the 
two moral deeds. This was reflected in the factor loadings, higher for one vignette and 
lower for the other. Two key examples are items SI5/Values and SD17/Guilty. Item SI5 
had a relatively strong loading for Nicholas’s subsample (.764), but weaker for Francia’s 
(.604), determining a lower-than-expected performance among the total sample. Even 
 




more striking is the case of item SD17, whose factor loading for Francia’s subsample was 
acceptable, although not fully satisfactory (.609), but was far too weak for Nicholas’s 
subsample (.333), causing a poor performance among the total sample. From a 
substantive viewpoint, beyond the statistics, shared values with the moral agent (SI5) 
and guilty feelings (SD17) were not common experiences across the two vignettes and 
therefore could not be considered generalisable experiences related to the self-
regulation of virtue. Therefore, these items were dropped from their respective scales. 
The other intervention to improve the fit of the endogenous latent variables 
consisted in allowing a few covariances between the error terms of some observed 
indicators. In theory, this represents a violation of the principle of local independence 
that underlies the construction of latent variables, that is, the assumption that the 
indicators should not be correlated after conditioning on the latent variable (Borsboom 
et al., 2003). Researchers have provided conflicting evidence on existence and entity of a 
potential bias introduced by allowing such correlations, for example in studies that used 
the multitrait-multimethod approach, first introduced by Campbell and Fiske (1959). 
Some scholars reported negligible bias (see e.g., Marsh & Bailey, 1991; Tomás et al., 
2000) and others cautioned against underestimating the distortions in the factor 
loadings, especially under specific circumstances (when the product of the method 
loadings and method correlations is relatively large; see Conway et al., 2004). 
Even when the method is a single one (experimental survey-based self-reports, as 
in the present study), the introduction of error covariances in a latent factor model 
implies that the latent variable itself cannot account for the entirety of the variance of 
its indicators. While part of this unexplained variance may be due to random 
measurement error, covariation among indicators could underlie unspecified systematic 




latent model. This generally unwanted component is sometimes referred to as 
“construct-irrelevant variance” (Baird, 2010). 
According to Kline (2012), the assumption of local independence is restrictive and 
unrealistic in the behavioural sciences. Its violation probably occurs in empirical research 
more often than usually acknowledged. He recommends including correlated errors in 
model specification if they are substantively justifiable. Introducing them without clear 
substantive reasoning could result in overfitting and the solution could be too sample-
specific, failing to generalise to the whole population (see e.g., MacCallum et al., 1992). 
At the same time, Cole and colleagues (2007) warn that failing to specify justifiable 
correlated errors could have even more harmful consequences in terms of biased 
estimates of the factor loadings.  
Research has suggested that sources of construct-irrelevant variance can be both 
methodological and substantive. Brown (2015) lists among the sources of bias the kind 
of assessment (self-reports or observer ratings), the data collection method (in-person 
interviews or self-administered online or pen-and-paper questionnaires), the kind of 
questionnaire items (reversed or similarly worded), the content of the response set, 
demand characteristics, susceptibility to socially desirable or acquiescent responding, 
reading disabilities or other cognitive biases. Bocell (2015) mentions other method 
sources, for example item order effects (especially when questionnaire items are not 
fully randomised), use of mixed response scales (multiple-choice, true/false, free-recall 
responses), use of different item stem wording (negatively- and positively-worded 
stems), context or priming effects (prior questions affecting the following ones), 
language inconsistencies (use of common/simple versus unusual/complex words). It 




inventory carried the same introductory words (“I felt…”, “I was…”, “It made me feel…”, 
“Actions…”, “Francia/Nicholas may have…”). 
In sum, method effects depend on the type of assessment instrument or item 
formatting/placement in a survey, whereas substantive effects could be related to 
personal characteristics or propensities of the participants. All of them could easily 
result in correlated errors and it is often quite difficult to identify and specify them 
before data collection or determine their individual contribution, singling out the most 
impactful. 
In Study 3, six error covariances were allowed in CFA between items of the moral 
self-regulation inventory (Fig. C15-C16), but the final integrated structural models (Fig. 
C26a-b) only accommodated three in Nicholas’s subsample and none in Francia’s65. The 
items involved in these error covariances are summarised in Table C27. 
 
Table C27:  
Moral self-regulation: item pairs with correlated errors in the final integrated structural 
equation models (Nicholas’s subsample) 
Item code Item wording 
SI2 When I read these stories, I feel awakened to the good in the world 
SI3 This story strengthens my faith in humanity 
 
Item code Item wording 
SD5 Francia may have done a good deed, but I bet she is seeking the praise of others 
SD6 Francia may have had ulterior motives for doing this 
 
Item code Item wording 
SD16 I felt as if I was threatened by something 
SD18 I felt resentful 
  
 
65 The revised structural models without opinion-based comparison variables (Fig. C23a-b) only had one 




These item pairs carry repetitive or very similar expressions at the beginning of 
each statement. Therefore, without ruling out other explanations, one of the possible 
sources for the emergence of construct-irrelevant variance could be attributed to 
method effects related to item wording. 
Other than that, because analysis of measurement invariance showed negligible 
differential item functioning (DIF66) for the twenty-two indicators of the moral self-
regulation inventory, Study 3 could be said to have provided initial evidence of validity 
and reliability of the dimensional structure and item composition of these endogenous 
latent variables. 
Exogenous Latent Variables 
Analysis of the exogenous latent variables presented specific challenges. The 
measurement instruments chosen for regulatory focus and approach/avoidance were 
validated scales that have been widely used in psychological research for decades. 
Despite evidence of validity and reliability in the motivation science literature, in Study 3 
these constructs exhibited relatively low internal consistency, in some cases clearly 
suboptimal. Promotion focus was the latent variable with the weakest reliability, due to 
the low loadings of two items: Pm1/Unable (.452) and Pm6/Hobbies (.373). This 
phenomenon caused measurement errors within the latent variable, reducing the 
overall fit. For that reason, those items were dropped from the latent variable. Notably, 
the error covariances included in CFA between two promotion focus items and two 
avoidance items were not specified in the full structural models. 
Structural Models 
 
66 DIF consists in unequal slopes or intercepts of a latent variable indicator across different sample groups 




Path modelling from Study 2 provided the fundamental specification criteria to 
carry out full SEM for the total sample and each of the two vignettes in Study 3. Since 
the path models developed in Study 2 used observed instead of latent variables, the 
initial structural models in Study 3 did not yield satisfactory fit and required addressing a 
few issues. First, for the reasons discussed in the previous chapter, a positive correlation 
between moral discrepancy and self-improvement was expected in Francia’s vignette 
even if it did not appear in the final path model from Study 2. A few parameters in the 
motivational variables were also modified: a) their covariance structure was adjusted to 
reflect the findings from the larger sample; b) approach was preferred to promotion 
focus for the prediction of self-improvement due to a stronger regression weight and a 
slightly better overall fit. 
Although the resulting revised models achieved nearly excellent fit, a few 
modifications were made to reduce residual error and further improve the substantive 
theory underlying them. The search for parsimony had led to the prioritisation of moral 
comparisons based on ability, overlooking the contribution of opinion-based 
comparisons for the explanation of the dependent variables variance. This narrower 
specification of the perimeter of the models partly compromised their accuracy, 
especially in Nicholas’s condition, where the impact of less positive judgments of the 
deed was stronger. From a statistical standpoint, the integrated models inclusive of 
judgments underlying opinion-based comparisons achieved two important 
improvements while retaining the same goodness-of-fit: they allowed to increase the 
total variance explained of the outcome variables (more than doubling it in Nicholas’s 
subsample) and levelled to non-significance the covariance of the disturbances of the 
outcome variables. This way, from a substantive perspective, the integrated models 




theoretical explanation that is better equipped to elucidate the mechanisms of the 
response to moral exemplars not only when their deeds are unequivocally judged as 
morally excellent (e.g., Francia), but also when they are liable to a wider range of moral 
judgments, from more to less positive (e.g., Nicholas). 
Whereas the measurement model was invariant between vignettes, the integrated 
structural models were not, replicating the findings from path modelling in Study 2. 
Analysis of the integrated models by vignette (Fig. 24a-b) and for the total sample (Fig. 
C25) yielded critical insights. At the level of the total sample (Fig. C25), the two moral 
self-regulatory modes were predicted by both opinion- and ability-based comparisons. 
By contrast, at the level of the individual vignette opinion- and ability-based 
comparisons exerted a comparatively different level of impact on moral self-regulation 
depending on the nature of the moral action: opinion-based comparisons (judgments 
about the goodness and the propriety of the deed) were more influential in Nicholas’s 
than in Francia’s vignette. They are probably essential to explain the variance in all 
moral scenarios where the deed results in conflicting opinions, but when comparison 
processes remain more in the background, as in Francia’s vignette, motivational 
processes acquire comparatively greater relevance, directly affecting moral self-
regulation with greater intensity. Indeed, the size of the approach and prevention focus 
regression weights for the prediction of respectively self-improvement and self-defence 
was twice as large in Francia’s compared to Nicholas’s subsample. 
Complementary Insights 
The secondary analyses provided further discernment about some of the 
mechanisms that govern the psychological processes experienced by individuals when 
they witness virtuous deeds performed by others. Latent profile analysis allowed to 




one characterised by very strong self-improvement and virtually no self-defence (full-out 
improvers), and another with strong self-improvement along with mild defensive 
regulation (improvers) limited to dismissal of the exceptionalism of the moral agent and 
the attribution of ulterior motives. The third profile (mixed defenders) was a cluster that 
on average displayed a blend of broadening and defensive states, with a considerable 
variation around the means with which each self-regulation item was endorsed. This 
profile did not feature participants who completely rejected acknowledgement of the 
morality of the agents or denied any form of positive inspiration, but at the same time 
they questioned the agents’ motives and the generalisability of the behaviour as an 
ethical norm to adhere to; these defensive reactions were probably the result of feelings 
of either vulnerability and guilt when the agent was seen as almost inaccessibly 
outstanding (the organ donor), or feelings of threat and resentment when the behaviour 
implied ethical standards that strongly conflicted with those of the participants 
(homosexuality). 
The association pattern of the moral comparison clusters with the self-regulation 
profiles closely mirrored the results from the structural models: notably, participants in 
the upward comparison cluster associated with participants in the two self-
improvement profiles, and participants in the downward comparison cluster associated 
with participants in the mixed defender profile. Moreover, the Sankey diagram (Fig. C29) 
graphically illustrated that, for the most part, participants engaging in upward 
comparison were the same who self-improved, and participants engaging in downward 
comparison were those who self-defended more intensely. The convergence of the 
results from the variable-centred and the person-centred analyses offered strong 
evidence of the robustness of the main findings. As Loken and Molenaar (2008) 




One further consideration concerns the size of the positive versus negative 
regulatory response: overall, the full-out improvers and improvers clusters were much 
larger than the mixed defenders cluster (69% versus 31%), making moral self-
improvement a much more common reaction (relative to self-defence) to the exposure 
to acts of moral goodness. Interestingly, a recent study by Sun and Goodwin (2020) 
highlighted that people do not seem to value moral self-improvement goals (e.g., in 
terms of honesty, fairness, compassion) as much as non-moral improvement targets 
(e.g., sociability, productiveness, anxiety). Following Hudson and Fraley (2016), the 
authors attribute this finding to well-being concerns: they argued that becoming more 
moral results in fewer personal benefits and is often accompanied by personal costs, 
thus becoming, for instance, less anxious or more sociable turns out to be a safer and 
more desirable target (Sun & Goodwin, 2020). 
This explanation raises a question. If personality changes such as becoming less 
anxious or more sociable were primarily motivated by the desire to improve one’s own 
rather than others’ life, why exposure to others’ displays of virtue instigated in the 
present research such strong self-improvement responses? Although this work does not 
speak directly to this point, the reasons might be found in the fact that moral self-
improvement was measured here as a transient state induced by an experimental 
manipulation, whereas Sun and Goodwin’s study refers to changes of more permanent 
moral traits. Study 4 addressed the issue of the extent to which a temporary state of 
self-improvement translates into actual prosocial behaviour. 
Limitations 
Although Study 3 accomplished its goal of identifying substantively meaningful 
solutions with satisfactory psychometric properties for a single measurement model and 




virtue, the results should be considered preliminary, and a few clear limitations must be 
acknowledged. 
First, modifications were introduced after fitting the initial hypothesised models in 
CFA and SEM. The input models (those obtained from Study 2) were clearly provisional, 
having been developed with exploratory/generative techniques, such as EFA and path 
modelling with observed variables. Those provisional models did not yield satisfactory fit 
in Study 3 and therefore post-hoc modifications were introduced. Although all of them 
were theoretically grounded and the specific rationale was discussed in detail, post-hoc 
modifications require replication through further testing among new samples from the 
same population. In defence of the final models, though, it could be argued that the 
fundamental relationships across the key variables was repeatedly observed across the 
first three studies of the present research. 
An aspect that would benefit from further research is the measurement of the 
motivational dispositions, so that their impact on moral self-regulation can rest on 
firmer ground. Not only did these latent variables exhibit lower reliability than the new 
moral self-regulation constructs, but also they showed some inconsistent relational 
patterns. While a smaller sample could have partly explained this phenomenon in Study 
2, the large sample size of almost a thousand participants in Study 3 should have 
ensured stable results. Independent samples t-tests between vignettes for each of the 
four motivational constructs returned non-significant results (see SMC4); yet, in the 
integrated structural models, they behaved differently between vignettes. The 
correlation between promotion and prevention focus, which in the literature is usually 
non-significant or weakly positive, was found to be weakly positive in Nicholas’s 
subsample and weakly negative in Francia’s subsample. Inconsistencies also appeared in 




Nicholas’s subsample and non-significant in Francia’s subsample. The effect size of these 
correlations was always small, regardless of their sign, but these inconsistencies are still 
worth noting. Additionally, LPA returned six motivational profiles that were complex to 
interpret; unlike the three very clear self-regulation profiles, they showed a certain level 
of conceptual overlap and were clearly differentiated only by the avoidance construct. 
The six-profile solution emerged as the best among others with slightly different 
parametrisations that yielded ten or even nineteen profiles. These results testify to the 
intricacy of participants’ response to the motivational dispositions, but could also hide 
possible methodological issues due to the known deficiencies in the respective 
measurement instruments, particularly chronic regulatory focus, as discussed in the 
introduction to Study 2. 
Beyond Self-Regulation: Measuring Social Behaviour 
The structural model fitted to the total sample provided a measure of the 
effectiveness of the experimental manipulation, highlighting the chain of causal effects 
induced by the presentation of moral vignettes and experienced in the form of two 
modes of moral self-regulation, through the mediation of moral comparisons and with 
the additional contribution of correlated motivational traits. The size of these effects 
varied from moderate to strong or very strong, and the RMSEA was excellent, although 
with a significant p-value (persisting lack of invariance). One thing to notice here is that 
the fairly large regression weight between the variables vignette and goodness of the 
deed (r = -.33; p < .001) was obtained from two stimuli whose individual structural 
models shared more commonalities than differences. 
The following study (Study 4) was designed to move beyond pitting vignettes with 
different (but relatively equipollent) moral deeds against each other, and instead 




against a control condition functioning as a near-neutral benchmark (a mildly positive 
moral act). This approach allowed to test whether the experimental condition, via the 
elicitation of stronger self-improvement through a greater deed, could inspire a higher 
degree of helping behaviour than the control condition. After all, because self-regulation 
is in the service of actual behaviour and represents one of the critical predictors of 
success in life (Baumeister, 2007), the integration of overt social behaviour in the 





Study 4: Model Extension 
 
Introduction 
The moral self-regulation inventory and the integrated structural models of the self-
regulation of virtue obtained with Study 3 represented a fundamental step in the 
research plan delineated in the introductory chapter (Fig. IV). However, the downstream 
processes remained to be investigated. Indeed, the original conceptual model (Fig. III) 
also included the behavioural outcomes of moral self-regulation. The integration in the 
model of actual social behaviour was therefore the key aim of Study 4, which also 
provided an opportunity for the exploration of other related constructs. 
In more detail, beyond retesting essential aspects of the models, Study 4 was 
designed to meet three key objectives: 
1. measure to what extent prosocial behaviour (specifically, helping behaviour) is 
affected by different levels of self-improvement experimentally induced by two 
distinct deeds: an outstanding and a mild moral action; 
2. measure mechanisms and strength of the relationship between moral self-
improvement and helping behaviour; 
3. explore the relationship between moral self-regulation and other related constructs 
(e.g., regulatory mode, social desirability), providing directions for further research. 
Objective 1: Behavioural Effects 
With regard to the first objective, Study 4 was designed to compare measures 
related to the deed in Francia’s vignette to baseline measures obtained from a new 
moral scenario, with the same protagonists and essentially the same contextual 
features, except for one fundamental element: the level of goodness of the moral 





was at risk of organ failure (a remarkable moral deed), in the control condition Francia 
bought a latte to a friend who forgot her wallet and could not pay for her drink (a mild 
act of everyday kindness). Based on the structural model, the higher level of goodness of 
the deed in the experimental condition was hypothesised to lead to a higher degree of 
helping behaviour (relative to control) through the elicitation of a higher level of self-
improvement (hypothesis 1 – H1; see Fig. D1). 
 
Figure D1:  







The manipulation of the goodness of the deed was clearly intended to provide 
further evidence to corroborate confidence about its causal impact on self-improvement 
and indirectly on helping behaviour. 
Objective 2: Mechanisms of the Behavioural Effects 
Although social cognitive models of self-regulation include overt behaviour in the 
domain of self-regulation (e.g., Zimmerman, 2005), in the present research the 
definition of moral self-regulation left behaviour outside. Yet, an understanding of the 




model, representing a measure of concurrent validity. This relationship was precisely the 
focus of Study 4. 
The link between self-regulation and actual behaviour is not necessarily 
straightforward, since several factors can interfere with people’s standards, goals, and 
strivings. For example, effective self-regulation of behaviour can be impaired if the 
standards implicated in the regulatory process are unclear or in conflict with each other, 
or in the presence of poor monitoring mechanisms, or when emotion regulation hinders 
instead of supporting goal pursuit (Baumeister, 2007). Additionally, plans and 
implementation intentions can play an important role as facilitators or inhibitors in the 
pursuit of desired end-states (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997), enabling the link 
between thought and action (Haggard & Lau, 2013). 
The moral self-regulation inventory from Study 3 accounted for some of the above-
mentioned elements: certain items directly or indirectly captured goals and standards in 
the moral domain (e.g., SI1, SI4, SD2, SD10), others referred to desires and intentions 
(e.g., SI6, SD8). However, a few indicators initially designed to tap into these 
components were dropped from the final inventory, because they behaved differently 
across the two vignettes of Francia and Nicholas (in other words, they were not 
invariant, but dependent on the moral content of the stimuli). These items, although no 
longer part of the final moral self-regulation inventory, were still tested in the present 
study for confirmatory or exploratory purposes. One of them was particularly important, 
item SI7 (“I feel like I want to do something good for others”, originally in the moral self-
improvement scale), because it measured the desire to enact altruistic behaviours, a 





In previous experimental research (Schnall et al., 2010), a direct causal link between 
the emotion of moral elevation (which partly overlaps with moral self-improvement) 
and helping behaviour was found; there, the measure of elevation included the action 
tendency item “want to help others”, which is very similar to item SI7. In Study 4, in the 
absence of a similar action tendency measure within the self-regulation construct, the 
link between moral self-improvement and helping behaviour could still exist, since other 
items include motivational tendencies, for instance SI4 (“Francia has shown me how to 
be a better person”) and SI6 (“I want to be more like Francia”), but it could potentially 
be weaker or marginally non-significant, as at least some of the variance could be 
absorbed by the desire to enact helping behaviours (item SI7). 
For this reason, in Study 4 the relationship between the final self-improvement 
scale and helping behaviour could potentially take different forms, each corresponding 
to alternative hypotheses. The relationship could be direct, with item SI7 having no 
influence on the outcome. However, item SI7 could also play a decisive role in bridging 
self-improvement and helping behaviour; therefore, in addition to the primary 
hypothesis of a direct relationship between self-improvement and helping behaviour, a 
secondary indirect hypothesis was formulated, with the desire to do something good for 
others functioning as a mediator (partial or full). A further alternative hypothesis was 
also tested, according to which self-improvement could exert a stronger or weaker 
influence on helping behaviour depending on the strength of the desire to do something 
good for others; in this case, the action tendency item SI7 would function as a 
moderator. 
With the addition of the variable vignette as predictor, the three hypothesised 





H3), and moderated mediation (hypothesis 4 – H4) are graphically illustrated in Figures 
D2a-c. 
 
Figures D2a-c:  
Objective 2 – Hypotheses 2-4: three alternative mechanisms of simple mediation (H2), 





Note: the dotted lines represent direct pathways that might or might not be significant, depending on whether the 
mediation process is partial or full (not a critical pathway for these tests). 
 
 
If Study 4 results supported any of these three hypotheses, evidence would be 
obtained that not only certain emotional states (e.g., moral elevation, kama muta) but 




behaviour, either directly or through conditional processes. This finding would 
complement respectively Schnall et al.’s (2010) and Blomster Lyshol et al.’s (2020) 
effects of moral elevation and kama muta on prosociality. 
Objective 3: Further Exploration 
Beyond the two objectives described above, Study 4 was also designed to analyse 
the relationship between moral self-improvement with other constructs of interest, such 
as motivational drivers (regulatory mode), social desirability, social comparison 
orientation, locus of control, personality traits (humility, narcissism), and self-growth 
constructs (e.g., hedonia and eudaimonia motives, growth motivation, etc.). These 
constructs were measured in the second part of the questionnaire in a post-task whose 
primary function was to provide a measure of helping behaviour (the outcome variable 
of this study), but also offered the opportunity to conduct further exploratory work with 
a view to informing future research. The methodological aspects will be clarified in the 
next section of this chapter. Some of the aforementioned constructs, briefly discussed in 
the introductory chapter, had been identified as pertinent to the project since its 
inception: regulatory mode, humility, narcissism. Others emerged in response to the 
results of Studies 1-2: socially desirable responding and social comparison orientation. 
Others still were envisaged while designing Study 4: internal locus of control and self-
growth constructs. As a whole, the investigation of these additional variables was 
intended to provide: a) preliminary information about their nature of predictors of 
moral comparison and self-regulation; b) specific psychometric properties of moral self-
improvement (and partly self-defence), namely convergent and discriminant validity. 





In the context of the self-regulation of virtue, regulatory mode was expected to 
function as an exogenous predictor, like regulatory focus and hedonic orientation, with 
which it constitutes a prominent triad in motivation science (Higgins, 2014). Like the 
other two measures mentioned earlier, regulatory mode operates in a cybernetic 
framework. The two regulatory modes of assessment and locomotion consist in distinct 
but complementary concerns respectively for truth and control (Higgins, 2014). 
Assessment mode revolves around needs for accurate evaluation and scrupulous 
decision making through meticulous pondering of strengths and weaknesses of 
alternative choices and courses of action; by contrast, locomotion mode is rooted in 
psychological needs for constant motion, ongoing change, and state shift (Kruglanski et 
al., 2000). Both are critical to attain an effective link between thought and action, 
assessment stressing goal setting (deliberative phase) and locomotion emphasising goal 
striving (implementation phase), as delineated in the Rubicon model of action phases in 
goal-orientated behaviour (Gollwitzer et al., 1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987). The 
Rubicon model posits a clear separation between these two phases: the deliberative 
phase is focused on choices regarding the likelihood that a particular goal could bring 
about a desired end-state, or regarding the worth of a particular goal as opposed to an 
alternative goal (consistent with assessment mode); the implementation phase entails 
execution of the intended course of action and maintenance of the effort to sustain 
action (consistent with locomotion mode). According to the Rubicon model, once a 
decision is made, further deliberative reflection is usually inhibited and psychological 
resources converge toward the effective implementation of the planned actions, 
echoing Julius Caesar’s principle expressed in his famous claim "Alea Iacta Est" (literally, 




over and inciting his legions to initiate the fight in the imminent civil war (Heckhausen & 
Gollwitzer, 1987). 
Empirical research on regulatory mode applied to the moral domain is scant. 
Recently, Cornwell and Higgins (2014) have explored the links between locomotion and 
assessment with the moral foundations, identifying a positive association, particularly 
among liberals, between locomotion and the binding moral foundations, primarily based 
on concerns for social usefulness; this link can be severed when participants are 
experimentally induced into an assessment mode, which shifts the focus to moral truth 
(Cornwell & Higgins, 2014). 
Regarding the relationship between regulatory mode and prosocial behaviour, 
newly published research (Baldner et al., 2020) has found that a locomotion orientation, 
thanks to the high importance placed on goal attainability, contributes to the formation 
of helping goals (along with sympathy toward a specific target in need), which is a 
critical antecedent of helping behaviour. 
Despite the scarcity of empirical research in this area, locomotion mode seems 
conceptually related to self-improvement strivings, given its focus on action and change. 
High locomotors crave for movement and show an impatience with any barriers or 
delays; they worry about standing still, and so they readily embrace opportunities for 
change, rarely look back or engage in counterfactual thinking, and usually experience 
positive affect (Kruglanski et al., 2013). If locomotors are presented with an act that they 
deem morally admirable, their favourable judgment is likely to trigger positively 
valenced conation and action, and for this reason locomotion mode was expected to 





By contrast, assessment mode seems conceptually related to defensive self-
regulation. High assessors are concerned with epistemic needs and go to great lengths 
to find out the “right” option, making comparisons between several alternatives and 
evaluating “counterfactual ‘might have beens’ or imagined futures” (Kruglanski et al., 
2013, p. 81), which make them more susceptible to negative affect, particularly guilt or 
regret (Kruglanski et al., 2013). Various studies have also associated assessment with 
neuroticism (Kruglanski et al., 2000) and depressive moods (Hong et al., 2004). This 
penchant to rumination and volatility predisposes high assessors to actively seek and 
detect flaws in their own and others’ behaviour; when presented with another person’s 
good deed, they might be inclined to thoroughly examine it (along with its context) until 
they identify imperfections, weak spots, faults, ulterior motives, as they would do with 
their own behaviour (see Komissarouk et al., 2018); the more they weigh up strengths 
and weaknesses, the more likely they are to devalue the action and defensively dismiss 
the positive character of the moral agent. For these reasons, assessment mode was 
anticipated to be positively correlated with moral self-defence. 
In addition, given the prominence of accurate evaluation concerns, assessment 
mode was also expected to bear a strong positive correlation with social comparison 
orientations (Higgins et al., 2003), which will be considered next. 
Social Comparison Orientation 
In the discussion of Study 2, it was observed that individual differences exist among 
people in their tendency to engage in social comparisons with others (Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999). It was argued that participants’ disposition to engage in comparisons with the 
moral agents in the vignettes might have correlated with distinct self-regulatory 
patterns. More specifically, participants with stronger social comparison orientations 




“competitors”, particularly when they engage in ability-based comparisons. Therefore, 
in Study 4 a positive correlation was anticipated to exist between self-defence and social 
comparison orientation (driven by ability-based comparisons). 
Additionally, as noted earlier, social comparison orientation was also expected to 
be positively correlated with assessment mode, due to the shared disposition to engage 
in ongoing evaluations of the social environment. 
Social Desirability 
As previously discussed, research participants sometimes show a tendency to 
under-report socially undesirable thoughts and feelings, and over-report socially 
desirable ones, especially when the topic is somehow sensitive (Krumpal, 2013). Even in 
the absence of any concerns for impression management, participants may still be 
subject to a non-conscious self-deception bias and respond in ways that are more 
socially desirable (Paulhus, 1984). 
In the discussion of Study 1, it was noted that some form of social desirability bias 
could have potentially been at play in the present research: participants might have self-
reported their response to the good deeds presented to them in ways that, to a certain 
extent, inflated self-improvement, and especially deflated self-defence. Therefore, in 
Study 4 it was anticipated that a positive correlation would be found between self-
improvement and social desirability, and a negative correlation would be found between 
self-defence and social desirability. 
Internal Locus of Control 
The notion of locus of control was introduced in psychology by Rotter in the context 
of his social learning theory of personality back in 1954 (published over a decade later). 
It was defined as a generalised expectancy for internal as opposed to external control of 




they tend to think of events as under their own influence (internal locus) or under the 
control of outside influences (external locus); he also specified that internality and 
externality should not be considered typologies, but two ends of a continuum (Rotter, 
1975). 
In the 1980s the literature on ego actions started to investigate in more depth the 
relationships between the loci of control and coping/defence mechanisms. Vickers and 
colleagues (1983) found a significant positive correlation between externality and self-
defence, and a positive correlation (albeit weaker) between internality and coping 
mechanisms67. Additionally, Furnham and Steele (1993), in their review on locus of 
control measures, discuss defensive externality in terms of external attributions 
motivated by expected failures. 
Because moral self-defence can be considered a subset of wider ego defensive 
mechanisms and moral self-improvement a specific kind of coping mechanism, it was 
expected that in Study 4 internal locus of control would be negatively associated with 
moral self-defence, and possibly positively associated with moral self-improvement68. 
Further, because of the respectively high concerns for inner control and low concerns 
for external verification, internal locus of control was expected to correlate positively 
with locomotion mode and negatively with social comparison orientation. 
Narcissism and Modesty/Humility 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, narcissism could be potentially related to 
downward comparison and defensive self-regulation, and modesty/humility to upward 
 
67 In the literature on ego actions, Haan (1985, 1986) defines coping as a set of adaptive, purposeful, 
conscious behaviour choices that adhere to reality and are morally superior, and defences as compelled, 
maladaptive, rigid behaviours that distort reality and hinder mature moral behaviour (see also Paulhus et 
al., 1997). 
68 Possibly positively associated with moral self-improvement because of the weaker correlation between 




comparison and self-improvement. Although narcissism and humility were left out of 
the main model due to parsimony concerns, Study 4 provided the opportunity to 
explore their correlation patterns. It was expected that both facets of narcissism would 
positively correlate with self-defence, especially vulnerable narcissism, since the wide 
majority of moral self-defence items pertain to self-protection mechanisms, which the 
literature found to be associated more strongly with low self-esteem and vulnerable 
narcissism (Hart et al., 2018; Rohmann et al., 2012). Further, because of the tendency by 
modest/humble people to hold moderate and accurate views of one’s strengths and 
weaknesses (Davis et al., 2016), a positive correlation was expected between these 
personality traits and moral discrepancy (through upward comparisons) and self-
improvement. 
The two facets of narcissism have also been investigated in the context of 
regulatory mode theory. In a recent study, Hanke and colleagues (2019) found that the 
need to “get ahead” of others, typical of grandiose narcissists (see also Morf & 
Rhodewalt, 2001), can be fuelled by strong locomotion concerns, which emphasise 
movement and advancement. By contrast, the sense of insecurity and fear of failure that 
characterises vulnerable narcissists can be sustained by greater sensitivity to the 
evaluation of information from the social environment, which is typical of assessment 
mode. Therefore, and in accordance with Boldero and colleagues (2015), these 
correlation patterns between narcissism and regulatory mode were expected to be 
replicated in Study 4. 
Self-Growth Constructs 
Lastly, the voluntary task in the second part of the Study 4 questionnaire allowed to 
measure a few constructs related to the growth of the self that were recently developed 




The first of them was the hedonia and eudaimonia motives for activities (HEMA; 
Huta & Ryan, 2010), which the authors define as two distinct (and partly overlapping) 
motivational sources of subjective well-being: hedonia motives concern seeking 
pleasure or comfort, and eudaimonia motives seeking development or use of the best in 
oneself. Both are conceptualised as motives for acting with specific orientations, and for 
this reason both can be seen as predictors of subjective well-being broadly defined as 
“one or more subjectively experienced states or evaluations of one’s life” (Huta & Ryan, 
2010, p. 736). Hedonic and especially eudaimonic motives encompass the search for 
elevating experiences, such as awe, transcendence, connection with a greater whole and 
other broader levels of functioning (Huta & Ryan, 2010) and therefore should be 
associated with moral self-improvement processes, which are characterised by the 
elevating sense of inspiration experienced when witnessing outstanding moral deeds. 
Consequently, in Study 4 it was expected that eudaimonic motives for activities 
correlated positively with moral self-improvement. 
The second self-growth measure explored in Study 4 was the growth motivation 
index (GMI; Bauer et al., 2019), assessing the desire to foster personal growth. The 
authors describe it as a eudaimonic motive of the good life centred around personally 
meaningful self-growth pathways, which could manifest in two forms: one focused on 
the cultivation of happiness and well-being (experiential eudaimonia), and the other on 
the cultivation of wisdom and psychosocial maturity (reflective eudaimonia) (Bauer et 
al., 2008). Because of the clear reference to self-growth and improvement in areas 
pertinent to virtue and the good life, in Study 4 it was expected that the growth 
motivation index correlated positively with moral self-improvement. 
The third self-growth construct explored in Study 4 was the desire and commitment 




one’s weakness and grow as a person. Again, this measure was expected to correlate 
positively with moral self-improvement. 
If moral self-improvement showed the expected correlation patterns with 
eudaimonic motives for activities, experiential eudaimonia of the growth motivation 
index, and desire and commitment to self-improvement, these correlations would 
provide initial evidence of convergent validity for the new construct of moral self-
improvement. Also, if no significant correlations were found between these three 
constructs and moral self-defence, they would provide initial evidence of discriminant 






Study 4 was initially designed to be conducted during the months of February and 
March 2020 in the Social Processes Laboratory at Lancaster University (UK) using 
Qualtrics self-administered questionnaires run on personal computers. When data 
collection was nearly halfway through, it had to be halted due to the COVID-19 outbreak 
and the subsequent lockdown. The dataset was too small to be analysed and since there 
was no sign of a full reopening of campus for the foreseeable future, in April it was 
decided to reset, switching to online data collection69. A few minor changes were made 
to the script of the Qualtrics questionnaire to make it suitable to run online in the US 
through CloudResearch/MTurk (for consistency with Studies 2-3). The sample was also 
increased to account for the new data collection method. At its completion, it was 
noticed that data quality was poor, as nearly half of participants had to be removed 
from the sample; analysis of their answers to the check questions suggested that they 
might have not read the questions or might have answered randomly, in violation of the 
guidelines set up by MTurk. This behaviour could have been caused by the difficult 
material and psychological conditions that participants could have been experiencing 
during the lockdown. Given the unusual loss of participants, CloudResearch 
supplemented a top-up of new participants to make up for the discarded 
questionnaires. At the end of data collection, the intended sample was approximately 
achieved (further details in the Participants section). 
Experimental Design and Materials 
 




Study 4 had a between-subjects design (Fig. D1): participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two independent conditions. In each condition, participants were 
presented with one of two moral vignettes: Francia Kidney or Francia Latte (Appendix 3). 
The initial study in the laboratory was preregistered on the OSF website; the revised 
online version was registered again just after the first part of data collection, before the 
extra-sampling and, crucially, before data analysis. A structured questionnaire was made 
available to potential participants in return for payment. Repeat participants from the 
previous two studies were automatically excluded via the MTurk participant ID. 
Questionnaire Structure and Procedure 
The study had received prior ethical approval by the Faculty of Science and 
Technology Research Ethics Committee (FSTREC) at Lancaster University (UK), and was 
divided in two parts. In part one, the initial instructions informed participants that the 
study was about recall and reactions to social situations (see SMD1). To minimise 
demand characteristics, the cover story asked participants to carefully read a vignette 
describing a social situation for an episodic memory experiment, followed by some 
questions about the situation itself. After the socio-demographic questions, the moral 
self-evaluation question, the measurement of critical predictors (regulatory mode), and 
a few faking items related to participants’ perceived mnemonic abilities (to reinforce the 
cover story), participants were presented with a vignette and carried out the ostensive 
memory task (free recall of the story, used as attention check). Next, they answered the 
usual response questions involving moral judgments, self-regulation items, and an open-
ended question to allow them to freely share comments. 
Next, the study was declared finished, and participants were thanked and 
debriefed. However, at that point – unbeknownst to participants – the second part of 




offered to voluntarily take part in an additional unpaid task. They were told that they 
were under no obligation to participate, but any number of questions they would 
answer from the ensuing personality scales would have greatly helped the 
experimenter. They were also told that they could interrupt the task at any time 
(without being penalised) by simply clicking the “End” button at the bottom of each 
screen. The personality scales in the post-task comprised the constructs for the 
exploratory analyses described earlier. 
Lastly, an open-ended question allowed participants to describe their perception of 
the purpose of the study, after which they were thanked for their effort, provided with 
their MTurk code for payment, and fully debriefed, including an explanation of the post-
task and its rationale. 
Participants 
Sample Size Determination 
The sample size for the online study was predetermined based on power analysis. 
Two kinds of power analysis were conducted: one for an independent samples t-test or 
Mann-Whitman U-test, and one for mediation analysis. G*Power ver. 3.1 was used for 
the first analysis, while the second was run using Schoemann et al.’s (2017) application 
for Monte Carlo power analysis for mediation models in R. 
Power analysis for a t-test or U-test was based on the effect size of the helping 
behaviour mean difference across experimental and control conditions estimated in the 
second experiment by Schnall et al. (2010). As a conservative strategy, here the lower 
limit of the confidence interval of Schnall et al.’s effect size was taken (d = .5402). The 
total sample size to detect this effect was determined to be 88 and 92 participants, 
respectively for a one-tailed t-test and a one-tailed U-test, assuming alpha = .05, power 




Power analysis for mediation analysis was based on a model with self-improvement 
as predictor, desire to do something good as mediator, and helping behaviour as 
outcome (corresponding to hypothesis 3). Assuming alpha = .05, power = .80, and a 
standardised correlation coefficient of .30 between self-improvement and helping 
behaviour (using a more conservative estimate of the original correlation coefficient of 
.49 measured in the second experiment by Schnall et al., 2010), the required sample size 
for the experimental condition was determined to be 120 participants, hence a total 
sample of 240 participants (see SMD4 for further details). 
Because the sample size requirement for mediation analysis was more stringent 
than for a t-test or U-test, that sample size (240 participants) was regarded as more 
appropriate and augmented to 300 participants in consideration of the objective to 
analyse the post-task data and run more complex path models. 
Data Collection and Cleaning (Step 1) 
At the end of the first part of online data collection, the dataset comprised a total 
of 430 subjects. Of these, 30 did not provide consent or dropped out before providing 
consent, 26 declared to have poor English language skills, 70 dropped out before 
completing the questionnaire, 60 failed the two instructed response questions, 82 failed 
the attention check based on the free recall of the story, and 2 correctly guessed the 
purpose of the study. Having removed these subjects from the sample (following the 
preregistration plan), the remaining sample size was only 160, well below the expected 
300 participants. The loss of power was caused for the most part by the removal of 
participants who failed the attention checks based on the instructed responses and the 
free recall (142 participants). The analysis of the open-ended responses to the free recall 
questions allowed to determine the clear random nature of the responses, bearing no 




Data Collection and Cleaning (Step 2) 
The top-up sample provided 191 additional participants, of whom 7 did not give 
consent or dropped out before providing consent, 38 dropped out before completing 
the questionnaire, 9 failed the two instructed response questions, 15 failed the 
attention check based on the free recall of the story, and 9 correctly guessed the 
purpose of the study. Having removed these participants from the top-up sample, 120 
participants remained and were added up to the previous 160 to form the new total 
sample of 280, a much closer number to the expected 300 participants. 
Multivariate Outliers 
At that point, outlier analysis was conducted, reproducing the same methodology 
applied in the previous studies using the combined analysis of centred leverage values, 
Mahalanobis distance, and Cook’s distance. The observations that exceeded two out of 
three of the cutoff points determined by those values were considered extreme 
multivariate outliers. This analysis enabled the detection of 6 outliers, which were 
subsequently deleted from the sample, following the preregistered plan. 
Final Sample Composition 
After the above-mentioned exclusions, the final valid sample was composed of 274 
participants: 141 respondents allocated to the Kidney condition (experimental) and 133 
to the Latte condition (control). It comprised 125 females (45.6%), 148 males (54.0%), 
and 1 participant (0.4%) who self-reported “other” (non-binary) to the gender question. 
Age ranged from 20 to 68 years70, with median of 34 and mean of 37 years (SD = 11). All 
participants were US residents, of which 269 (98.2%) were US nationals and the 
remaining 5 (1.8%) from other nationalities. The median completion time was 15 
 
70 One participant’s answer to the age question was 1993. Given the absence of other issues on the 




minutes. There were no significant differences in the socio-demographical composition 
of the sample across the two conditions (see SMD5). 
Measures 
Many of the measures in Study 4 were the same as in Study 3 (e.g., socio-
demographic questions, moral judgment questions, moral self-regulation inventory), 
whereas others were new (helping behaviour, regulatory mode, scales measured in the 
post-task). The new measures will be described next in more detail, but a couple of 
important considerations about the moral self-regulation inventory must be discussed 
first. 
Moral Self-Regulation 
Two critical (and related) points concerning the measurement of moral self-
regulation must be emphasised for Study 4. First, moral self-regulation was measured 
through the scales consisting of ten self-improvement and twelve self-defence items. 
However, the two self-improvement and the seven self-defence items that were 
dropped from the respective final scales were also included in the questionnaire to test 
further hypotheses. For instance, the inclusion of item SI7/ForOthers was justified to 
enable the test of hypotheses 3 and 4 (Fig. D2b-c), and the inclusion of item SD4/People 
was related to the substantiation of expectations about the functioning of the self-
defence scale in the control condition. 
The latter point leads to the second important consideration about the moral self-
regulation inventory. Effectively, Study 4 was designed to investigate primarily self-
improvement and helping behaviour, thus focusing on the positive response to greater 
or smaller good deeds; the development of the control vignette (Francia Latte) and the 
formulation of the key hypotheses reflected this specific aim. Therefore, the negative 




secondary exploratory analyses limited to the experimental condition. In fact, moral self-
defence was expected to be a valid measure only for the experimental condition 
(Kidney), but not for the control condition (Latte). This is because its items were 
designed to measure self-serving defensive reactions which apply to virtuous acts of a 
certain entity, such as the donation of a kidney in the experimental vignette; however, 
many of them were not appropriate for small-scale acts of ordinary goodness (e.g., 
paying a latte for a friend in the control vignette), as they would not constitute 
instantiations of defensiveness. A couple of key examples can help clarify this important 
point. Scoring high on item SD1 (“In many ways, I have done greater deeds than 
Francia”) can be legitimately considered an overly flattering self-enhancing response 
when referred to the outstanding moral act of donating a kidney, but cannot be 
regarded as defensiveness when referred to an everyday act of kindness like paying a 
latte for a friend. For most participants it will be probably true that they have performed 
a more significant moral action than that in their lives; as such, scoring high on this item 
simply constitutes the recognition of a true fact, not a manipulation of the reality to 
favour the self beyond what objective facts would warrant, which is precisely how self-
enhancement/self-protection are defined according to Sedikides and Alicke (2012). 
Similarly, scoring high on SD3 (“It is not such an extraordinary action”) should be true for 
most people when referred to paying a latte for a friend (a truly ordinary action), while it 
would clearly indicate self-defence in the case of donating a kidney, which is an 
extraordinary action. A similar reasoning can apply to other items, such as SD10 
(“Everyone occasionally does something really good, so Francia isn’t more praiseworthy 
than anybody else”) and even items dropped from the final scale, such as SD4 (“I know 
people who have done greater deeds than Francia”), which for this reason were 




the control condition the scoring expectancy for the measurement of self-defence is 
opposite to what it should be; while in general self-defence should be lower (or 
equivalent) for accessible everyday good deeds compared to outstanding deeds, for 
these items a significantly higher score was anticipated to be found in the control 
condition because they clearly reflect an objective reality for most people. If evidence 
for this expected pattern were obtained from the data, then the self-defence scale 
would not be analysed among the Latte subsample and the total sample, and would be 
regarded as a valid measure only for the experimental condition in the secondary 
exploratory analyses71. 
New Measures 
Helping Behaviour. Amongst the new measures, helping behaviour was the most 
important, since it represented the dependent variable through which behavioural 
outcomes of moral self-regulation were measured and added to the model. It is 
important to emphasise here that the behaviour measured in the present study was 
actual behaviour, not merely a self-reported behavioural intention or propensity. The 
measure of actual helping behaviour was obtained thanks to a voluntary task offered to 
participants in the second part of the questionnaire, as described earlier in this chapter. 
When the study was designed, a deliberate attempt was made to devise a measure 
of overt helping behaviour that was not categorical (e.g., helped versus did not help). 
This was achieved by offering participants an extra-task consisting of 122 questions, 
divided into multiple personality scales. The number of questions answered would count 
as a measure of helping behaviour: the greater the number, the higher the degree of 
 
71 The identical list of moral self-regulation items (those of final inventory and the dropped items) was 
tested for the two conditions also for consistency reasons (to retain the same questionnaire regardless of 




help voluntarily offered by the participant to the experimenter. Thus, helping behaviour 
was designed as a continuous variable ranging from 0 (declined to participate in the 
post-task) to 122 (answered to all the post-task questions). The measure was not 
anticipated to be normally distributed, but it was designed to capture the nuances of a 
phenomenon that was expected to be graded, not dichotomous. 
While the order of the items within the scales in the post-task was randomised for 
all scales, the scales themselves were kept in the same order for all participants, so that 
a minimum sample size was achieved at least for the most critical measures (that were 
asked first). 
Regulatory Mode. Other than helping behaviour, the other important new measure 
of Study 4 was regulatory mode. The measure was collected in the first part of the 
questionnaire, before the presentation of the vignettes, following the flow adopted for 
regulatory focus and hedonic orientation in the previous studies. 
The regulatory mode questionnaire was developed by Kruglanski and colleagues 
(2000) and consists of twelve items for the measurement of assessment mode (three 
reverse-coded) and twelve items for the measurement of locomotion mode (two 
reverse-coded). Examples of assessment items are “I often compare myself to other 
people” and “I spend a great deal of time taking inventory of my positive and negative 
characteristics”; examples of locomotion items are “I enjoy actively doing things, more 
than just watching and observing” and “When I decide to do something, I can’t wait to 
get started”. The original version also comprises six faking items, which have not been 
included in the present study. 
The twenty-four items were presented in randomised order and participants 




were worded as in the original scales: 0 = strongly disagree, 20 = moderately disagree, 
40 = slightly disagree, 60 = slightly agree, 80 = moderately agree, 100 = strongly agree. 
Social Desirability. Socially desirable responding was measured through the short 
social desirability scale (SDS-S; Reynolds, 1982). The original social desirability scale was 
developed by Crowne and Marlowe (1960) and consisted of a thirty-three-item scale 
that over the years became widely used in social psychology. However, due to its length, 
it proved to be difficult to administer in questionnaires that already include multiple 
measures, a problem shared with other popular social desirability scales, such as the 
balanced inventory of desirable responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1994). Strahan and Gerbasi 
(1972) proposed shorter versions of Crowne and Marlowe’s questionnaire, and a decade 
later Reynolds validated three different scales, of which the third (a thirteen-item scale) 
showed the best psychometric properties. That scale (with eight reverse-coded items) 
was adopted in Study 4. Item examples are “No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a 
good listener” and “I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's 
feelings”. The items were presented in randomised order and participants answered 
using unipolar scales ranging from 0 to 100 (with slider bars), whose anchor points were 
worded as in the original scale: 0 = not at all true, 100 = very true. Higher values on the 
scale correspond to stronger socially desirable responding. 
Social Comparison Orientation. In the social comparison literature, there was not 
much to choose from to measure social comparison orientation, as very few attempts 
were made to assess individual differences in tendencies to engage in social 
comparisons; the Iowa-Netherlands comparison orientation measure (INCOM; Gibbons 
& Buunk, 1999) was the obvious choice. It consists of a bidimensional scale of two 
correlated factors, one with six items measuring the tendency toward ability-based 




toward opinion-based comparisons (one reverse-coded). Given the correlation expected 
between the two factors, only the two sub-scales were anticipated to be used in the 
analysis. 
Item examples are “If I want to find out how well I have done something, I compare 
what I have done with how others have done” and “I always like to know what others in 
a similar situation would do”. The items were presented in randomised order and 
participants answered using scales ranging from 0 to 100 (with slider bars), whose 
anchor points were worded as in the original scales: 0 = strongly disagree, 25 = disagree, 
50 = neutral (neither agree nor disagree), 75 = agree, 100 = strongly agree. 
Locus of Control. Locus of control was measured as a trait through the internal 
control index (ICI; Duttweiler, 1984). This scale has replaced the original twenty-nine-
item scale developed by Rotter (1966), which was criticised for its multidimensionality, 
forced choice format, low item total-score correlation, and inclusion of items not 
representative of the construct (Duttweiler, 1984). The ICI possesses stronger reliability 
and validity (confirmed by subsequent studies, e.g. Goodman & Waters, 1987; Meyers & 
Wong, 1988) and consists of twenty-eight items (half of them reverse-coded) that map 
onto one single factor (Jacobs, 1993). 
The items were introduced by the statement “Thinking of your normal or usual 
attitudes, feelings, or behaviours, with reference to the following statements, to what 
extent…” and items examples are “…do you like jobs where you can make decisions and 
be responsible for your own work?” and “…does what other people think have strong 
influence on your behaviour?” (reverse-coded). 
The items were presented in randomised order and participants answered using 




worded as in the original scale: 0 = rarely, 25 = occasionally, 50 = sometimes, 75 = 
frequently, 100 = usually. 
Narcissism. The scales to measure the two facets of narcissism are very common. 
Grandiose narcissism was measured through the short version of the narcissistic 
personality inventory (NPI-16; Ames et al., 2006), while the hypersensitive narcissism 
scale (HSNS; Hendin & Cheek, 1997) was used to measure vulnerable narcissism. The 
former consists of a unidimensional scale comprising sixteen items that cover the 
aspects of exhibitionism, entitlement/exploitativeness, and leadership/authority, 
whereas the latter is a unidimensional scale that includes ten items covering the aspects 
of vulnerability, hypersensitivity, and entitlement (Crowe et al., 2019). 
The original NPI-16 has a forced choice format, but in Study 4 the items were 
measured through a semantic differential of 101 points; an example of the two opposing 
statements is “I am an extraordinary person” (highest narcissistic response 
corresponding to 100) and “I am much like everybody else” (highest non-narcissistic 
response corresponding to 0). They were presented in randomised order. 
Answers to the HSNS items were provided by participants with slider bars using 
scales ranging from 0 to 100, whose anchor points were worded as in the original scale: 
0 = strongly disagree, 25 = disagree, 50 = neither agree nor disagree, 75 = agree, 100 = 
strongly agree. Item examples are “My feelings are easily hurt by ridicule or by the 
slighting remarks of others” and “I dislike sharing the credit of an achievement with 
others”. They were presented in randomised order. 
Modesty/Humility. Modesty was measured through the four questions (two 
reverse-coded) that make up the modesty sub-trait in the Honesty/Humility dimension 
of the HEXACO questionnaire (Lee & Ashton, 2004). An item example is “I wouldn’t want 




For the assessment of humility, Study 4 used the intellectual humility scale 
developed by McElroy and colleagues (2014), modified from informant-report to self-
report. The scale includes sixteen items mapping onto two correlated factors: 
intellectual arrogance (e.g., “I value winning an argument over maintaining a 
relationship”) and intellectual openness (e.g., “I am good at considering the limitations 
of my perspective”). 
The four modesty items and the sixteen intellectual humility items were mixed and 
presented in randomised order. Participants answered using scales ranging from 0 to 
100 (with slider bars), whose anchor points were: 0 = rarely, 25 = occasionally, 50 = 
sometimes, 75 = frequently, 100 = usually. 
Self-Growth Constructs. The first of the three self-growth constructs explored in 
Study 4 was hedonia and eudaimonia motives for activities (HEMA; Huta & Ryan, 2010). 
This measure consists of five items assessing hedonic motives (e.g., “Seeking 
enjoyment” and “Seeking pleasure”) and four items assessing eudaimonic motives (e.g., 
“Seeking to pursue excellence or a personal ideal” and “Seeking to use the best in 
yourself”). The nine items were presented in randomised order and participants 
answered using unipolar scales ranging from 0 to 100 (with slider bars), whose anchor 
points were worded as in the original scales: 0 = not at all, 100 = very much. 
The second self-growth construct, the growth motivation index, was assessed 
through the GMI measure developed by Bauer and colleagues (2019), who tested it in 
the U.S., Japan, Guatemala, and India. It consists of four items measuring the motive to 
cultivate critical self-reflection and intellectual development (GMI-reflective) and four 
items measuring the motive to cultivate personally meaningful activities and 
relationships (GMI-experiential). According to the authors, the former reflects wisdom 




actively seek new conceptual or philosophical perspectives from which to think about 
life, even if they mean I’ve been wrong all along”. A GMI-experiential item example is 
“The important activities in my life are activities that involve the people I love”. The 
eight items were presented in randomised order and participants answered using 
unipolar scales ranging from 0 to 100 (with slider bars), whose anchor points were 
worded as in the original scale: 0 = never, 50 = periodically, 100 = always. 
The third self-growth construct, desire and commitment for self-improvement 
(Breines & Chen, 2012), consists of seven items, for instance “I want to find 
opportunities that will challenge me and help me grow as a person” and “It’s up to me 
whether or not I continue to have certain weaknesses”. The items were presented in 
randomised order and participants answered using scales ranging from 0 to 100 (with 
slider bars), whose anchor points were worded as in the original scale: 0 = strongly 
disagree, 100 = strongly agree. 
Analytic Approach 
The final dataset was analysed using R ver. 3.6, RStudio ver. 1.3, IBM SPSS Statistics 
ver. 26, and Jamovi ver. 1.2.27 (Jamovi Project, 2020). Data analysis comprised the usual 
preliminary inspection of descriptive statistics and assumptions for statistical testing and 
estimation, as well as primary and secondary analyses, following the preregistered plan: 
 primary analyses encompassed first and foremost null hypothesis significance 
testing (and Bayes factors72) for the comparison of helping behaviour across the 
two conditions (objective 1), and also path modelling for the analysis of the possible 
conditional processes regulating the relationship between vignette and helping 
behaviour (objective 2), with the inclusion of other intervening variables in wider 
 





 secondary analyses comprised exploration of the correlation patterns of moral self-
regulation (primarily self-improvement) with the new measures collected in the 
first part of the questionnaire (regulatory mode) and in the post-task (social 
desirability, social comparison orientation, locus of control, narcissism, 






Results and Preliminary Reflections 
Descriptive Statistics 
The means of the socio-demographical variables, illustrated in Figure D3 along with 
the moral self-evaluation, were slightly more leaning toward the religious and 
conservative side of the spectrum than in the previous studies. There were no significant 
differences between the two conditions (see SMD5). 
 
Figure D3:  
Mean scores for the socio-demographical variables and the moral self-evaluation (total 




For what concerns regulatory mode, the means of the items and the scale 
composite means are illustrated in Figures D4-D5. The distributions of all the items as 
well as the scales showed non-normality, with no significant difference between 


































Figure D4:  





Figure D5:  

















































































































































































































With regard to the moral appraisals (Fig. D6), one thing to notice is the discrepancy 
in the judgments between the two conditions, particularly in terms of goodness versus 
propriety of the deeds: comparatively, paying a latte for a friend was deemed to be 
more of an obligatory than a good action (very high score on propriety, i.e. the right 
thing to do), whereas donating a kidney was considered an outstanding deed in a more 
supererogatory sense (markedly lower score on propriety). The full output can be found 
in SMD7 (including significance testing). 
 
Figure D6:  
Mean scores for the moral appraisal variables by condition, with bootstrap standard 




The mean moral discrepancy was positive for both conditions and significantly 
higher for Kidney: 11.27 (SD = 18.09) for Kidney and 0.98 (SD = 18.20) for Latte. Only 


































opposed to 42.1% in the Latte condition (Fig. D7; full analysis in SMD7, including 
significance testing). 
 
Figure D7:  





Moving on to the moral self-regulation measures, the composite means of the self-
improvement scales were respectively 64.61 (SD = 25.96) for the total sample, 76.79 (SD 
= 21.04) for the Kidney condition, and 51.69 (SD = 24.44) for the Latte condition. 
Regarding the self-defence scale, the composite mean for the Kidney condition was 
20.51 (SD = 24.78)73. The means of the moral self-regulation items of the two scales are 




73 The composite means of the self-defence scale for the Latte condition and the total sample are not 


































Figure D8:  
Mean scores of the ten self-improvement items (plus two dropped items) for the two 




Figure D9:  
Mean scores of the twelve self-defence items (plus six dropped items) for the two 










































































































































































































































As hypothesised, items SD1, SD3, SD4, SD10 (and also SD2) were rated significantly 
higher in the control condition, offering support to the notion that the self-defence scale 
cannot be considered a valid measure for the Latte vignette (and consequently the total 
sample). Therefore, the planned exploratory analyses on self-defence were carried out 
only for the experimental condition. 
Regarding the second part of the questionnaire, 181 participants (65.7%) chose not 
to help the experimenter and dropped out of the post-task without answering any 
questions; the remaining 93 participants (33.9%) who took part in the post-task 
answered an average of 18 questions (SD = 36): 22 questions in the Kidney condition (SD 
= 40) and 14 questions in the Latte condition (SD = 31). Eighteen participants (7%) 
answered all the 122 questions. 
Normality tests for the dependent variable (Tab. D1) showed that the distributions 
were not normal (see also frequency distribution and density plots in Fig. D10-D11; full 
output in SMD9)74. 
 
Table D1: 
Normality tests for the outcome variable helping behaviour (total sample and by 
vignette) 
Tab. D1a: normality tests  
Kolmogorov-Smirnova  Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig.  Statistic df Sig. 
Total sample  .350 274 <.001  .554 274 <.001 
         
Vignette 
Kidney  .343 141 <.001  .602 141 <.001 
Latte  .356 133 <.001  .494 133 <.001 
 




74 Attempts to transform the data to remove the bias (logarithmic, square root, and reciprocal 













Because only 33.9% of participants helped the experimenter through participation 




low sample size, especially those toward the end of the task. Consequently, some of the 
analyses reported later in this chapter are underpowered and should be taken with 
caution, while other planned analyses have not been reported at all. Sample sizes and 
key descriptive statistics for the post-task constructs are documented in Table D2. 
 
Table D2: 
Sample size and key descriptive statistics for the post-task constructs (total sample). 






 Short Social Desirability Scale (SDS-S) 93 52.36 15.48 0.370 0.805 
 Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation 
Measure (INCOM): 
     
- INCOM Opinion-Based Comparisons 62 63.67 17.71 -0.560 0.435 
- INCOM Ability-Based Comparisons 62 54.58 20.89 -0.517 -0.251 
 Internal Locus of Control (ICI) 47 60.90 12.72 0.859 -0.176 
 Grandiose Narcissism (NPI-16) 30 39.61 16.36 -0.364 -0.358 
 Vulnerable Narcissism (HSNS) 26 56.47 20.64 0.199 -1.297 
 Modesty (from HEXACO) 26 66.68 21.21 0.348 -1.515 
 Intellectual Humility 26 61.24 16.08 0.511 -1.292 
 Hedonia & Eudaimonia Motives for Activities 
(HEMA): 
     
- HEMA Hedonic Motives 24 71.52 18.79 -0.851 -0.188 
- HEMA Eudaimonic Motives 24 73.99 18.37 -0.618 -0.129 
 Growth Motivation Index (GMI) 23 71.59 14.78 -0.423 -0.925 




A manipulation check was carried out to ensure the deeds in the two vignettes 
were associated with significantly different perceptions of goodness, which in turn were 
hypothesised to elicit significantly different levels of moral self-improvement. 
To account for violations of normality of the dependent variables, one-tailed 
independent samples t-tests with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals were carried out: 
 on average, participants in the Kidney condition judged the deed to be morally 
better (M = 92.15, SD = 14.87) than those in the Latte condition (M = 71.24, SD = 




25.75], was statistically significant, t (221.500) = 8.773, p = .001, representing a 
large effect size of d = 1.22075; 
 on average, participants in the Kidney condition experienced a higher self-
improvement state (M = 76.79, SD = 21.04) than those in the Latte condition (M = 
51.69, SD = 24.44); without assuming equal variances, this difference, 25.10, BCa 
95% CI [19.85, 30.59], was statistically significant, t (260.851) = 9.085, p = .001, 
representing a large effect size of d = 1.10. 
Therefore, the manipulation was successful. 
Test of H1 – Differential Prosocial Effects of the Manipulation 
Following the preregistration plan, due to the bias in the distribution of helping 
behaviour, the differential effect in helping behaviour between conditions was assessed 
not only through a parametric test with bootstrapping (one-tailed independent samples 
t-test), but also a non-parametric test (one-tailed independent samples Mann-Whitney 
U-test): 
 on average, participants in the Kidney condition offered the experimenter more 
help by answering more questions (M = 22.06, SD = 39.52) than those in the Latte 
condition (M = 13.90, SD = 31.33); without assuming equal variances, a t-test 
revealed that this difference, 8.15, BCa 95% CI [0.75, 16.22], was statistically 
significant, t (260.851) = 9.085, p = .027, representing a small effect size of d = 
0.229; 
 however, a Mann-Whitney U-test showed that there was no significant difference 
in the degree of participants’ helping behaviour in the Kidney condition (Mdn = 0, 
 
75 According to Cohen’s (1988) classic guidelines, the size of an effect d can be assessed thanks to the three 




mean rank = 71) and in the Latte condition (Mdn = 0, mean rank = 67), U = 8642, p = 
.093. 
As it appears, while the t-test would reject the null hypothesis, the U-test failed to 
reject it. In the presence of conflicting results, accepting the outcome of a non-
parametric tests usually represents a more conservative and reliable strategy, because 
non-parametric tests do not rely on any specific distributional assumptions and are less 
subject to bias with lower sample sizes and outliers (Leech & Onwuegbuzie 2002). Based 
on this strategy, the null hypothesis of a non-significant difference in helping behaviour 
between the two conditions should not be rejected. However, to assess the relative 
strength of evidence for the null versus the alternative hypothesis, a Bayesian one-tailed 
Mann-Whitney U-test was conducted using Jamovi, with computation of Bayes factors. 
A Bayes factor is a ratio that contrasts the likelihood of the data under the alternative 
hypothesis and the null hypothesis (BF₊₀) (or vice versa: BF₀₊), enabling to assess how 
much more likely the data are to occur if the alternative hypothesis is true, compared to 
if the null hypothesis is true (or vice versa) (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). 
Following Jeffreys’s (1961) recommendation, given the paucity of reliable 
information available for the analysis, a safe prior to adopt was the Cauchy distribution 
(using 0.707 times the standard deviation). The Bayes factors of BF₊₀ = 0.772 / BF₀₊ = 
1.296 weakly supported the null hypothesis (Tab. D3); however, based on the guidelines 
and thresholds for the interpretation of Bayes factors recommended by Jarosz and Wiley 
(2014) and van Doorn et al. (2020), the evidence remains anecdotal and inconclusive 







One-tailed Bayesian Mann-Whitney U-Test with Bayes factors 
   BF₊₀  BF₀₊ W  
Helping Behaviour  0.772 1.296 10111 
    Note: the alternative hypothesis specifies that condition Kidney is greater than Latte. 
               Result based on data augmentation algorithm with 5 chains of 1000 iterations. 
 
 
Figure D12:  





Relationship and Mechanism: Mediation Tests 
Hypotheses H2, H3, and H4 identified three potential mechanisms for the 
transmission of a significant effect of moral self-improvement to helping behaviour: a 
direct effect (H2), a mediated effect through the desire to do something good for others 
(H3), and a moderated effect with an interaction between self-improvement and the 
desire to do something good for others (H4). These hypotheses were tested among the 
total sample, fitting path models with observed variables with the MLR estimator across 




the above-mentioned approach was preferred to bootstrapping mediation analysis 
based on regression for two main reasons: a) path models (and SEM in general) 
incorporate and test causal assumptions, whereas regression methods do not (see 
Bollen & Pearl, 2013); b) path models utilise the maximum likelihood estimator instead 
of ordinary least squares, thus prioritising accuracy of the coefficient estimates (rather 
than of the predicted values), which is recommended for theory testing (see Kline, 
2016). Additionally, model fitness measures (unavailable with regression) can be 
obtained. 
Test of H2 – Simple Mediation Model 
To test hypothesis 2, a simple mediation model was fitted, with vignette as 
predictor, moral self-improvement as mediator, and helping behaviour as outcome. The 
revised path diagram76 with standardised regression weights is illustrated in Figure D13 




76 The models portrayed in Figures D13-D15 slightly differ from the hypothesised models in Figures D2a-c as 
they only include significant pathway coefficients (essentially, the non-significant direct relationship 
between vignette and helping behaviour was omitted, and revised models were fitted and reported with 





Figure D13:  
Results from path analysis with observed variables, test of H2 – simple mediation. 
Revised model with only significant pathways (standardised regression weights). 










Main fit indices of the path model to test simple mediation among the total sample 
 Tot. Sample 
Chi-Square (scaled) .312 
df (scaled) 1 
p-value (scaled) .577 
  
RMSEA (scaled) <.001 
p-value (scaled) .662 
  
CFI (scaled) 1.000 







The relationship between moral self-improvement and helping behaviour was 
positive and significant, with a regression weight of .18 (p < .001), supporting H2. When 
analysed by group (i.e., by vignette), the regression weights for both vignettes are 
positive and significant: .16 (p < .001) for the Kidney condition, and .13 (p = .048) for the 
Latte condition. The mediation effect was -.09 (p < .001) (full output in SMD10). 





To test hypothesis 3, a serial mediation model was fitted, with vignette as predictor, 
moral self-improvement and desire to do something good (item SI7) as sequential 
mediators, and helping behaviour as outcome. The revised path diagram with significant 
standardised regression weights is illustrated in Figure D14 and the main fit indices 
reported in Table D5 (full output in SMD10). 
 
Figure D14:  
Results from path analysis with observed variables, test of H3 – serial mediation. Revised 
model with only significant pathways (standardised regression weights). Estimator: 









Main fit indices of the path model to test serial mediation among the total sample 
 Tot. Sample 
Chi-Square (scaled) .312 
df (scaled) 1 
p-value (scaled) .577 
  
RMSEA (scaled) <.001 
p-value (scaled) NA 
  
CFI (scaled) 1.000 











There was no significant relationship between the desire to do something good and 
helping behaviour among the total sample (and by vignette), and therefore the action 
tendency item SI7 did not function as a mediator between moral self-improvement and 
helping behaviour (H3 was not supported by the data, full output in SMD10). This finding 
could imply that the composition of the moral SI scale, even without item SI7, retained 
other action tendency items capable per se to promote prosocial behaviour, although 
future research will have to further investigate this effect. 
Test of H4 – Moderated Mediation Model 
To test hypothesis 4, a moderated mediation model was fitted, with vignette as 
predictor, moral self-improvement as mediator, desire to do something good (item SI7) 
as moderator, and helping behaviour as outcome. The revised path diagram with 
significant standardised regression weights is illustrated in Figure D15 and the main fit 
indices, all poor, are reported in Table D6 (full output in SMD10). 
 
Figure D15:  
Results from path analysis with observed variables, test of H4 – moderated mediation. 
Revised model with only significant pathways (standardised regression weights). 












Main fit indices of the path model to test moderated mediation among the total sample 
 Tot. Sample 
Chi-Square (scaled) 262.812 
df (scaled) 3 
p-value (scaled) <.001 
  
RMSEA (scaled) .562 
p-value (scaled) <.001 
  
CFI (scaled) .582 







There was no significant interaction between moral self-improvement and the 
desire to do something good among the total sample (p = .214), and the action tendency 
item SI7 did not function as a moderator between moral self-improvement and helping 
behaviour. Thus, hypothesis 4 was not supported by the data: no evidence was found 
that the level of helping behaviour induced by a moral deed had different intensity 
depending on the desire to do something good for others (full output in SMD10). 
Regulatory Mode: Correlation Patterns 
Following the preregistered analysis plan, Pearson’s zero-order correlation 
coefficients were computed and tested one-tailed77 for locomotion and assessment 
mode among the total sample. Table D7 documents correlations between the two 










Zero-order correlations between the regulatory mode and moral appraisals (total 
sample) 











Pearson Correlation 1 .001 .129* .246*** .228*** -.116* 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .494 .016 <.001 <.001 .028 
N 274 274 274 274 274 274 
Bootstrapc 
Bias 0 -.001 -.001 <.001 .001 .001 




Lower . -.123 .032 .124 .125 -.224 
Upper . .128 .230 .357 .335 .013 
Assessment 
Mode 
Pearson Correlation .001 1 .044 .031 .012 .036 
Sig. (1-tailed) .494  .232 .305 .421 .275 
N 274 274 274 274 274 274 
Bootstrapc 
Bias -.001 0 -.002 .001 -.002 <.001 




Lower -.123 . -.062 -.066 -.088 -.076 
Upper .128 . .150 .134 .116 .138 
Note:         * p < .05 (1-tailed)                         *** p < .001 (1-tailed). 
                   c. Bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
 
 
The first finding concerns the non-significance of the correlation between 
locomotion and assessment among the total sample. This finding is consistent with the 
literature (Kruglanski et al., 2000). The second finding concerns the non-significance of 
the correlations between assessment mode and all the main moral appraisal variables; 
by contrast, locomotion mode was positively correlated with the agent evaluation, as 
well as with the goodness and propriety of the deed, and negatively correlated with 
moral discrepancy. 
The correlations between regulatory mode and moral self-regulation were assessed 
among participants in the experimental condition (Kidney) to obtain a valid measure of 
association for self-defence. As expected, results exhibited positive correlations 
between locomotion mode and self-improvement, and between assessment mode and 
self-defence (Tab. D8). No significant correlations were found between locomotion and 






Zero-order correlations between regulatory mode and moral self-regulation (Kidney 
condition) 







Pearson Correlation 1 .058 .434*** .015 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .248 <.001 .430 
N 141 141 141 141 
Bootstrapc 
Bias 0 -.002 -.001 -.003 
Std. Error 0 .093 .080 .068 
BCa 95% C.I. 
Lower . -.127 .259 -.123 
Upper . .229 .586 .144 
Assessment 
Mode 
Pearson Correlation .058 1 .034 .234** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .248  .344 .003 
N 141 141 141 141 
Bootstrapc 
Bias -.002 0 .001 -.002 
Std. Error .093 0 .077 .060 
BCa 95% C.I. 
Lower -.127 . -.115 .113 
Upper .229 . .180 .343 
Note:         ** p < .01 (1-tailed)                         *** p < .001 (1-tailed). 
                   c. Bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
 
 
A Wider Behavioural Model of Moral Self-Improvement 
Building on all these findings, a wider path model of moral self-improvement was 
fitted among the total sample, inclusive of helping behaviour as outcome variable and 
motivational and moral appraisal variables as predictors and mediators. 
The fitted model is depicted in Figure D16 and its main fit indices are documented 







Figure D16:  
Wider self-improvement path model with observed variables for the total sample. 













Main fit indices of the wider self-improvement path model for the total sample 
 Tot. Sample 
Chi-Square (scaled) 13.802 
df (scaled) 7 
p-value (scaled) .055 
  
RMSEA (scaled) .060 
p-value (scaled) .314 
  
CFI (scaled) . 983 







The model showed good fit across all the main indices. Moral self-improvement 
was the only conduit to helping behaviour, which was not predicted by any other 




goodness of the deed and locomotion mode (positively), but not by moral discrepancy, 
presumably due to the numerically low incidence of downward comparisons, 
particularly in the Francia Kidney subsample (as in Study 2). Moral discrepancy was 
predicted positively by the goodness and propriety of the deed, but also negatively by 
locomotion, consistent with the correlation coefficient examined earlier. Locomotion 
was also positively associated with goodness and propriety of the deed, thus exhibiting a 
similar pattern to that observed for approach in Study 3. The variable vignette 
negatively predicted the goodness of the deed, but contrary to Study 3, positively 
predicted the propriety of the deed. This phenomenon can be better understood by 
examining the results from structural invariance analysis by group (by vignette). An 
unconstrained model, whereby all parameters were freely estimated for each condition, 
was compared to a fully constrained model, whereby all parameters (regression weights 
and intercepts) were constrained to be equal between conditions. The result of the 
structural invariance test showed that the two conditions, at a model-wide level, were 
significantly different (see Tab. D10; full output in SMD11). What this finding implies is 
that the condition (vignette) behaved as a model-wide moderator of the relationship 
between the predictors and the behavioural outcome (helping behaviour) (see e.g., 
Sarstedt et al., 2011). 
 
Table D10: 
Structural invariance test by condition (total sample) 
Model df AIC BIC χ2 χ2 diff. df diff. Sig. 
Unconstrained 10 11948 12092 23.737    
Fully constrained 24 12094 12188 198.603 167.84 14 <.001*** 






Having ascertained the lack of structural invariance, two distinct models were 
fitted, one for each condition. Both achieved satisfactory fit (Tab. D11). 
 
Table D11: 
Main fit indices of the wider path models for the two vignettes 
 Kidney Latte 
Chi-Square (scaled) 8.761 11.248 
df (scaled) 5 7 
p-value (scaled) .119 .128 
   
RMSEA (scaled) .073 .068 
p-value (scaled) .262 .294 
   
CFI (scaled) .981 .963 
TLI (scaled) .942 .920 
GFI .999 .999 
AGFI .994 .995 
AIC 6067.135 5873.418 
BIC 6126.110 5925.444 
 
 
The fitted models with their significant pathways are illustrated in Figure D17a-b 








Figures D17a-b:  
Wider self-improvement path models with observed variables for the two conditions. 









The fundamental driver of the lack of structural invariance between the two models 
was represented by the relationship between the goodness and the propriety of the 
deed. The non-significance of the pathway in the control condition reflects the construal 
of the deed (paying a latte for a friend who forgot her wallet) as a morally due action 




deed in the experimental condition (donating a kidney) underlies its construal as an 
outstanding action well beyond the call of duty (supererogatory), as also confirmed by 
the analysis of the means (Fig. D6). 
What was invariant between the two vignettes, though, was the association 
between self-improvement and helping behaviour (regression weights of .15 vs .13, 
respectively in the Kidney and Latte conditions). Thus, this finding confirms that, 
although donating a kidney was viewed as a significantly better moral deed that evoked 
a significantly higher level of self-improvement, there was no conclusive evidence that 
the two actions inspired significantly different degrees of helping behaviour. 
Exploratory Analyses (Post-Task Constructs) 
Due to the low sample sizes, the measures collected in the post-task allowed 
merely partial and preliminary understanding. Only correlation analysis for the 
constructs of social desirability and social comparison orientation are reported here 
(further information in SMD12), as the samples are comparatively higher than for the 
other constructs (see Tab. D2). All the variable associations were tested one-tailed78 and 
expressed through zero-order Pearson’s correlation coefficients with bootstrap 
confidence intervals. More complex modelling was not possible. 
Social Desirability 
Socially desirable responding was anticipated to be associated positively with self-
improvement and negatively with self-defence. The results of the analysis confirmed this 
expectation: the SDS-S correlated positively with self-improvement (r = .243, p = .009; 
 




among total sample) and negatively with self-defence (r = -.417, p = .001; among Kidney 
subsample79). 
Social Comparison Orientation 
Social comparison orientation was expected to be positively associated with 
defensive regulation, particularly driven by ability-based comparisons. The results of the 
analysis showed that ability-based comparison tendencies did correlate positively with 
self-defence (r = .421, p = .005; among Kidney subsample), but also with self-
improvement, albeit to a lesser degree (r = .343, p = .003; among total sample). Opinion-
based comparison tendencies correlated positively with self-improvement (r = .323, p = 
.006; among total sample), but not with self-defence (r = .082, p = .314; among Kidney 
subsample). 
The expected positive correlation between social comparison orientation and 
assessment mode was also found among the total sample, especially strong for ability-
based comparison tendencies (r = .509, p < .001). Locomotion did not correlate with 
either ability- or opinion-based comparison orientations (respectively, r = -.068, p = .301, 










Study 4 was designed as an integration to the structural models obtained from 
Study 3. Its main purpose was to add a behavioural component to the models, 
investigating the prosocial effects of moral self-improvement, thus supplementing a 
measure of concurrent validity. To achieve this goal, the study assessed the extent an 
outstanding moral deed elicited a significantly different degree of helping behaviour 
from an ordinary act of kindness (objective 1). In addition, it measured alternative 
potential mechanisms (and the magnitude) of the relationship between moral self-
improvement and helping behaviour under the described experimental conditions 
(objective 2). 
The design was inspired by two experiments published by Schnall et al. (2010), 
modified to achieve two further goals: first, by using in the control condition a moral 
stimulus (a mild act of everyday kindness) instead of a non-moral one (a nature 
documentary in Schnall’s experiment 1 or a funny story in experiment 2), the full moral 
self-improvement model, inclusive of the moral judgments and self-regulatory variables, 
could be re-tested and integrated with a behavioural outcome80. Second, by adapting 
the post-task and using relevant personality scales instead of a boring mathematical 
exercise (Schnall’s experiment 2), extra-measures could be obtained for exploratory 
purposes (objective 3). 
Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic 
Data collection took place under unusual conditions related to the COVID-19 
pandemic. The initial study in the laboratory in the UK had to be interrupted due to the 
lockdown and adapted to become suitable to an online environment. This solution did 
 





not prevent further issues from emerging soon after: about half of the participants 
recruited from the CloudResearch/MTurk platform did not follow the questionnaire 
guidelines and had to be removed from the sample. Given the exceptional 
circumstances, a top-up of participants was implemented so that the intended sample 
size was approximately achieved. 
As a general consideration, it is fair to say that Study 4 was impacted by the COVID-
19 pandemic just as much as many other online studies conducted between the end of 
winter and the beginning of summer 2020. The impact could be due to structural and 
behavioural changes occurred during that time span among popular crowdsourcing 
platforms. A recent analysis (Arechar & Rand, 2020) has provided evidence of a shift in 
the composition of MTurk samples during the lockdown, with new workers 
characterised by different socio-demographic profiles entering the platform (younger, 
more male, non-white, and conservative). At the same time, a behaviour change was 
noticed, as the new workers were found to be up to twenty percentage points more 
likely to fail attention checks, respond carelessly and inconsistently. This general trend 
was reflected in the issues experienced with Study 4, where nearly half of participants in 
the first part of online data collection failed the attention checks; additionally, the final 
sample was indeed more male, conservative, and religious/spiritual than, for example, in 
Study 3. 
Despite these issues, it should be recognised that, given the existing constraints, 
the actions undertaken to minimise disruption, convert the study to an online platform, 
and achieve satisfactory power represented effective countermeasures. 
Significance of the Main Findings 
Thanks to those corrective actions, the results of Study 4 seem for the most part to 




moral action were associated with helping behaviour in the sample. At the same time, 
the hypothesis that the two conditions were significantly different in terms of helping 
behaviour was not upheld by the data: the mild act of ordinary kindness in the control 
condition, although judged as significantly less remarkable than the truly outstanding 
moral deed in the experimental condition, ended up generating a similar degree of help 
even in the presence of significantly different levels of moral self-improvement. It is 
possible that the level of self-improvement in the experimental and control conditions 
was high enough to elicit a comparable amount of help, or that an exogenous variable, 
left outside of the remit of Study 4, was the common cause across the two conditions. 
Either way, a clear causal link between moral self-improvement and helping behaviour 
could not be established and should be further investigated, because the evidence in 
favour of the null hypothesis was anecdotal and more research will be necessary to 
ascertain the true nature of the effect in the population (if any). 
This result may have been affected by the design and some residual demand 
characteristics. Despite the cover story, participants knew that they were under 
experimental conditions. The presentation of the vignettes in isolation within each 
condition (between-subjects design) might have produced a slightly inflated degree of 
prosociality in the control group. In future research, it could be considered to show 
participants across conditions an initial vignette to warm them up and frame their 
response; reactions to the following experimental stimuli would then be anchored to a 
common set of baseline measures, which could be used to calibrate the ensuing 
variables. This kind of pre-task, common to the two conditions, could enhance the 
accuracy of the comparison between them, but would affect the measurement of the 




Future research could also consider designs with alternative control conditions. To 
retain the same framework adopted in the present research, a comparison of the 
experimental condition depicting a remarkable moral action with a control condition 
showing another action seems necessary81. In addition, to justify a questionnaire 
centred on morality (moral appraisal questions, moral self-regulation inventory) the 
control deed should be, as in Study 4, as small as possible, but still morally relevant82; it 
should preferably be normative83, and perhaps in a domain leaving others in the 
background and implicating the self more directly (e.g., purity). 
The kind of prosocial behaviour measured in Study 4 was helping behaviour. It was 
an exogenous measure of actual behaviour: exogenous because helping the 
experimenter by filling out personality scales did not bear any resemblance to the moral 
deed that elicited help, and actual behaviour because it was real overt behaviour, not 
just dispositions or intentions to help. Indeed, the desire to do something good for 
others (a measure of action tendencies dropped from the moral self-improvement 
inventory in Study 3) neither was conducive to helping behaviour nor interacted with 
self-improvement in the prediction of helping behaviour; thus, it did not function as 
either a mediator or a moderator, despite its strong correlation with self-improvement. 
The self-improvement construct, thanks to the indicators that shape it, directly 
translated into helping behaviour, without any conditional processes related to helping 
 
81 Designing a control condition with the behavioural task immediately following the introductory 
sociodemographic questions (i.e., with no moral stimulus and no appraisal and regulatory questions) would 
likely lead to high demand characteristics, endangering the validity of the measurement: participants’ 
knowledge of being in an experimental setting could make them behave (if only non-consciously) in a way 
that is consistent with what they might assume is the experimenter’s intent, resulting in a paradoxical 
higher degree of help in the control than in the experimental condition. 
82 A control condition depicting a non-moral action would likely cause a high rate of participant confusion 
and drop-out, due to the irrelevance of the appraisal and self-regulatory questions specifically centred on 
morality. 




desire (limited to the measures collected in Study 4). This finding addressed the question 
of what sort of mechanism affects the relationship between self-improvement and 
helping behaviour84. 
When considering the wider nomological network of moral self-regulation and its 
prosocial effects, Study 4 offered at least two novel insights. The first concerned the 
results from the analysis of regulatory mode, another important predictor from the 
motivation triad that also includes hedonic orientation and regulatory focus. As 
expected, locomotion mode was found to correlate positively with self-improvement, 
and assessment mode to correlate positively with self-defence. In the self-improvement 
portion of the path model, locomotion worked similarly to promotion focus and 
approach temperament, positively correlating with self-improvement and downward 
comparison. 
The second insight highlighted how judgments of propriety and goodness of moral 
deeds were underpinned by their fundamental construal in terms of obligation and 
supererogation. This learning was already partly brought to life by the results of Studies 
2-3 through the comparison of Nicholas’s and Francia’s deeds, but became more evident 
in Study 4 thanks to the sharper contrast between a mild act of everyday kindness 
(control condition) and an outstanding moral action (experimental condition): paying a 
latte for a friend who forgot her wallet was “the right thing to do” (obligation) to a 
greater extent than donating a kidney, which in turn was a greater moral deed, far 
beyond the call of duty (supererogation). Beside this analysis of the means of the moral 
judgments, consideration of the regression weights (and their sign) lent further credit to 
this interpretation: among the total sample, the variable vignette negatively predicted 
 




the goodness of the act (i.e., the deed in the Kidney condition was morally better), but 
positively predicted the propriety of the act (i.e., the deed in the Latte condition was 
more morally due). The analysis of the path model by vignette made this finding even 
more striking: whereas in the Latte condition there was no significant correlation 
between goodness and propriety (a considerable number of participants judged the 
deed obligatory and not necessarily particularly good), a very strong one was found in 
the Kidney condition (the deed was remarkable just as much as it was the right thing to 
do). Critically, whereas propriety alone was unable to induce self-improvement 
processes in the Latte condition, the coincidence of judgments of high goodness and 
high propriety did elicit high self-improvement states in the Kidney condition. Further, at 
total sample level, the vignette predicted the goodness/propriety of the deed and 
(directly and indirectly) self-improvement, functioning as a model-wide moderator of 
the relationship between all the model predictors and helping behaviour85. 
Although future research will have to solidify our understanding of the causal links 
between moral self-improvement and prosocial behaviour, the findings overall provide 
at least correlational evidence of the social relevance of the SR of virtue. The integration 
of a behavioural component in the study of the self-regulation of virtue remains one of 
the crucial features of future endeavours in the field. 
Limitations 
The conditions under which Study 4 was carried out were more challenging 
compared to the previous studies due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the 
face of all the difficulties, a lot of care was devoted to putting in place measures that 
could effectively address the problems that arose. The data collected in the laboratory 
 
85 The absence of structural invariance between vignettes was essentially driven by the different 




had to be discarded, so the study was converted to an online methodology. The initial 
online sample was affected by unusual non-compliant participant behaviour, so a top-up 
of participants was supplemented to complete the sampling plan and achieve 
approximately the intended power. The effect size of the relationship between moral 
self-improvement and helping behaviour was considerably smaller than the expectation 
based on a conservative estimate from previous research; consequently, the exploratory 
analysis of the measures collected in the post-task was underpowered and must be 
taken with caution. Where the sample was large enough, a few correlational patterns 
were reported because they could be reasonably utilised to inform predictions for future 
confirmatory research, but more complex modelling could not be undertaken. Where 
modelling was feasible, for the most important measures, it was conducted with path 
analysis using observed variables instead of full structural modelling with latent 
variables. This solution was adopted for consistency reasons, so that all the hypotheses 
were modelled with the same approach, including the moderated mediation model, for 
which notoriously interactions with latent variables with many indicators are extremely 
challenging with full SEM. This simplification was deemed reasonable in light of the fact 
that in the wider models examined in Study 4 only locomotion and self-improvement 
could have been treated as latent variables (recall that, by contrast, in Study 3 most of 
the variables were latent). Therefore, not modelling the error in path analysis should 
have had limited impact on the regression weight estimates and the fit indices. Lastly, 
another solution adopted for consistency reasons was the fitting of all the path models 
with the MLR estimator86. 
  
 
86 The one and only categorical variable was vignette in the analyses among the total sample, and the 




General Discussion and Conclusive Remarks 
 
In the ancient world, in both Western and Eastern societies, moral teaching 
revolved around the characterisation of virtue through noteworthy human beings of 
impeccable moral character (see e.g., Solomon et al., 2008). The works and the life of 
philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in the West, Lao-Tzu, Confucius, and 
the Buddha in the East, testify this commitment to moral education through virtue and 
virtuous exemplars. 
The centrality of virtue was eclipsed in Western thought starting from the scientific 
revolution and especially during the age of enlightenment, as the focus gradually shifted 
from moral character to right behaviour, with the rise of ethical codes based on the 
moral imperative (Kant) and utilitarian reasoning (Bentham and Mill). The return to 
prominence of virtue began in the late 1950s in philosophy (Anscombe, 1958) and was 
embraced soon after by the behavioural and social sciences with the movements of, 
among others, humanistic and positive psychology. The present research can be 
considered part of this line of inquiry: through the investigation of the reactions to the 
noble actions of virtuous people, moral excellence has been put back centre stage, 
offering new food for thought about how psychology can contribute to better 
understanding what role the bright side of human nature can still have in contemporary 
societies to inspire people to better themselves and behave in ways that are socially 
desirable. 
Methods 
Capitalising on the recommendations by Dubin (1969), the methodological 
approach was designed to make large of use generative/exploratory techniques before 




testable hypotheses based on a sound blend of deductive (theory-based) and inductive 
(data-driven) reasoning. 
In an open science project that included four studies in the US and UK (N=1,814), 
participants were presented with uplifting stories of human goodness in the form of 
vignettes, where virtuous people performed good actions to the benefit of others and 
through various degrees of personal cost. These vignettes were created specifically for 
this research, building on the recommendations by Christensen and Gomila (2012) to 
facilitate comparability and replicability. 
The questionnaire, and more generally the research design and procedure, were 
structurally similar across the four studies (Fig. V). Participants, following a few general 
questions about themselves, including a moral self-evaluation, made judgments about 
the level of goodness and propriety of the deeds, and drew inferences about the moral 
character of the protagonists of the stories, making attributions from situational and 
personal cues, and reporting the feelings they experienced. As a result of their cognitive, 
affective, and conative states, they also accepted or declined to participate in an unpaid 
voluntary task to help the experimenter, filling out a few additional personality scales, 
thus providing a measure of helping behaviour. 
Hypotheses and Conceptual Model 
In moral psychology, research and theorising on moral goodness have already shed 
light on some of the psychological processes implicated in the reactions to others’ 
virtuous actions. These were mostly independent endeavours that investigated either 
the uplifting positive emotions of moral elevation (e.g., Haidt, 2000, 2003) and kama 
muta (Blomster Lyshol et al., 2020), or the dysfunctional phenomenon of moral 
resentment and do-gooder derogation (e.g., Minson & Monin, 2012). Partly inspired by 




theoretical model capable of integrating these perspectives, identifying the workings of 
the self (see Leary & Tangney, 2012) as the central psychological function that could 
provide a more thorough explanation of why some people react positively and others 
negatively when they are exposed to displays of human virtue. The research 
hypothesised the existence of two distinguishable kinds of moral responses, each 
characterised by distinctive sets of self-regulatory mechanisms: one socially adaptive 
defined “moral self-improvement” and the other ultimately dysfunctional defined 
“moral self-defence”. These mechanisms were anticipated to be the result of moral 
comparative processes, to be associated with specific motivational dispositions, and to 
impact individuals’ social behaviour. 
Main Findings 
Analysis of the response to the moral exemplars in the vignettes unearthed how 
complex and multifaceted the human nature can be; as expected, all participant samples 
across the four studies experienced both positive and negative reactions to others’ 
moral excellence, as a result of the processes through which the self negotiates its 
standing and standards vis-à-vis the moral agents and their deeds. 
Participants exhibited the two hypothesised moral self-regulatory modes. Some 
praised the moral agents, felt uplifted by their actions and inspired to better themselves 
(moral self-improvement); others felt threatened, denigrated the moral agents and 
dismissed the goodness of their actions, inferring ulterior motives and experiencing 
resentment (moral self-defence). 
Among the critical antecedents of these self-regulatory modes were specific 
judgments about the moral deeds and the agents, which subsumed moral comparisons 
based on opinion and ability, in line with Festinger’s (1954) original social comparison 




significant portion of the variance of respectively self-improvement and self-defence. 
Opinion-based comparisons were strong predictors for moral deeds susceptible to a 
wider spectrum of judgments (e.g., Nicholas’s fight against discrimination), including 
lower ratings on the goodness and propriety of the deed, which explained defensive 
regulation. 
Although comparative processes are ubiquitous (Dunning, 2000; Hoorens, 2011), 
the present research showed that people exhibited different degrees of proneness to 
engage in moral comparisons, in line with Gibbons & Buunk (1999): individuals with 
strong externalities reverted more frequently to comparisons than those who relied 
predominantly on internal standards (Duttweiler, 1984; Rotter, 1975). Simple everyday 
acts of kindness tended to feed moral comparisons more than truly outstanding acts of 
goodness, due to the greater perceived self-other similarity (Wills, 1991) and reassuring 
accessibility of the deed. 
Moral judgments/comparisons and self-regulation were also associated with 
specific motivational factors. The present research examined the impact of 
approach/avoidance (Elliot & Thrash, 2002), regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997), and 
regulatory mode (Kruglanski et al., 2000), identifying distinctive patterns through which 
they affected the moral response, directly or indirectly. All other things being equal, 
motivational drivers such as approach (or promotion focus) and prevention focus, 
showed greater predictive power than moral comparisons when the deed was perceived 
more universally as highly positive (e.g., Francia’s organ donation). 
In line with extant social cognitive theories (Bandura, 1991; Zimmerman, 2005), 
there was evidence that moral self-improvement, far from being an “inert” internal 
process, was rather in the service of behaviour: self-improvement was linked with actual 




sample) than hypothesised based on previous studies on moral elevation (Schnall et al., 
2010). This relationship was not mediated or moderated by the desire to do something 
good for others (a critical action tendency item dropped from the final inventory in 
Study 3), providing evidence that the structure of the final self-improvement scale 
includes action tendencies that are in direct relationship with prosocial behaviour. 
Surprisingly and against predictions, a smaller deed (paying a latte for a friend who 
forgot her wallet) and a greater deed (donating a kidney to a friend at risk of organ 
failure) did not reveal any conclusive evidence of a significant difference in the degree of 
prosociality that they triggered. Therefore, this particular result is deserving of further 
investigation before a clear causal relationship can be claimed. 
Theoretical Contributions 
The study of virtue – and morality more broadly – has its roots in philosophy, from 
the legacy of the ancient Greek forefathers (Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle) up to the 
more recent contributions by Anscombe, MacIntyre, and Rawls in the twentieth century. 
Psychology owes a great deal to philosophy, but over time has grown as an independent 
discipline, branching into different strands of research and theorising, among which 
moral psychology retains a lot of common ground. The present research project has 
borrowed multiple concepts originally defined and refined in moral philosophy (virtue, 
moral character, eudaimonia, supererogation, just to mention a few), investigating them 
as part of an inquiry into the psychological processes elicited by moral goodness. To do 
so, a self-regulation approach was adopted, enabling the integration of the above-
mentioned independent lines of research, and injecting new life into them. 
Self-regulation has been conceived of here in its broader meaning, encompassing 
both explicit and implicit processes (Carver & Scheier, 2016; Forgas et al., 2009), thus 




that is, self-control, willpower, and other executive functions (see e.g., Baumeister et al., 
2006). The moral regulatory processes examined in the present research (i.e., moral self-
improvement and self-defence) include respectively broadening self-growth processes 
(Sedikides & Hepper, 2009) and self-serving enhancement and protection mechanisms 
(Sedikides & Alicke, 2012), which map onto the two most fundamental regulatory 
functions that evolved for the expansion and the preservation of the self (Pyszczynski et 
al., 2012). 
The literature on self-improvement comprises two theoretical traditions: the 
humanistic and the achievement strands (Sedikides & Hepper, 2009). The construct of 
moral self-improvement examined here is rooted in ethical strivings, and therefore is 
more closely linked with the schools of humanistic (Maslow, 1954) and positive 
psychology (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), which emphasise the growth of the self as a 
eudaimonic endeavour aiming at human flourishing and social harmonisation (Bauer et 
al., 2015). On the other hand, the literature on self-defence was initially developed in a 
psychodynamic framework (Freud, 1894), but the present research has drawn primarily 
on social psychology theorising on self-enhancement and self-protection (Alicke & 
Sedikides, 2009), social desirability and self-deception (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; 
Paulhus et al., 1997). 
Analysing the response to virtuous acts through the lens of self-regulation allowed 
the current research to embrace but also broaden the perspective taken up by existing 
studies on emotion, whether positive emotions such as moral elevation (Schnall et al., 
2010) and kama muta (Blomster Lyshol et al., 2020), or negative emotions such as 
resentment and do-gooder derogation (Minson & Monin, 2012). The present research 
has shown that it is not just an emotional state elicited by a good deed that relates to 




self, energised to approach desired end-states and avoid undesired end-states through 
promotion and prevention strategies, negotiates its moral position against other people 
and referential standards (beliefs, values, ideals, norms). The self was also found to be at 
the centre of the upstream processes that elicit self-improvement and self-defence: 
comparative and motivational mechanisms. These cover a lot of ground in the social 
psychology literature, gravitating toward the more dated work on social comparison by 
Festinger (and his students and followers), and the vast opus in contemporary 
motivation science by psychologists such as Higgins, Kruglanski, Elliot, and colleagues on 
regulatory focus, regulatory mode, and approach/avoidance. 
In a nutshell, by observing from a self-regulation viewpoint the processes elicited by 
exposure to acts of virtue performed by people of admirable moral character, it was 
possible to combine in a single model the cybernetic mechanisms of key motivational 
drivers and comparative processes that – taken together – trigger regulatory functions 
of the self associated with social behaviour. 
While acknowledging certain methodological limitations and substantive 
ambiguities in the findings, the harmonisation of all these literatures and conceptual 
perspectives under a coherent unified self-regulatory framework constitutes the most 
crucial substantive theoretical contribution of the present research. 
Methodological Advances 
Stimuli 
The use of vignettes is not new in moral psychology, but those developed for the 
present research programme share specific features that are relatively novel and worth 
noting. Prior studies on positive emotions (elevation, awe, etc.) have used mainly videos 
(e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Erickson et al., 2017; Lai et al., 2014; Schnall et al., 2010; 




Aquino et al. (2011), and Thomson and Siegel (2013), who used written stories. The text 
told true stories, and visuals were juxtaposed to make the narrative more realistic and 
engaging. Compared to videos, this kind of stimulus has the advantage of being easier to 
administer in online research among participants who own simpler technology or are 
less computer savvy, and are more flexible to develop, pre-test, modify, and re-test. 
Furthermore, to make research with moral vignettes more comparable and 
reproducible, the present investigation followed recommendations (Christensen & 
Gomila, 2012; Clifford et al., 2015) to standardise as much as possible format and 
content elements, so that more rigorous control could be achieved. 
The result was satisfactory, as the twelve vignettes created and tested in Study 1 
delivered on the objectives of the research, particularly three of them (Francia, Nicholas, 
and Ruxandra). Francia and Nicholas were used again in Studies 2-3 to refine the 
measurement and structural models, and a new one was created and tested as control 
stimulus in Study 4 against Francia; Ruxandra was put aside due to resource constraints, 
but still represents a valuable option for future research. 
Moral Self-Regulation Inventory 
The present research has also developed and assessed a new measurement 
instrument for two modes of moral self-regulation. The inventory encapsulates 
cognitive, conative, and affective indicators that measure type and level of the moral 
response to acts of virtue performed by moral exemplars. 
The moral self-improvement scale partly overlaps with some measures of moral 
elevation used, for example, by Schnall et al. (2010), Aquino et al. (2011), and Thomson 
& Siegel (2013). However, whereas these are just a set of items collated to assess 
various components of the related moral emotion, the moral self-improvement scale is a 




indicators that have been developed and pre-screened (Study 1), and subsequently 
assessed in exploratory factor analysis (Study 2) and confirmatory factor analysis (Study 
3), exhibiting good psychometric properties. A measure of concurrent validity (helping 
behaviour) was also provided, while measures designed to provide convergent validity 
(HEMA, growth motivation, etc.) will require larger sample sizes. 
The moral self-defence scale is new altogether. The item indicators that compose it 
have been inspired by disparate sources, indirectly by the psychoanalytic tradition 
(Freud, 1894) and more directly by the theoretical frameworks of self-enhancement and 
self-protection (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; Hepper et al., 2010). Again, across Studies 1-3, 
the instrument was pre-screened, and then assessed through EFA and CFA, showing 
good psychometric properties. Together, the moral self-improvement and self-defence 
scales form the moral self-regulation inventory, which represents a new methodological 
tool available to scholars who wish to further research on the response to virtue or test 
whether their stimuli or intervention materials have the desirable effect, that is, inspire 
self-improvement and not trigger strong self-defence. 
Independence of Moral Comparison and Self-Regulation Measures 
Another contribution of the present research is the assessment of moral 
comparison and moral self-regulation as conceptually independent measures. A large 
portion of the literature on social comparison is based on the rank-order paradigm 
(Gerber, 2018), which tends to conflate them by measuring the choice of the 
comparison target, which is interpreted as a regulatory mechanism to improve or 
defend the self. 
By contrast, in the present research ability-based moral comparisons were 
measured through the difference between moral evaluations of the agent and the self 




judgments about the goodness and propriety of the deeds (against personal norms or 
beliefs). These measures were completely distinct from (albeit correlated with) the 
measures of moral self-regulation, represented by the new inventory described above. 
The conceptual clarity deriving from distinguishing these measures from each other 
could be claimed to be another strength of the research, further advancing similar 
approaches introduced by Crocker and colleagues (1987), while adapting them to the 
domain of virtue investigated here. 
Causal Inferences 
Although the interpretation of the structural equation models made use of causal 
inference, by no means the four studies that make up this research project were 
intended to provide “definitive proof” of causality. Rather than an output, causality was 
an input to structural equation modelling. Pearl (2012) clearly states that SEM is an 
inference engine that converts causal assumptions, queries, and data into logical 
implications, conditional claims, and data-fitness indices. If the qualitative causal 
assumptions used as input are grounded in theory and/or results from empirical studies 
(Kline, 2016), then “passing these tests does not prove the validity of the causal 
assumptions, but it lends credibility to them” (Bollen & Pearl, 2013, p. 9, emphases 
added). 
It still holds true that the qualitative causal assumptions of a specified model 
remain just a single test away from rejection (Bollen & Pearl, 2013). The three conditions 
traditionally required for causal inference are: a) association (variables must be 
correlated); b) temporal ordering (a cause must unambiguously precede an effect); c) 
isolation (ruling out extraneous variables) (see e.g., Bollen, 1989; Bullock, Harlow, & 
Mulaik, 1994). While the first two conditions are fulfilled in the presence of respectively 




in the present research), providing evidence of the third is more arduous; indeed, it is 
possible that inclusion in the model of an additional variable might reveal that a certain 
association interpreted causally is spurious, and would disappear if only that variable 
were accounted for in the model specification. The condition of perfect isolation is in 
practice an “unobtainable ideal” (Bollen, 1989), but can be replaced by pseudo-isolation, 
which occurs when the error terms of the outcome variables, which summarise all 
omitted determinants, are independent of the predictors. Under this assumption and in 
conjunction with the other fundamental principles of causality, the structural equation 
models that achieved satisfactory fit to the data in the present research cannot be 
denied the role of “contributors” to the determination of “causal and counterfactual 
expressions” (Pearl, 2012) and represent a first step toward further credibility that could 
be achieved thanks to future testing among new samples. 
Directions for Future Research 
The current research project has set foot in the territory of virtue with a self-
regulation perspective which promises plenty of possible further developments. 
Personality Traits 
To begin with, replicating some of the exploratory work conducted in Study 4 has 
the potential to expand the theoretical model, for example adding personality 
predictors of moral comparison and self-regulation, such as humility and narcissism. 
Their analysis in Study 4 was hindered by the low sample size, but appropriately 
powered studies could validate the correlation of humility with upward comparison and 
self-improvement, and of narcissism with downward comparison and self-defence. 
Moral Scenarios 
Beyond the top vignettes of Francia and Nicholas, Study 1 pointed to Ruxandra’s 




would represent a sort of “stress test” for the model. This scenario garnered 
comparatively higher levels of self-defence following poorer judgments of the goodness 
of the deed. This is the same phenomenon that was observed, to a lesser degree, in 
Nicholas’s vignette, suggesting in Study 3 the addition of opinion-based comparisons to 
the model. For Ruxandra’s vignette, it is likely that a larger sample will replicate the 
finding that a considerable portion of the variance of self-defence is explained by the 
low ratings of the goodness of the deed (which subsume opinion-based comparisons), 
with moral discrepancy (which is underpinned by ability-based comparisons) playing a 
more marginal role. Should the model fit be satisfactory and the error negligible, the 
theoretical framework would be further solidified, having been successfully applied to 
three vignettes – depicting decreasing levels of perceived moral goodness – capable of 
explaining differential gradients of moral self-improvement and self-defence.  
Ideally, a wide variety of further moral scenarios could be crafted and tested, 
allowing the systematic manipulation of relevant contextual factors that are 
hypothesised to be implicated in the self-regulation of virtue. Indeed, these situational 
variables are known to interact with individual differences in generating complex 
response patterns. Modelling these patterns in a person-by-situation framework could 
expand even further the remit of the research. 
Trait Measures of Moral Self-Regulation 
The moral self-regulation inventory measures state latent variables. Because during 
human development the ongoing prevalence of certain states ends up consolidating in 
more stable traits, it would be interesting to develop and validate a trait moral self-
regulation inventory that assesses ingrained dispositions to engage in moral self-




effects of systematic moral self-regulatory tendencies on happiness, well-being, self-
actualisation, eudaimonia and hedonia. 
Cross-Cultural Validation 
The moral self-regulation inventory, as well as the full structural models of the self-
regulation of virtue, could also be investigated cross-culturally among non-WEIRD87 
samples, for example testing them in Japan, China, Brazil, South Africa, and so on. 
Particularly interesting would be their validation in more communal and less 
individualistic societies. Communal orientation (Clark et al., 1987) and interdependent 
self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994) were found to be associated88 
with social comparison orientation (which should increase defensive regulation), but 
also with prosocial tendencies (which should stem from moral self-improvement). The 
coexistence of these opposite regulatory forces could lead to suppression effects (which 
could potentially cancel each other out), making this investigation worth undertaking. 
However, it would be important to tightly control demand characteristics in the 
experimental design and carefully model a measure of socially desirable responding, 
since individuals in communal interdependent cultures tend to conform to the assumed 
expectations of the experimenter and the perceived social norm (Buunk & Gibbons, 
2007). 
Manipulation of Motivational Variables 
In the structural models in Studies 2-4, the motivational predictors were treated as 
exogenous traits. To strengthen causal inference, future research could design 
experiments that manipulate those variables, treating them as transient states. The 
 
87 WEIRD is the popular acronym of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic (see Henrich et al., 
2010a, 2010b). 




literature on regulatory focus, regulatory mode, and approach/avoidance provides a 
wealth of related experimental inductions89. As examples of regulatory focus and 
approach/avoidance inductions adapted to the context of moral goodness, participants 
could be assigned the task of writing/typing a memory of when they performed a good 
deed that reflected an ideal enabling them to achieve an important aspiration in their 
life (promotion induction in approach motivation), or a memory of when they 
performed a good deed that reflected a moral duty enabling them to avert a critical 
threat in their life (prevention induction in avoidance motivation). 
Antisocial Behaviour 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the primary form of social behaviour 
investigated in the present research was prosocial behaviour, due to the prevalence of 
positive reactions (moral self-improvement) in response to the moral exemplars 
portrayed in the vignettes. The integration of social behaviour in the theoretical model 
was accomplished in Study 4 through a helping task that tested the prosocial effects of 
moral self-improvement. Because of the non-conclusive findings, further research will 
have to clarify this link. 
An additional area of investigation could measure possible relationships between 
moral self-defence and antisocial behaviour, not covered in the present research. 
Despite the scarcity of specific evidence, the literature has examined associations 
between defence mechanisms and antisocial personality (see e.g., Bowins, 2004; Bryhn 
Nørbech et al., 2013; Presniak et al., 2010; Vaillant, 1994), the link between self-threat 
and antisocial personality and behaviour (see e.g., Aquino & Douglas, 2003; Kumari et 
 
89 For regulatory focus see e.g., Freitas et al., 2002; Higgins et al., 1994; Higgins et al., 2001; for regulatory 
mode see e.g., Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Komissarouk et al., 2018; Mannetti et al., 2009; for 




al., 2009; McGregor et al., 2009), and the links between moral disengagement (and its 
predictors and moderators) and antisocial behaviour (see e.g., Caprara et al., 2014; 
Hardy et al., 2015; Hyde et al., 2010). This body of research could inform hypotheses 
about the possible relationship between moral self-defence and antisocial behaviour, 
provided a valid measure of moral self-defence is warranted to assess self-shielding 
reactions to moral goodness in a “morally minimal” control condition, and a specific task 
is devised to measure antisocial behaviour (for example a cheating task, see e.g., 
Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Mazar et al., 2008). Should no consistent relationship 
emerge, future research could examine at least to what extent moral self-defence 
hampers prosocial behaviour. 
Neurophysiological Measures 
Future research on the self-regulation of virtue could also include some 
neurophysiological measures, extending the methodological horizon beyond self-
reports. In the literature on moral elevation, the study by Piper, Saslow, and Saturn 
(2015) stands out as one of the few in which the researchers attempted measurements 
of heart rate (HR), respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), and medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC) activity. What they found is that, during elevation, HR and RSA increased, 
indicative respectively of sympathetic and autonomic activation. These functions are 
recruited simultaneously in a narrow range of situations, typically when both arousal 
and social engagement are required; they also found increased mPFC activity, which is 
often measured at the emergence of the emotions of compassion (see e.g., Immordino-
Yang et al., 2009) and awe (see e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Given the similarity of the 
stimulus content used for the study by Piper et al. (2015) and Study 4, as well as the 




improvement, a similar neurophysiological response pattern should be expected for 
moral self-improvement elicited by stories of moral goodness. 
At a first glance, it might appear that another theoretical framework could provide 
physiological measures useful to expand the methodological remit of the current 
research: the biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat (BPS; Blascovich, 2008; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). The model links specific psychological states with patterns 
of physiological responses in situations of social facilitation, or in other words, when the 
presence of others (co-actors, observers, etc.) induces effects of performance 
enhancement and impairment, which are triggered by the interplay of affective and 
cognitive processes (Blascovich et al., 1999). In the BPS model, challenge and threat are 
conceptualised as person-situation motivational states: challenge occurs when the 
perceived availability of resources meets or exceeds the perceived situational demands, 
and vice versa for threat, when demands exceed resources (Seery, 2013). A perceived 
challenge in a self-relevant domain causes the heart to pump more blood while arteries 
are more dilated, which translates into measures of high cardiac output (CO) and low 
total peripheral resistance (TPR); by contrast, a perceived threat in a self-relevant 
domain causes the heart to pump less blood as the arteries constrict (low CO and high 
TPR). It is important to highlight that, according to the model, excess of or lack of 
resources in relation to situational demands represent evaluations that occur mainly at 
an implicit level, outside of conscious awareness, and are constantly updated (Quigley et 
al., 2002). 
It might appear that the BPS notions of challenge and threat could roughly 
correspond conceptually to what in the present research was referred to as 
“opportunity” and “threat” to the self. However, despite similarities in collateral aspects 




of the two models. An opportunity to improve as a person does not imply evaluations 
that resources exceed demands, but rather a tension toward an ideal moral aspiration, 
whatever the personal resources available at the moment (even if currently insufficient, 
one might believe that, as a result of improving, additional resources will become 
available in the future); a threat to one’s moral standing does not imply evaluations that 
demands exceed resources, but rather the perception of an attack to cherished self-
views, independent of the defensive armoury of resources currently available to the self 
(an attack to moral self-beliefs is unpleasant regardless of the comparative moral stature 
attributed to self and other). Furthermore, the BPS applies to a performance context 
(Seery, 2013), which is not directly applicable to the moral domain. 
Another related theory that links conceptual neurophysiological systems to specific 
psychological functions is Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST). In its revised 
formulation (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), RST defines three brain-behaviour systems: 1) 
the behavioural approach system (BAS), a system that motivates approach toward all 
appetitive stimuli (Pickering & Smillie, 2008); 2) the fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS), an 
avoidance mediator of all aversive stimuli90 (Smillie et al., 2011); 3) the behavioural 
inhibition system (BAS), a goal-conflict resolver, for instance in the simultaneous 
presence of BAS-approach and FFFS-avoidance (Pickering & Corr, 2008). The BAS is 
related to desire (approach), the FFFS to fear (defensive avoidance), and the BIS to 
anxiety (defensive approach). Initially, RST was proposed as a state theory, but soon 
after it was suggested that the functioning of the three neurobiological systems could 
manifest themselves as stable dispositions (Corr & McNaughton, 2008), thus making RST 
 
90 The FFFS elicits defensive attack (fight) in the presence of proximal threats, and flight and freeze concern 
responses to distal threats, depending respectively upon the availability and unavailability of escape (Smillie 




a biological theory of personality in its own right (Corr, 2015). The possibility to use 
neuroimaging techniques (e.g., fMRI) for these neurophysiological measures of 
approach and avoidance motives opens new opportunities to complement self-reports 
with other indicators. However, the complexity of the interpretation of these 
measurements should not be underestimated, since the three neurobiological systems 
are widely distributed, each of them mapping onto multiple brain organs91. Another 
issue related to this kind of neuroimaging studies is the availability and cost of large 
samples required to embed them into wider structural models; a practical solution could 
be to design studies that isolate smaller portions of the wider moral self-regulation 
model, so that adequately powered research can be conducted in the laboratory among 
reasonably achievable samples. 
Recommended Priorities 
Of all the possible directions examined above for future research, two seem to be 
critical: first, expanding the analysis by investigating a wider repertoire of moral actions, 
for example testing Ruxandra’s vignette or other vignettes expected to generate a 
sizeable amount of less positive reactions; second, validating the measurement and 
structural models among non-WEIRD samples. It must be added that cross-cultural 
validation would also assume the integration of a measure of social desirability, 
modelling it based on the results of the exploratory analysis conducted in Study 4. These 
integrations would ensure coverage of a wider set of situational variables as well as 
invariance across cultures, improving the theory generalisability. 
Practical Implications 
 




Beyond its theoretical contributions to the literature in moral psychology and 
adjacent disciplines, the current research provides insights that could be useful for the 
design and implementation of various kinds of interventions aimed at maximising the 
benefits of moral self-improvement and minimising the drawbacks of self-defence. 
Although beyond the scope of the present endeavour, a few examples will be briefly 
discussed in the next paragraphs to elucidate the practical implications of the research; 
the focus will be primarily on the collective rather than the individual level, thanks to the 
potential wide-ranging benefits of related interventions and policies. 
Amplifying the Upsides of Moral Self-Improvement 
In the Media. Stories and exemplars of human goodness do appear in the present 
media landscape, but the news is often said to be burdened by overwhelmingly negative 
information, presumably due to the endemic “negativity bias” (Rozin & Royzman, 2001), 
which makes people naturally attend more closely to negative than positive information. 
In this context, expanding the presence of positive moral stories in the mass and social 
media would inspire uplifting prosocial responses among the audiences, as evidenced by 
this research project. This is precisely the mission of organisations such as Greater Good 
and research centres such as The Greater Good Science Center at the University of 
California, Berkeley92. 
Moral Education. Exemplars of human virtue could also be viewed as part of a 
moral education journey that could potentially inform revised curricula across a variety 
of developmental stages and disciplines. This could be done by using dialogical and 
critical engagement techniques (see Hart et al., 2019) while framing inspiring moral 
stories of praiseworthy heroes and heroines in a narrative biographical form in primary 
 





and secondary schools for children and adolescents (e.g., in the study of history, 
philosophy, but also the sciences), or in more sophisticated forms in academic 
institutions and other organisations for adults (e.g., in undergraduate and graduate 
modules, courses and training sessions for entrepreneurs, social workers, medical staff, 
civil servants, etc.). If execution and delivery of these programmes are accurately 
designed for the respective audiences, their potential to positively affect all aspects of 
social, political, and economic life should not be underestimated.  
These new strategies differ from traditional approaches to moral education limited 
to the presentation and discussion of moral dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1981). These are useful 
to improve moral reasoning and judgment about right behaviour, but remain silent 
about other aspects of morality, such as empathy, moral motives, moral affect, which 
are more conducive to building positive character traits (Han, 2019). Indeed, wise moral 
judgment could remain idle if not accompanied by character strengths that help 
translate sound moral reasoning into actual moral behaviour (Bebeau, 2002). It is 
precisely for this reason that character traits are becoming increasingly central to a new 
moral education paradigm that goes beyond rational rule-based ethics and emphasises 
motivation and virtue as essential means toward the good life and human flourishing 
(Han, 2015). 
Containing the Downsides of Moral Self-Defence 
The results of the present research also provide hints to devise actionable 
interventions capable of reducing the negative effects of moral self-defence. The related 
theoretical framework is offered by self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), which 
proposes that people can put aside their need to deflect self-threats by affirming the self 
in another domain, unrelated to the one under threat and at the same time central to 




mechanism, self-affirmations function as part of a “psychological immune system” 
(Gilbert et al., 1998) and promote more effective social adaptation: by shifting attention 
towards a different domain, individuals see the larger context of who they are, 
refocusing on the values by which they holistically define themselves as worthy 
(Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Self-affirmation interventions have the potential to counter 
the need to activate defensive strategies that in the long run end up compromising the 
person’s ability to cultivate and nurture constructive social relations (Sedikides, 2009; 
Sedikides & Luke, 2007). 
Self-affirmations can be induced for instance by asking individuals to write/type, 
reflect, and engage in a task evocative of a value that is personally relevant to them. 
There is substantial empirical evidence (for a research review, see e.g., Sherman & 
Hartson, 2011) that these procedures generate the effect of boosting global self-
resources, reducing defensive mechanisms. Although they have not been extensively 
employed in the context of moral self-threats, it is plausible to assume that they can be 
effective in mitigating the pitfalls of moral self-enhancement and self-protection. 
At a collective level, these interventions could become part of moral education 
programmes. They could be particularly important for individuals who, due to the kind 
of socialisation that they were exposed to during their childhood, have developed 
ingrained dispositions to defensive regulation. Self-affirmations could help sustain their 
sense of self-worth by leveraging cherished values and experiences, limiting the 
maladaptive potential inherent in self-serving defensive mechanisms. 
A Closing Note 
Putting the self at the centre of an investigation of the response to others’ virtuous 
actions and explaining moral self-regulation in terms of how the self negotiates its 




provide evidence that virtue can be a double-edged sword. The findings shed new light 
on why most people feel uplifted and inspired to better themselves (moral self-
improvement), but others feel resented, derogate the moral agents, and minimise or 
deny the goodness of their actions (moral self-defence). Empirical testing across a series 
of studies led to the consolidation of a new instrument (the moral self-regulation 
inventory) to measure the two above-mentioned self-regulatory modes, and new 
structural models that identify the nomological network of critical predictors and 
behavioural consequences. Analysis of the moral typologies through latent profile 
modelling provided an additional person-centred view at various levels of the models; 
the associations across the motivational, comparison, and self-regulatory types mirrored 
the relational pathways obtained through structural equation modelling, reinforcing the 
robustness of the findings. 
The self-regulatory profiles indirectly showed the relative size of the positive versus 
negative responses to acts of human virtue. Although they speak to the bittersweet 
nature of the human response to moral goodness, they also revealed the strong 
prevalence of the sweet side, thanks to the widely predominant positive reactions 
experienced by participants. Theoretical/methodological advances and promising new 
directions for research were discussed alongside limitations in the interpretation of the 
findings; further, practical guidelines for possible strategies in education and media 
policies have been suggested for the maximisation of the benefits of moral self-
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3. The two Study 4 vignettes: 
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